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States, Societies & Security in the 21st Century: Third Annual West Point Social Sciences Seminar

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In Partnership with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy, Brussels School of Governance; the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College; the Modeling Emergent Social Order Lab at the Ohio State University; and the Polish Institute of International Affairs

This seminar emerges – by design – from a collaboration between policy professionals, academics, and military leaders. It represents 13 topic-driven, transdisciplinary working groups, assembled from across professions, geographies, and nationalities. We hope these ongoing working groups will continue to be a resource for national and international leaders seeking to better understand critical economic, political, social, and technological questions at the heart of strategy.

This report captures the work of over 200 professionals seeking to support and inform the joint, interagency, and multinational policy community at a time of significant uncertainty in the international system.

This is the third of what we hope will be many more reports. The first report supported the initial drafting of the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept by Secretary General Stoltenberg's Policy Planning Unit, led by Dr. Benedetta Berti, to whom we are immensely grateful for inspiring these working groups. We are also grateful for contributions of the late, great, Bear Braumoeller, whose mentorship and support helped bring about this seminar to.

We hope the report challenges and informs its readers, and we remain at their disposal to continue challenging and informing.

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

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INTRODUCTION

Research, Learning, and Policy: A Transdisciplinary Approach

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ABSTRACT

How can higher education leaders help to connect scholarship with policy and practice? Both academics and practitioners call for collaboration, yet achieving the ideal outcome of mutually beneficial partnership is difficult. We offer a framework to achieve these collaborative goals with transdisciplinary research and practice: going beyond multi- and interdisciplinary research to address broad societal problems that are not constrained by traditional disciplinary boundaries.

We address this question by attempting to build transdisciplinary bridges between research and policy since 2022. This essay focuses on our initial observations and their implications for participants after three years of work. We find that transdisciplinary research is more than just bringing people together – it requires systematic engagement and appreciation for the uniqueness of academic disciplines and policy specializations. Transdisciplinarity depends, in fact, on disciplinarity. Our initial experiences point to three rules of thumb for integrating research and policy in a transdisciplinary framework: first, transdisciplinarity must be grounded in critical policy questions that in turn drive engagement across academic disciplines. Second, engagement must be habitual, continual, iterative, and centered around problem-solving. Finally, such collaboration should produce written output that is accessible to the public both in peer-reviewed and other popularly consumed outlets.

"*Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back*"

—John Maynard Keynes

Academics and policy practitioners have long recognized shared goals and ambitions regarding producing impactful research. For scholars, the goal of impactful scholarship is at the core of nearly all faculty models in higher education and a requirement for professional advancement. For practitioners, advancing policy interests to achieve a particular outcome guides their behavior. In political science and economics, behavioral observations and knowledge produced in research at universities across the country inform decision-makers about all types of policy choices they may face. Given the natural topical overlap, it might seem obvious that collaboration would occur organically. It does not: practitioners at the highest levels continue to seek greater interaction and collaboration with academics (Executive Office of the President of the United States 2024), and scholars continue to work hard at being relevant to the policymakers that control the levers of government (Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Del Rosso 2015; Desch 2019; Tama et al. 2023; Barma and Goldgeier 2022). In this paper, we explore reasons for a perceived gap and note our attempts to close it by organizing a recurring seminar and topical working groups over the last three years.

We aim to ensure that intellectual influence flows both from practitioners to academics, *and* from academics to practitioners. We also aim to ensure that practitioners "in authority" are not "distilling frenzies from an academic scribbler" whose name they have forgotten, but rather continuously updating frameworks based on steady engagement with academics who apply rigorous research design principles to address questions of societal importance.

Practitioner Calls for Collaboration

US President Joe Biden's administration argued in its 2024 "Blueprint for the Use of Social and Behavioral Science to Advance Evidence-Based Policymaking" that "[s]uccessfully leveraging social and behavioral science allows the federal government to produce more efficient and effective efforts with more positive, meaningful, and equitable outcomes for all individuals. The failure to understand and address the social and behavioral dimensions of issues reduces effectiveness of policies, programs, and outcomes for the American public and risks unintended consequences. Without the effective integration of social and behavioral science, federal policies and programs simply cannot achieve their intended outcomes (Executive Office of the President of the United States 2024, 8)." The blueprint offers a framework and recommendations for success in this endeavor. It involves a six-step, cyclical process: identifying opportunity areas, considering social and behavioral insights, synthesizing evidence to identify best practices, identifying actionable steps and policy mechanisms, implementing and disseminating findings, and reflecting on and revising conclusions.

Operationalizing this framework has been a challenge to scholars and policymakers alike. We seek to overcome that challenge in our annual social sciences seminar (Becker and Woodaz 2023) by providing "good offices" and practical leadership to create opportunities for engagement and shared consideration between scholars and practitioners, who synthesize their work into research-based policy recommendations disseminated in both peer-reviewed journals and in more popular and policy-focused outlets.[1]

[1] We deliver this this synthesis to policy partners in the form of a special report (Becker and Woodaz 2023), publish essays in peer-reviewed journals like *International Affairs* (Person, Kulalic, and Mayle 2024) and *Defence Studies* (Becker, Duda, and Lute 2022; Becker, Woodaz, and Anderson 2024), and in popular outlets like *War on the Rocks* (Becker, Lute, and Smith 2022) and as *Centre for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy Policy Briefs* (Thew et al. 2023a; Thew et al. 2023b; Thew et al. 2023c; Andrzejczak et al. 2023)

The Biden administration blueprint also offers five "recommendations to enable the use of social and behavioral science in policymaking:" evidence building in collaboration with entities outside of government; open collaboration leading to meaningful engagement; reducing barriers to such collaboration; funding support; and mandating social science-informed strategies (Executive Office of the President of the United States 2024, 19). Though far from a mandate, our conference initiates opportunities to systematically collaborate, as our working groups involve personal partnerships between researchers and policymakers. We support meaningful engagement through open collaboration and reduce barriers by providing a simple platform for live and virtual collaboration across disciplines and professions.

Academic Calls for Collaboration

Academics worry about relevance. Scholars would like to influence policy, but the path to success as an academic often requires methodologies and technologies that render research indecipherable to a policy audience, let alone the wider public. The apogee of this anxiety is Desch's (2019) description of academia as a "cult of the irrelevant," admonishing scholars and the institutions they have built to incentivize problem-driven, policy-relevant research that focuses on the needs of policymakers. While Desch puts the onus on academics to adapt to policy needs, we take an approach closer to Freedman's (2019), which contends that scholars can find professional and personal fulfillment working on either or both narrow theorizing and hypothesis testing and on hard substantive problems. The key for Freedman is trying to make findings widely accessible, not steering the types of research being done.

The issue is of such importance to social scientists that philanthropic organizations and leading academics have joined to address it. Recent developments, particularly the increasing number of accessible outlets focusing on "bridging the gap" between research and policy, mean that scholars can pursue *both* highly rigorous approaches to research design and methodology while engaging with the public and policy communities (Farrell and Knight 2019).

Carnegie's "Bridging the Gap" initiative, for example, aims to "advance institutional change and introduce policy-relevant ideas, reforms and research to help solve problems across disciplines and around the world (Carroll 2023, 5)." Academics have not hesitated to take up this challenge. Jentleson and Ratner (2011, 6) identified three drivers of the gap to be bridged: the dominant incentive structure in academia, which values policy relevance less than theoretical and technical acumen; the role think tanks play in communicating research to policymakers; and a lack of interest in the policy community in academic research. They in turn recommend increasing incentives for policy-relevant research, more "programmatic and project-based connectivity," and more opportunities for academics to operate in the world of policy.

