COIN Research Report
This research critically reexamines the 2005 Tal Afar operation and its subsequent influence on U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, challenging the dominant population-centric narrative that emerged from this pivotal case. While the operation led by COL HR McMaster has been widely celebrated as a model of innovative, population-focused counterinsurgency, this study argues that the actual mechanisms of success have been systematically misrepresented in subsequent doctrine and policy discourse. Through detailed analysis of this critical case, the report identifies and deconstructs four pervasive myths in modern COIN theory: (1) the overestimation of reconstruction spending as a violence-reduction mechanism, (2) the undervaluation of firepower and conventional combat operations in establishing security, (3) the exaggeration of collateral damage’s impact on long-term outcomes, and (4) the premature emphasis on tribal engagement before kinetic clearing operations.