Collaboration between the Carnegie Foundation and academics has yielded both practical advances, such as support for the *Monkey Cage* and its successor *Good Authority* (Sides 2023). Scholars have also studied and reported on such collaborations, including valuable lessons learned. Particularly notable are Barma and Goldgeier's (2022, 1767) "four I's": 1) *Influence* (taking a long-term view, focusing on rigorous research, and exercising influence if and when opportunities arise), 2) *Interlocutors* (building relationships over time with mid-level policy professionals, but also civil society and private sector actors); 3) *Integrity* (avoiding "lab leaks (Musgrave 2024)" of incomplete findings that policymakers seize upon for pet projects or "the illusion of inclusion (Shapiro 2014)," wherein policymakers meet with scholars to place academic sheen on preferred policies; and 4) *Inclusion* of a wide range of perspectives within the scholarly community, in particular the global South and other underrepresented perspectives (Acharya 2023).

Our approach focuses on the notion of rigor *as* relevance (Frieden and Lake 2005), rather than framing the two as competing approaches with chance overlaps. Rather than focus our efforts on any predetermined set of outputs for practitioners or academics, we invite both to bring current work to the seminar to present alongside one another as peers. We ensure cross-pollination in the construction of our working groups but rely on organic input from interested parties rather than playing matchmaker between scholars and practitioners. What every participant can expect is that their work will be held to a high standard and their research design will be subject to critique from disciplinary experts for suitability to answer their question or problem.

Why is this difficult?

If governmental, civil society, private sector, and academic actors all desire more and better interactions, and have carefully considered obstacles to such interactions, along with best practices for circumventing those obstacles, why does it remain difficult to bridge the research-policy gap?

We argue that two key mechanisms remain elusive: first, there is no real "neutral ground" on which academics and practitioners can collaborate, learn one another's languages, and develop a common lexicon. Brief stints in academia or in graduate programs for policy professionals, or internships in government agencies for scholars are valuable, but hard to scale and idiosyncratic in terms of experience gained. Second, the challenges of incentives remain while in theory rigor and relevance should be complementary and not substitutes, the rewards to be reaped for policy writing – for early career academics in particular – may not be worth the opportunity costs and risks.

For academics, the coin of the realm is peer-reviewed publications. Meaningful scholarship, validated by peers through a blind review process, leads to career advancement and additional funding to conduct meaningful scholarship. As such, academics are primed to focus on producing high-impact research that must go through a cumbersome and long vetting process that can take months if not years to complete. While scholars (Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Barma and Goldgeier 2022) have acknowledged these challenges and prescribed solutions, "tenure and promotion standards continue to place limited weight on public engagement, political attacks on experts have raised new barriers to bridging, and social media often serve as sites of discrimination and harassment (Tama et al. 2023)." Scholars and practitioners need a neutral venue to engage with one another, free from harassment, with opportunities to participate in rigorous scholarship and public engagement simultaneously. So, while there might not be an abstract neutral ground for the sides to meet, there is at least one physical neutral ground: military service academies positioned at the intersection of academia and the policy world. Such a venue is a necessary but not sufficient condition for transdisciplinary collaboration between scholars and practitioners: the annual Social Science Seminar is a place to convene and a conduit enabling people who may not otherwise interact in their day-to-day professional lives to collaborate systematically.

Practitioners aim to make smart choices about options to resolve real-world problems as quickly as possible. They operate on timelines, whereas appointed or elected officials may only hold jobs at the federal level for two years. This means transitioning to work outside the government to making major decisions about the US (or other countries they represent) in a time horizon of at most months.

Without ongoing engagement with research and scholars, risks associated with "lab leaks" and illusions of inclusion are high. Just as the US Special Operations Command reminds that "Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur (Collins 1987)," scholar and practitioner collaboration is less effective in the wake of a crisis. Collaboration must be habitual, consistent, and problem-oriented, mindful of fundamental research and academic rigor.

Two difficult-to-reconcile discrepancies emerge from the description above. The first is time horizons. Academics move in terms of years practitioners operate more day-to-day. Accelerating academics or motivating practitioners to invest in longer time horizons runs counter to the incentive structures of each. Academics will never compromise rigor, and practitioners will never allow the perfection to be the enemy of the "good enough."

The less obvious but related discrepancy between academics and practitioners is the evidence needed before making a policy change. For academic social scientists following the causal inference revolution (The Committee for the Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2021), proving causation is a rigorous high bar to clear, making peer review difficult for empirical papers studying topics that bar randomization of treatments. The practitioner must often make decisions with only observational data, anguish over cause and effect often comes across as doubt, and decision-makers will opt to follow inclined to more confident advisors even those who are less well-informed.

How to start fixing these problems?

There have been many calls to resolve the challenges above from both sides. Some scholars have called for more professional credit for making policy recommendations and having policy impact in career trajectories (Carroll 2023). For the practitioner, greater funding to academic researchers should then mean the academics get a seat at the table and provide intellectual capital to the funding entity (Executive Office of the President of the United States 2024). While these are discrete actions to try to change incentives for both sides, neither resolves the fundamental issues mentioned above. Time horizons are not shifted in this paradigm. Tenure and policymaking clocks are not synchronized. Moreover, changing the behaviors of each actor requires personal investment and a leap of faith that the behavior change will be rewarded.

We argue that focusing on one actor's prescriptive goals papers over the discrepancies that make bridging the gap difficult. What is needed is a paradigm shift by both actors to come to a shared understanding of value outside of their respective career ecosystems. This change is not easy and comes with new challenges, which we will discuss in the upcoming sections. However, there is a paradigm in which collaboration becomes easier, recurring, and impactful. That framework is transdisciplinarity, which we define and discuss in the remainder of the paper.

We also provide two practical suggestions to overcome, circumvent, or remove the two key remaining obstacles noted above: the lack of truly neutral ground on which to collaborate, and the risks and opportunity costs of policy engagement, particularly for junior scholars. For the first, we offer a physical, intellectual, and virtual venue for scholars to engage with policymakers, private sector, and wider societal actors on equal terms: a multidisciplinary academic conference with policy and private sector partners, focused on producing policy-relevant outputs. Beyond the conference, working groups operate continuously through a process of writing, critiquing, and revising work for an audience of policy partners.

To address the second challenge (risks and opportunity costs), scholars deliver academic papers at the conference as they would in their normal academic routine, only the audience includes non-academics, and chairs and discussants are challenged to team with rapporteurs to write policy-focused essays, supported by peer-reviewed journals like *Defence Studies* and *International Affairs*. With the same muscle movement, scholars can *both* push forward their academic research agendas *and* engage with policy. Both suggestions operate within the framework of transdisciplinarity, to which we now turn.

What is transdisciplinary research?

A general need for interdisciplinarity has been recognized by scholars for at least 30 years, and, according to some, for much longer – dating to Plato (Klein 1990, 19). More recently, there has been a trend to actively seek interdisciplinary (Lattuca 2001) and transdisciplinary (Lawrence et al. 2022) research. In this transdisciplinarity paradigm, the goal is shared outcomes for all participants. In other words, the parochial interests of academics or practitioners are secondary to the primary goal of "getting right" meaningful policy decisions. In the case of national security, for example, this means agreeing that all the actors are working towards a sound national defense as well as protecting the lives of a country's citizens. How to go about doing that requires a shared understanding between people living a decision in the moment and scholars who have studied related problems for their whole professional lives. Recognizing the primacy of shared interests, rather than incentivizing the particularities of careers within academic or practitioner time horizons, is the substantive leap that makes transdisciplinarity a different framework and one that could enable a bridge to be built across the gap that has been discussed for well over a decade.

What does our attempt at transdisciplinarity look like?

As West Point faculty, we are both disciplinary experts and federal employees. Our mission is to teach, develop, and inspire emerging leaders in the U.S. Army so that they can defend the US. At the same time, we are expected to be dependable sources of intellectual capital for national leaders. Because we are a department of social sciences, the practice of social science is at the center of how we conduct our mission: through the practice of social science, we engage in systematic, rigorous, and critical thought with our students, with our policy partners, and with other academics. The benefits to be gained by each, from each, and with each are readily apparent in our daily activities. To maximize those benefits, we must pursue excellence in disciplinary expertise while also acquiring practical policy expertise.

Because we are positioned outside conventional silos, we routinely bring together individuals who otherwise would not cross paths. This often takes the form of decision-makers and scholars discussing policy with undergraduates so cadets can employ different ways to view problems and resolve them in the complex environments in which they will surely operate. While we do this in the classroom, individual lectures can only go so far in serving the development of cadets and junior military personnel. Learning from past experience is necessary, but more is needed to tackle the problems of today. While seeking to avoid the cult of irrelevance, we began hosting a seminar for a particular policy client of interest – initially for NATO's Policy Planning Unit as they drafted the Alliance's 2022 Strategic Concept (NATO 2022; Berti 2022; Becker, Duda, and Lute 2022). Since then, we have watched transdisciplinary work occur and grow in scope by regularly convening all the relevant and adding new policy partners each year, ranging from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy to the UK Ministry of Defence's Defence Economics Section. We have also enabled people at all stages of their careers, from undergraduates to flag officers and ambassadors, to work on national security challenges, grounding their work in rigorous social science as well as policy experience.

The Transdisciplinarity of National Security

Security is an inherently interdisciplinary field organized around a broad subject area and necessarily crosses disciplines – most obviously international relations, American politics, history, and comparative politics. But there is also a clear overlap between economics and sociology, and students of security studies are also often interested in strategy, organizational and political psychology, computing, and the STEM fields that underlie

the technologies of conflict (Fomin et al. 2021). Moreover, security studies scholars may also be interested in transdisciplinarity – that is, going beyond interdisciplinary research to address broad societal problems (like war and peace) in a way that transcends, rather than merely crosses, disciplinary boundaries. Perhaps God really did "give physics the easy problems (Bernstein et al., 2000)."

Perhaps more than in most fields, students of security seek insights specifically to inform policy. While many research questions lend themselves to testing discrete hypotheses, the broader security policy questions that research feeds quickly become very complex. Strategy is almost by its nature an open system without verifiable "ends (Driver et al. 2022);" most security studies questions are, essentially, wicked problems that defy solutions and, instead, require multiple resolutions. These resolutions are never permanent, so strategists and security studies scholars find themselves observing and managing multiple dynamic equilibria.

This situation may be part of the reason that integration of – for example – history and political science has long been an object of interest for students of international security (Gavin 2024; Cappella Zielinski et al. 2023). While distinctions between the seeking of causal relationships and broad patterns as opposed to seeking understanding through rich detail (Schroeder 1997), or narrative and theory (Elman and Elman 1997), "differences between the two disciplines are not fixed but instead vary over time as a function of trends within each, which further complicates any comparison (Levy 1997, 23)." As social scientists whose work addresses national security, our task is perhaps lighter than that of scholars seeking transdisciplinary engagements across more distant fields. However, we continue to struggle mightily.

One significant advantage West Point's Department of Social Sciences has in the quest for transdisciplinarity is our integration of Economics and Political Science in a single department. Particularly as defense industrial policy and challenges of human capital transcend not just academia and policy but also geography, the fundamentally "integrated" modes of social scientific inquiry that are emerging among methodologists (Jacobs and Humphreys 2024) and the physical and professional integration of political scientists and economists at West Point are fortuitously complementary. In 2024, for example, we partnered with the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Office of Global Investment and Economic Security to provide insights from scholarship on the economics of alliances, defense industrial policy, and the subfields of defense economics and political economy of security. All these insights emerged from panels that included political scientists and economists who are here housed in the same department.

For the last three years, we have brought policymakers and academics together in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point to address pressing policy challenges. Some of these challenges have been identified by the policymakers themselves, while others have been identified by scholars. This two-way flow of ideas is central to our model.

To probe our questions about the transdisciplinary integration of research, teaching, and policy, we found it useful to evaluate our own, sometimes unwitting, attempts at doing just that through key characteristics of transdisciplinarity identified by Lawrence et al (2022, 47). First, we have sought "to focus on the theoretical unity of knowledge, [to] transcend disciplinary boundaries (2022, 47)." In 2022, we addressed a set of questions that NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's staff grappled with as they prepared the alliance's first new Strategic Concept in 12 years, a major policy effort (NATO 2022; Berti 2022). Each essay in the public-facing written output of this seminar (Becker, Duda, and Lute 2022) was authored by at least one academic and one practitioner,[2] and several were authored by a broader set of contributors, particularly non-anglophone historians and social scientists (Kim et al. 2022; Herold, Schmitt, and Sloan 2022).

[2] See, for example, the 2022 Special Section of *Defence Studies* introduced by two active-duty Army officers and a former US Ambassador to NATO (Becker, Duda, and Lute 2022): https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/fdef20/collections/New-Nato-

In 2023, our topic (international order and ordering) was broader, and we sought to further transcend disciplinary boundaries by connecting political scientists, economists, historians, linguists, legal scholars, and philosophers – again also seeking to transcend geographic boundaries. We also had a broader charge: whereas in 2022, we had been asked to help NATO's Secretary General with the initial draft of the alliance's new Strategic Concept, in 2023, the Office of the (US) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for our help in preparing for the transition between the outgoing Chairman (US Army General Mark Milley) and the incoming Chairman (US Air Force General C.Q. Brown). To do this, we more than doubled the size of our hybrid event, with 24 panels falling under the broad title of "Order, Counter-Order, Disorder? Regional and Global Security Orders in the Shadow of Sino-American Competition (Becker and Woodaz 2023)," and aimed at helping the US Joint Staff and wider interagency community navigate a shifting international order with support from academics who study such shifts from various disciplinary perspectives.

In so doing, we also believe that we have included multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary academic research – developing useful policy insights by combining, for example, insights on linguistics, computational methods, and historiography. The extent to which we were successful will become more visible as we continue to develop our program and processes. However, an example of this in the 2023 seminar is a panel on which political scientist Bear Braumoeller and historian Beatrice Heuser collaborated to lead. Discussing papers by military and civilian researchers using methodologies ranging from process tracing to computational social science, this particular panel produced a useful paper that drew on the breadth of disciplines represented, along with the policy experience of its authors (Kelly and Rosol 2023).

We have been especially focused on the "involvement of non-academic societal actors as process participants (Lawrence et al. 2022, 47)." Such actors were involved in each seminar from 2022 to 2024 from top to bottom – and systematically engaged with the research process and with academics. In 2022, each research team focused on a "specific, complex, societally relevant, real-world problem (Lawrence et al. 2022, 47)" outlined in concert with the NATO policy planning team (Berti 2022). The keynote address for the seminar came from the key recipient of our research outputs – NATO's Head of Policy Planning in 2022, the Director of the (US) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Chairman's Action Group in 2023, and the Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2024. Their important questions and thoughts shaped not how the panelists' papers were researched, but how the chairs and discussants thought about synthesizing and connecting that research to broader theoretical and policy questions. Like the 2022 edition of the seminar (Driver et al. 2022; Magula, Rouland, and Zwack 2022; Gottemoeller et al. 2022; Frizzelle, Garey, and Kulalic 2022; McGerty et al. 2022; Bell et al. 2022; Webber et al. 2022), the 2023 edition (Becker and Woodaz 2023) featured scholar-practitioner collaboration throughout, with each panel featuring some mix of academic and non-academic actors. The 2023 seminar comprised 16 Working Groups, each dedicated to a strategic challenge to international order and ordering. The 2024 seminar grew to over 60 panels distributed across 13 Working Groups. We think this growth has increased the scope of collaboration, and the research outputs should reflect that intellectual and professional diversity.

Finally, we aim to improve the human condition, while "consciously contemplating the broader context (Lawrence et al. 2022, 47)." Our working groups continue collaborating to offer policy officials research insights and will reconvene in February 2025. While our contributions are relatively minor, we are convinced that our process and actions are consistent with a transdisciplinary ethos, aiming to inform policymakers and develop and focus research through real-world engagement.

Strategic-Concept, and the 2023 Special Section of *Defence Studies* introduced by two active-duty Army officers and Palantir Technologies' Senior Vice President of Federal & National Security (Becker, Woodaz, and Anderson 2024): https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/fdef20/collections/research-symposium-on-challenges.

Thinking about the future of interdisciplinary research, strategy, and policy

We have the beginning of national security transdisciplinarity at the Social Science Seminar at West Point. Yet, we are far from convinced that we have achieved the transdisciplinary ideal or even an ideal for policy-relevant national security research. Transdisciplinarity is more than "simply a matter of gathering the various actors figuratively 'around the table' to openly discuss the issue, expecting that this mere act will give rise to the new, robust insights or pathways forward that are being sought (Lawrence et al. 2022, 59)."

We do have three small suggestions for ourselves and for colleagues seeking effective collaborations that are complementary to their work within their disciplines – after all, "there is no transdisciplinarity without disciplinarity (Lawrence et al. 2022, 47)." First, we may seek to broaden our horizons of transdisciplinary engagement. We have thus far involved political scientists, linguists, area specialists, legal scholars, philosophers, computer scientists, and strategists. We have begun to expand our team to involve physical scientists – namely engineers working in areas such as arms technology and physicists working in nuclear systems and deterrence. We think these engagements will improve our work both substantively and methodologically.

Second, we should engage in consistent, iterative, and multi-modal (as opposed to only punctual and in-person) collaboration and knowledge production. In some senses, this is already occurring by default because of the year-plus timeline to produce and subject papers to peer-review, including the policy essays that are the hallmark of our seminar. We remain vigilant, however, against the "fallacy of the gathering table (Cappella Zielinski et al. 2023):" transdisciplinary research requires gathering, but gathering alone is not transdisciplinarity. The substantive projects we pursue in this forum extend beyond the act of gathering. Gathering will yield some fruit that cannot be anticipated, so it is good to get lots of people in a room together. However, having a target past convening situates deeper bonds through shared conversations and projects that will advance everyone's interests more than simply meeting at a table for two days.

Third, we are increasing the engagement of both the youngest scholars and practitioners (undergraduate students and West Point cadets), and more senior leaders (ambassadors, flag officers, and senior government officials – both elected and appointed). The advantages of this approach are legion – enabling advanced undergraduates to present their research on panels with top scholars and practitioners, which helps them develop into better scholars and leaders. Connecting senior leaders with academics and practitioners at all stages in their careers to write cogent policy essays grounded in the academic work presented at the seminar habituates each group to work *with* the other rather than simply talking *to* them. Simply broadening the range of participants across several demographic variables enhances the diversity of thought.

Finally, we continue to move toward systematically associating our peer-reviewed academic output with shorter pieces for non-experts, which is important for at least three reasons. First, shorter and more accessible pieces can connect our work with societal actors working on real-world problems. For example, while few policymakers read academic journals, many read *War on the Rocks*. By publishing condensed, policy-focused essays in such outlets, we provide a bridge between policy and scholarship beyond the reports we provide only to select policymakers. We have begun to hold editors' roundtables as part of the seminar, including editors from both peer-reviewed journals (*International Affairs, Defence Studies, Civil Wars Journal, Defence and Peace Economics, European Journal of International Security, Review of International Studies, Texas National Security Review*) and outlets geared to a more popular audience (the *Modern War Institute* at West Point, which also produces our Social Science of War Podcast, *CSDS Policy Briefs*, *War on the Rocks*). We connected both these roundtables with The Harding Project, a Chief of Staff of the Army-sponsored project to encourage professional writing among Soldiers. All working group outputs are published in a compendium through the West Point Press, ensuring that they are part of the historical record and accessible to anyone interested.

The second advantage of pairing peer-reviewed journal articles with shorter and more accessible pieces is that it broadens transdisciplinary engagement within academia – academics sharing substantive interests in policy challenges but working in different academic fields can constructively consider *one another* non-experts: this approach ensures that we communicate clearly and directly across disciplines and supports transdisciplinarity. Having accessible scholarly work provides a bridging tool for undergraduate classes where students may not be able to consume dense peer-reviewed articles but need to understand the intuition behind the analysis in this type of research. This may be extraordinarily challenging for students looking to ascend into the national security space. For example, it would be exceptionally challenging for individual students of integrated deterrence to master academic research across all the disciplines that bear upon the issue or master the diverse peer-reviewed literature across those disciplines. We also facilitate dialogue across academic disciplines by situating public dialogue between academics in diverse fields and non-academics in "popular" outlets.

Finally, non-expert communication helps individual scholars remain grounded in real-world challenges. Communicating with non-academics who are experts in these challenges and working with them regularly helps get practical feedback and facilitates increasing dialogue across disciplines and professions.

Concrete Future Actions

We have created a transdisciplinary space with our annual seminar. However, what we have not done as social scientists is measure the substantive gains that come from the seminar itself. We have not contributed much to operationalizing transdisciplinarity for empirical study (Newman 2023) – but we are willing to be studied and to study ourselves! We aim to support a "dynamic and durable social and behavioral science evidence ecosystem," making use of and synthesizing expertise "both inside and outside federal government (Executive Office of the President of the United States 2024, 23)." True to our backgrounds as military and policy professionals, as well as academics, we suggest doing this along two pathways: first, a process of tinkering or reinforcing success, which military operational language calls exploitation or pursuit. Second, our research backgrounds point us to careful policy analysis – estimating the causal effects of policy changes, which in this case are our actions in creating the annual Social Sciences Seminar.

At present, we are building our processes, reinforcing success, and seeking opportunities to test hypotheses. For example, we might use survey experiments to test the effects of involvement in our seminar on the integration of research insights into policymaking in the various organizations with whom we partner. We could also evaluate the pedagogical effects of the engagement of students in the seminar with pre- and post-evaluations of student research and writing, including control groups of non-participants, although randomization is likely not possible. We may also use our annual gathering and the ongoing working groups that it supports as platforms from which to explore technologies that support collaborative thinking and evaluation of that thinking, namely wargaming.

In short, we have created a usable format and platform for meaningful engagement between policy and research. Further, we have established a space for scholars and practitioners to build lasting relationships based on shared interests and goals. After four years of practice, we aim to implement some policy evaluation techniques, while at the same time broadening and deepening our network of collaborators and intuitively reinforcing the successes that we achieve.

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Chapter 1 – Order, Counterorder, Disorder? Alliances and International Security

Jordan Becker, Erin Lemons, and Mike Rosol

Order, Counter-Order, Disorder?

Alliances, Orders, and the Stability of Instability in International Security

ABSTRACT

What does recent research tell us about the construction, degradation, and reconstruction of international orders? Despite significant attention from international relations and security studies scholars, there remains dissensus about the past and present of international orders and ordering, to say nothing of their futures. In this review essay, we argue that recent work on ordering and its components leads to four major insights: first, complacency is a significant risk to international orders and global stability more broadly – in this context the attention and concern currently devoted to order and stability are salutary. Second, conflict and competition drive ordering, so the current period of such competition presents both risks and opportunities to strategists. Third, and emerging from this second element, insights on order formation are also applicable to order maintenance. Finally, alliances remain central to ordering, and alliance maintenance will, therefore, continue to be a critical area of study for social scientists and strategists alike.

BRAUMOELLER, BEAR F. (2019) *Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
COOLEY, ALEXANDER, and DANIEL H. NEXON. (2020) *Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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LEBOW, RICHARD NED, and RICHARD ZHANG. (2022) *Justice and International Order: East and West*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
POAST, PAUL. (2019) *Arguing about Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
SHIFRINSON, JOSHUA R. ITZKOWITZ. (2018) *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.*

The concept of order is central to international studies. Rebecca Friedman Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper[3] recently defined international order, building on the work of Ikenberry[4] and Bull[5], among others, as "the governing arrangements among states that establish fundamental rules, principles, and institutions… the basic framework that creates rules and settles expectations among states." Among wider audiences, order has been

[3] "The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order," *The Washington Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1445353.
[4] *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, New Edition* (Princeton University Press, 2019).
[5] *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (2012 Edition)* (Macmillan International Higher Education, 1977).

defined more pithily. Guglielmo Ferrero,[6] concluding his study on the origins of what Robert Jervis[7] called "the best example of a security regime – the Concert of Europe," defined order as "the set of rules that man must respect in order not to live in the permanent terror of his fellow men, of the innate madness of men and its unpredictable explosions - a set of rules that man calls freedom."[8]

Of course, the Concert of Europe arose from the quadruple alliance against Napoleon and was expanded after the alliance's victory, bringing additional states into the emerging European order. Alliances, order, peace, and security are thus -- in this example and many others -- intimately related. In a period in which international order and ordering appear to be shifting, seven recent books shed important light on this relationship. In *Only the Dead*, Bear Braumoeller[9] convincingly argues that orders maintain peace among their members, while driving conflict externally. Kyle Lascurettes[10] develops this line of thinking further in *Orders of Exclusion* by arguing that dominant states build orders to exclude and weaken potential threats. In *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, Joshua Shifrinson[11] challenges the contention that major shifts between great powers necessarily lead to destabilizing conflict, instead offering a theory explaining how power shifts can produce both conflict and cooperation. In *Exit from Hegemony*, Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon[12] argue that the existing, US-led international order is unraveling. In *Arguing About Alliances,* Paul Poast[13] argues that strategic "compatibility" drives successful alliance negotiations. In *Justice and International Order*, Richard Ned Lebow and Feng Zhang[14] propose transforming the US-led international order into a global order that rests on Eastern and Western conceptions of fairness and equality. Finally, Dale Copeland[15] centers international order not in military alliances, but first and foremost in the global commerce necessary to facilitate great power economic expansion in *A World Safe for Commerce*. These books suggest that the perpetual work of reconstructing orders[16] and renegotiating their legitimizing ideologies are likely to be critical in the coming years. Building (and rebuilding) the strategic compatibility that undergirds the alliances that in turn support orders will be an essential task.

What are the collective implications of these analyses for US efforts to reconstruct order and secure US interests by "reclaim[ing] our place in international institutions" and "revitaliz[ing] America's unmatched network of alliances and partnerships?"[17] Our argument here has four interrelated components: first, we contend that complacency is a significant, and perhaps the most significant, risk to international order and stability. By taking Cooley and Nexon's arguments about the end of US hegemony and Lebow and Zhang's warning of the global shift towards preferring equality over fairness seriously, leaders seeking to reconstruct international order can mitigate this danger – fear of instability can encourage institutions to stay on top of risk and can therefore be stabilizing.[18] Second, we contend that the addition of actual conflict with state actors (namely China and Russia) to this general concern about the erosion of international order can have order-maintenance effects that are analogous to the effects Braumoeller and Lascurettes observe war having on order-building. Third, we argue

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[6] *Ricostruzione: Talleyrand a Vienna (1814-1815)* (Garzanti, 1948), 379.
[7] "Security Regimes," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 362.
[8] Quote translated from Italian by the authors
[9] *Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
[10] *Orders of Exclusion: Great Powers and the Strategic Sources of Foundational Rules in International Relations* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020).
[11] Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).
[12] *Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
[13] *Arguing about Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 4.
[14] *Justice and International Order: East and West* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).
[15] Dale C. Copeland, *A World Safe for Commerce: American Foreign Policy from the Revolution to the Rise of China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024).Copeland
[16] Ferrero, *Ricostruzione: Talleyrand a Vienna (1814-1815)*.
[17] The White House, "Interim National Security Strategic Guidance," March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
[18] Hyman P. Minsky, "The Evolution of Financial Institutions and the Performance of the Economy," *Journal of Economic Issues* 20, no. 2 (1986): 345–53.

that Poast's arguments regarding war plan compatibility in alliance *formation* also apply to alliance *maintenance*. And finally, we argue that this alliance maintenance, along with the core economic partnerships that Copeland describes, are critical to the ongoing process of reconstructing international order. In particular, the links between alliance management in Europe and Asia and the development of shared understandings of the challenges posed by both China and Russia to international order are already stimulating significant efforts at reconstruction, but those efforts' continuation is far from assured.[19] At the same time, we must not oversimplify or essentialize the intentions and goals of a rising China, understanding both the motivations for revisionism and the methods it is most likely to use.

We probe empirical tests for these arguments: we evaluate the extent to which states are "exiting" the current international order through both UNGA voting and strategic discursive alignment; we evaluate the relationship between threat perceptions regarding China and Russia and UNGA voting alignment; and we evaluate the relationship between strategic discursive alignment and UNGA voting.

Order(s), Violence, and Security

In *Only the Dead*, Braumoeller argues that the rise and decline of orders drive systemic changes in the rate of international conflict. He contends that Tilly's[20] argument that "war made the state and the state made war" applies as well to international orders as it does to domestic orders – war makes orders, and orders make war. While others[21] have made similar contentions, Braumoeller is the first to test these propositions in a comprehensive, mixed methods study. Braumoeller's work outclasses other work on the persistence or decline of war on this count – his argument that international orders, and not changes in underlying human nature or views of war, determine the likelihood of violent conflict arising will likely stand until additional research it stimulates either disconfirms or solidifies it.

While Braumoeller makes a compelling case that war remains with us, he also acknowledges that the rate of conflict initiation declined at the end of the Cold War, which is significant. The policy insight here is not to declare victory over war and move on, but to avoid the "irony of Pinkerism"[22] – wherein national leaders schooled in Steven Pinker's[23] arguments about the long-term decline of violence behave in ways that make those arguments into a "self-defeating prophecy,"[24] We contend that assiduously and continually reconstructing international order is central to mitigating this risk of Pinkerist triumphalism leading to complacency, an unwinding of the current international order, and a rise in international conflict. We further contend that alliances are central to such order: since at least the end of World War II, US alliances have anchored regional orders in both Asia and Europe.[25] Indeed, in many cases, the US relies heavily on alliances to defend and extend the boundaries of the US-led international order in other regions of the world, from Africa to Europe and East

[19] Luis Simón, Linde Desmaele, and Jordan Becker, "Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America's European Strategy," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (2021): 90–115.
[20] *Reflections on the History of European State-Making* (Princeton University Press, 1975), 42.
[21] Lawrence Freedman, "Stephen Pinker and the Long Peace: Alliance, Deterrence and Decline," *Cold War History* 14, no. 4 (October 2, 2014): 657–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.950243; Frank G Hoffman, "Foresight into 21st Century Conflict: End of the Greatest Illusion?," *FPRI Philadelphia Papers*, no. 14 (September 2016).
[22] Jennifer Mitzen, "The Irony of Pinkerism," *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (June 2013): 525, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713001114.
[23] *The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined* (Penguin Books, 2012).
[24] Tanisha M. Fazal and Paul Poast, "War Is Not Over: What the Optimists Get Wrong About Conflict," *Foreign Affairs* 98, no. 6 (2019): 83.
[25] Sten Rynning and Olivier Schmitt, "Alliances," in *The Oxford Handbook of International Security*, by Sten Rynning and Olivier Schmitt, ed. Alexandra Gheciu and William C. Wohlforth (Oxford University Press, 2018), 652–67, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.44; Evelyn Goh and Ryo Sahashi, "Worldviews on the United States, Alliances, and the Changing International Order: An Introduction," *Contemporary Politics* 26, no. 4 (August 7, 2020): 371–83, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2020.1777044.

Asia. Foreign aid in general, and military assistance in particular, are important components of allied burden sharing.[26] The US has historically depended on the personal ties and expertise of former colonial powers as well as politically more palatable countries such as Canada and the Netherlands to defend Western influence and interests against rival powers in areas and at times in which the US has had less direct access.[27]

Braumoeller builds his case by asking (and answering) three critical empirical questions: first, is war going out of style? Second, is war becoming less (or more) deadly? Third, are the causes of war attenuating? His negative answers to each of these three questions may be "tragic,"[28] as he calls them, but they are also likely to mitigate the danger of the "irony of Pinkerism" leading to a more dangerous world – simply being aware that war has not become less frequent or less deadly over the last 200 years should make policymakers less reckless or more inclined toward what Ferrero calls a "constructive spirit"[29] – a commitment to perpetually maintain or reconstruct domestic and international orders, if only out of fear of the likely alternatives.

While Braumoeller uses exhaustive quantitative analysis to conclude that war is not going out of style, it is not becoming less deadly, and its causes are not attenuating, he makes the case for international orders as mitigating factors in largely qualitative terms. *Only the Dead* thus points researchers toward future mixed-methods research – noting that "although there are extensive literatures on both order and conflict, there is surprisingly little research that connects the two using data."[30] Braumoeller graphically demonstrates a connection between international order and conflict in Figure 8.1.[31] For this analysis, he reasonably compares countries within international orders and those outside of them. But in a period in which such orders are in flux (which is likely a more common state than truly stable orders), one might wonder how drift toward or away from orders affects conflict-proneness. Similarly, Braumoeller's analysis points toward an application to international order of the notion of stability-instability paradoxes applied in areas like finance[32] and arms control.[33]

An empirical exercise focused on order and conflict-proneness would help understand the extent to which the current international order is likely to protect humans from the dangers of war, and which humans it is more or less likely to protect. Continuous variables derived from voting patterns in international organizations[34] or from content analysis of discourse surrounding international organizations[35] could usefully be analyzed in relation to conflict-proneness to assess the extent to which international order is fraying and how such fraying affects conflict proneness.

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[26] Jacques van Ypersele de Strihou, "Sharing the Defense Burden Among Western Allies," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 49, no. 4 (1967): 530, https://doi.org/10.2307/1928338.
[27] Andrew Godefroy, "The Canadian Armed Forces Advisory Training Team Tanzania 1965–1970," *Canadian Military History* 11, no. 3 (2002), https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss3/4; Marco Wyss, "The United States, Britain, and Military Assistance to Nigeria," *The Historical Journal* 61, no. 4 (December 2018): 1065–87, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0018246X17000498.
[28] *Only the Dead*, 16.
[29] *Ricostruzione: Talleyrand a Vienna (1814-1815)*, 296.
[30] *Only the Dead*, 210.
[31] 211.
[32] Hyman P. Minsky, "The Financial Instability Hypothesis: An Interpretation of Keynes and an Alternative to 'Standard' Theory," *Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business* 16, no. 1 (1977): 5–16; L. Randall Wray, *Why Minsky Matters: An Introduction to the Work of a Maverick Economist* (Princeton University Press, 2015).
[33] Glenn H. Snyder, *The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror* (Chandler, 1965); Robert Jervis, "Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War," *Political Science Quarterly* 108, no. 2 (1993): 239–53, https://doi.org/10.2307/2152010.
[34] Michael A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, August 17, 2015, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715595700.
[35] Jordan Becker and Edmund Malesky, "The Continent or the 'Grand Large'? Strategic Culture and Operational Burden-Sharing in NATO," *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 1 (March 1, 2017): 163–80, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw039; Alexander Kentikelenis and Erik Voeten, "Legitimacy Challenges to the Liberal World Order: Evidence from United Nations Speeches, 1970–2018," *Review of International Organizations* 16, no. 4 (2020): 1–34, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09404-y.

Counter-order and Disorder?

The current international order appears to be undergoing significant shifts – being "called into question"[36] by the rise of revisionist powers like China internationally, and a populist wave within the US-led order.[37] These shifts suggest that the factor that Braumoeller has identified as central to limiting the ravages of war in Western Europe and North America may be at risk – with negative implications for human security broadly, and for the national security of the US and its allies more narrowly.

Scholars have long attributed these sorts of power shifts -- the rise of new powers and the relative decline of existing powers – with massive system destabilization and even hegemonic wars. Such outcomes may result from the rising power's desire to alter the rules of the international order in their favor or to hasten the fall of the declining power,[38] or from the declining power's imperative to strike preventively while they believe they are still in a position of advantage.[39] In short, power shifts are theorized to be highly destabilizing and often end in major wars.

Yet, in *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, Joshua Shifrinson[40] contends that traditional power transition theories oversimplify reality and do not account for the variation in dynamics between rising and declining powers. While rising and declining powers sometimes find themselves in conflict, the record also shows that they frequently cooperate.[41] According to Shifrinson, two key factors determine both whether a rising power will adopt a predatory or supportive policy towards a declining power and the intensity of that predation or support: (1) the declining power's strategic value to the rising power, especially its ability to act as a partner against other great powers, and (2) the strength of declining power's political-military posture, which determines its ability to resist the rising state.[42] These variables yield four possible strategies that rising states may employ in their relations with declining powers: relegation, weakening, bolstering, and strengthening.

Classic literature on power transition often focused on hegemonic wars, including attempts by rising states to knock decliners out of the ranks of the great powers.[43] However, Shifrinson argues that rising powers only adopt these sorts of intense predatory "relegation" strategies to quickly change the status quo -- which may also include means such as economic warfare, aggressive contestation of territorial control, and diplomatic isolation -- when the declining power is both of little strategic value in balancing against other potential adversaries and when it's military posture is weak.

When the declining state has little strategic value but maintains a strong military posture, the rising power will still adopt a predatory approach but use more limited "weakening" strategies to gradually undermine the decliner's power position without provoking direct confrontation. It may employ adverse trade policies short of total economic warfare, arms racing, or call into question the declining state's "credibility, prestige, or political

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[36] Joseph S. Nye, "The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump," *International Affairs* 95, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): 64, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy212.
[37] Ivan Krastev, *After Europe* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017); Barry Eichengreen, *The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era* (Oxford University Press, 2018); Stanley Sloan, *Transatlantic Traumas: Has Illiberalism Brought the West to the Brink of Collapse?* (Oxford University Press, 2018).
[38] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 1981).
[39] Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).
[40] Shifrinson, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*.
[41] Of note, unlike some theories, Shifrinson's does not require the rising power to surpass the declining power. It is enough that a declining power see an extended overall shift in relative power, which he measures as a loss of 5 percent in their share of capabilities relative to the other great powers in a ten-year period, sustained for five consecutive years, and ending either at the beginning of new sustained growth or exist from the great powers. Shifrinson, 15.
[42] Shifrinson, 13, 17–21.
[43] Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, 186–210.

legitimacy to reduce its influence."[44] In short, it will seek to affect long-term, low-cost, incrementally favorable shifts in the balance of power.

Perhaps more counterintuitive are cases where the rising power adopts supportive strategies toward the declining powers. Rising powers do this when declining powers have strategic value in balancing against other threatening states. This type of support takes on a limited form through "bolstering strategies" when the declining state has strategic value and is militarily strongly postured. The rising state's goal here is to help the declining state maintain its position on the cheap through limited assistance. Rising powers walk a fine line, hoping that the decliner will assist in balancing against other potential adversaries, but cautious of encouraging adventurism or counterbalancing that might drag it into unwanted conflict.

Finally, supportive strategies take on their most intense form when the strategically valuable declining state is militarily weak and requires significant "strengthening," including significant resource transfers, diplomatic and security guarantees, and alliances. This approach can turn the declining state into a useful proxy against other threats and deny such beneficial relationships to competitors, albeit at significant costs to the rising state.[45]

Shifrinson tests the explanatory power of his theory through rich process traces of three cases: American and Soviet response to British decline from 1945 to 1950, US policy towards a declining Soviet Union from 1983 to 1991, and a shorter sketch of the European powers' approaches to the decline of Austria-Hungary and France in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

His theory also has significant implications for contemporary alignments and global order. It predicts that the US's relatively strong military position makes it unlikely that China will pursue a relegation strategy that could lead to a major war. However, this does not imply that the US position, or the current order itself, is stable. Shrifrinson notes that China is already pursuing a less intense weakening strategy against both the U.S. and Japan through its efforts to expand influence in the South and East China seas, building militarily, and possibly working to undermine US credibility and legitimacy.[46] Further, the theory offers insight into other current and future U.S. and Chinese relations with third parties, to include Asian-Pacific regional powers, Europe, and the strength of Sino-Russian bonds. Sino-Russian relations will likely be determined by Russia's strategic utility to China and the strength of Russia's military posture.

The current US-led international order is also facing mounting criticism from both inside and outside. Lebow and Zhang[47] argue that all hierarchical orders are based on the concept of fairness (22). In allied burden-sharing, fairness would explain why it is just that a larger state that contributes more to the defense of all members of the order, in turn, receives more political rights and privileges. As international society shifts to value equality over fairness, smaller states and their domestic audiences are beginning to decry hierarchical orders – whether US or Chinese-made – as exploitative (21). As both the US and China compete for the support of strategically important states, Lebow and Zhang's work suggests that the US will need to change its legitimizing discourses and, more importantly, behavior to appeal to these smaller states whose outside options may curtail the US's recourse to coercion. Failure to do so may play directly into the type of delegitimization that Shifrinson suggests China is likely to undertake (and may already be undertaking) against the US.

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[44] Shifrinson, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, 20.
[45] Shifrinson, 21–36.
[46] Shifrinson, 22–23, 183–84.
[47] *Justice and International Order*.

Despite of disagreement on what international order is (or was), there is emerging consensus that it is at least changing dramatically[48] – and possibly ending.[49] Scholars have expressed concern about relative US decline leading to international disorder that is redolent of the 1970s thinking that gave rise to hegemonic stability theory.[50] Although some scholars[51] contend that these concerns are excessive, policy thinkers have taken note and there is interest within and outside of the current presidential administration in a form of reconstruction of the post-WWII international order.[52]

In *Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order*, Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon[53] make the most powerful and complete case to date for the end of US hegemony. If they are correct, the US will need to undertake significant foreign policy reorientations in the coming years. If they are incorrect, the wrong reorientations could create a stampede for the exits regardless.

Understanding the past, present, and future of international ordering has long been a preoccupation of international relations scholars. Raymond Aron[54] and Hedley Bull[55], for example, each contended that even in "anarchical" (i.e., no overarching authority to govern states' interactions with one another) international relations, a "society" of states share rules and institutions. David Lake[56] identified varying degrees of local and regional hierarchy – the extent to which powerful states control some actions and issues within other states – as a driver of international behavior. Deudney and Ikenberry[57] identified the concept of "liberal hegemony" to describe the dominance of the US in the process of ordering (part of) the world after 1945.

It is also worth noting that one of international relations' most significant theoretical works, Robert Keohane's *After Hegemony,*[58] theorizes on the possible persistence of institutions in the absence of American hegemony – 37 years ago and 6 years *before* the "unipolar moment"[59] of unrivaled US power. This US-led instance of ordering has recently become particularly central (and controversial) among policy elites. The 2017 US National Security Strategy expressed concern about China and Russia "trying to change the international order in their favor." Former US Secretary of State Pompeo[60] described the approach taken to mitigating that concern as "to reassert our sovereignty, reform the international order," and encourage allies to "exert their sovereignty as well."

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[48] Goh and Sahashi, "Worldviews on the United States, Alliances, and the Changing International Order."
[49] Christopher Layne, "The US–Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana," *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 89–111, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix249.
[50] Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade," *World Politics* 28, no. 3 (1976): 317–47, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009974; Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*; Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939: Revised and Enlarged Edition* (University of California Press, 1986); Carla Norrlof, "Hegemony and Inequality: Trump and the Liberal Playbook," *International Affairs* 94, no. 1 (January 1, 2018): 63–88, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix262.
[51] Thomas Oatley, "The Political Economy of Hegemony: The (Surprising) Persistence of American Hegemony," in *Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*, ed. William R. Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
[52] Joseph R. Biden, "Why America Must Lead Again," *Foreign Affairs*, November 8, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again; Alexander Vindman, "The United States Must Marshal the 'Free World,'" *Foreign Affairs*, December 7, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-12-07/united-states-must-marshal-free-world.
[53] *Exit from Hegemony*.
[54] "Qu'est-ce qu'une théorie des relations internationales?" *Revue française de science politique* 17, no. 5 (1967): 837–61, https://doi.org/10.3406/rfsp.1967.393043.
[55] *The Anarchical Society*.
[56] *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
[57] "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 2 (1999): 179–96.
[58] *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton University Press, 1984), https://books.google.fr/books/about/After_Hegemony.html?id=HnvpdocqT9EC&redir_esc=y.
[59] Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1990): 23–33, https://doi.org/10.2307/20044692.
[60] "Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order," U.S. Department of State, December 4, 2018, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287770.htm.

Cooley and Nexon argue that this approach is ineffective, and that the US hegemonic order is unraveling along three primary exit pathways: challenges from rival powers (China and Russia); smaller states heading for the exits; and transnational networks weakening existing norms. They argue that while choices made by the US may be hastening the unraveling, they are ancillary: former US President Trump's approach may have accelerated the exit from hegemony, but the other three drivers predate his rise and persist after his presidency.

Cooley and Nexon make a complex theoretical case for the causes of hegemonic ordering and the unravelling of hegemonic orders. They start by identifying[61] three "principles of liberal international order:" liberal democratic political systems within nations; free economic exchange within and among nations; and the use of multilateral institutions to manage international relations. They contend that US and allied leaders bet that "convergence"[62] around all three pillars would lead to a fundamental change in international relations – cooperation among states would become the norm rather than exceptional. They argue that this bet was misplaced, and that rival powers, smaller states, and transnational networks work through the *architecture* of the order itself (its rules, norms, and values), as well as its *infrastructure* (the relationships, practices, and interactions that maintain it), to undermine the overall *ecosystem* of the order.

These arguments are a significant addition to the literature on ordering, hierarchy, and hegemony. They tackle current issues directly in a theoretically and historically informed manner. They should inform how political scientists, policymakers, and strategists look at evolving international order in a time of seemingly persistent crises.

What is less clear is what alternative hypotheses might explain current trends in international ordering, or alternative depictions of the trends themselves. After all, the Trump administration sought to "reform the international order,"[63] and the Biden administration seeks restoration of that same order while acknowledging that more incremental reform might be in order.[64] Why is this exit from hegemony different from previously predicted ones?

A reader imagines that the authors were constrained by the requirements of writing a book for a broad audience to make their case in such a neat way that it appears a bit too neat. However, this ostensible shortcoming is also a strength of the book: it leaves open and fertile ground for hypothesis testing for scholars in multiple subfields, some of which might build on Braumoeller's work on order and political violence.

As one example, while Cooley and Nexon have clearly shown what exit from hegemony looks like in a host of important cases, scholars and policymakers would benefit from a general understanding of what unraveling looks like at the systemic level. Can we "see," for example, states stampeding for the exits, abandoning the US within institutions, or abandoning those institutions altogether? Recent empirical work[65] suggests that such may not be the case: surprisingly, explicit criticism of the current international (economic) order is limited, and threats to exit the order are rare.

Like any bold theoretical work, *Exit from Hegemony* provokes several unanswered questions. For that reason, it is likely to influence future research as much as current and future policymaking.

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[61] *Exit from Hegemony*, 16.
[62] Thomas Wright, *All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the Future of American Power* (Yale University Press, 2017).
[63] Pompeo, "Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order."
[64] Thomas Wright, "The Quiet Reformation of Biden's Foreign Policy," *Brookings* (blog), March 20, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/20/the-quiet-reformation-of-bidens-foreign-policy/.
[65] Kentikelenis and Voeten, "Legitimacy Challenges to the Liberal World Order: Evidence from United Nations Speeches, 1970–2018."

Future empirical work could build on the foundations laid in the work discussed above to answer important questions, for instance: do small states respond to increased pressure (or perceptions of pressure) from rival powers (China and Russia) by aligning with the US (balancing against China and Russia), or by hedging or bandwagoning with the rival powers? UN voting alignment[66] could be one way of getting at such behavior in a broad institutional context. Second, faced with assertive behavior by China and Russia, do neighboring small states seek closer security relationships among themselves and with external powers (the US)? Finally, in a narrower institutional context, does Chinese and Russian influence affect states' fulfillment of non-wartime alliance commitments? Operationally, does Chinese FDI or the rise of Russian-influenced right-populism in Europe affect burden-sharing behavior in NATO?

Figure 1, below, suggests that the general trend in UNGA voting since the late Cold War has, in fact, been toward closer alignment with the US as opposed to China or Russia, while standard deviations across states have remained relatively stable. It is also notable that after a long, steady increase through 2016, both shifting rather abruptly away from the US and toward its regional rival during the first two years of the Trump administration.

Figure 1: UNGA Vote Alignment with the US vs. China and Russia – Asia and Europe



Table 1 below probes the relationship between threat perception and balancing, hedging, or bandwagoning behavior. While Figure 1 merely visualizes a mean trajectory, the preliminary analysis in Table 1 uses both within-country and over-time variation. We start by generating a variable to capture (state-centric) threat perception of each country using the Wordscores stata module.[67] This is done separately for each region, as

[66] Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten, "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data."
[67] Will Lowe, "Understanding Wordscores," *Political Analysis* 16, no. 4 (2008): 356–71, https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpn004.

European threat perceptions are likely to be Russia-focused, while Asian threat perceptions are likely to be China-focused. Using a significantly expanded universe of documents (372 as opposed to 89), we replicate Becker and Malesky's[68] use of Wordscores to ascertain national strategic positions using such documents. For Asia, we use the Republic of Korea's relatively conciliatory[69] Participatory Government Defense Policy as the "pole" for the lowest threat perception regarding China with Taiwan's hawkish [70] National Defense Report as the highest. For Europe, we use Spain's[71] National Security Strategy as the pole for the lowest Russia-focused threat perception and Poland's[72] White Book on National Security as the pole for the highest Russia-focused threat perception.

The relatively stable and statistically significant negative relationship between threat perception and UNGA alignment with the US, as opposed to Russia or China, suggests that rather than aligning themselves further with the US as perceptions of threat from regional powers increase, countries may seek to hedge by shifting toward those regional rivals.

Table 1: Threat Perception and UNGA Alignment

Dependent Variable: UNGA Alignment with US	**Europe (Spain 2013 vs. Poland 2013)**			**Asia (ROK 2003 vs. ROC 2004)**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Bivariate	Country FE	Country & Year FE	Bivariate	Country FE	Year FE
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	Europe	Europe	Europe	Asia	Asia	Asia
Threat Perception from China/Russia	-0.00191**	-0.00300**	-0.00195**	-0.00551**	0.00011 6	-0.00772**
	(-2.431)	(-3.032)	(-2.543)	(-2.001)	(0.0437)	(-2.895)
Year			0.00898			0.00841
			(1.107)			(0.971)
Constant	-0.0829	0.0732*	-17.96	-0.371***	-0.586***	-17.18
	(-1.007)	(1.807)	(-1.104)	(-4.519)	(-7.675)	(-0.988)
Observations	563	563	563	155	155	155
R-squared	0.106	0.250	0.302	0.399	0.785	0.348
Number of Countries	31	31	31	11	11	11

z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

[68] "The Continent or the 'Grand Large'?"
[69] "Participatory Government Defense Policy," 2003, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/155728/SouthKorea2003main_eng.pdf.
[70] "National Defense Report," 2004.
[71] "National Security Strategy," 2013, https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/documents/estrategiaseguridad_baja_julio.pdf.
[72] "White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland" (National Security Bureau, 2013), https://en.bbn.gov.pl/en/news/332,White-Book-on-National-Security-of-the-Republic-ofPoland-now-in-English.html.

Overall, Cooley and Nexon's insights offer important suggestions for scholars and policy officials seeking to preserve Ferrero's[73] "set of rules" standing between the relative security of the current international order and a state of "permanent terror." They make a clear case for the end of US global hegemony but also suggest that the US can preserve some portion of its relative strength by maintaining the existing international infrastructure. Key to such maintenance is effectively stabilizing alliances and partnerships, which will likely require some renegotiation after years of challenges and a four-year period of acute strain.

(Re)Negotiating Order

The preceding suggests that, at a minimum, the current international order has contributed to peace and security in the states that have been a party to it and is under significant strain, putting that relative peace and security at risk. Thus, if those states want to maintain the security of their populations, it will be necessary to either maintain or rebuild the current order, create a new one, or some mix of the two.

While scholars generally agree that hegemons can take actions to maintain or endanger the order, it is less clear that powerful states can create new orders at will. Indeed, Lascurettes suggests that states such as the US and China may not have the preponderance of power or legitimacy necessary to drastically restructure the international order in the coming decades short of a great power war or a great power death.[74] As long as the US maintains a position of considerable strength, Shifrinson suggests that a rising China, even if it eclipses the US, is unlikely to initiate such a war intentionally, instead opting for limited measures to induce gradual weakening.[75] Indeed, Lebow and Zhang, although perpetual optimists, question whether either the US or China are currently prepared to make the necessary concessions to build consensual orders based on the principle of national equality in the absence of revolution.[76] In other words, do orders need to be destroyed in order to be reborn?

We contend that incremental change can lead to large-scale renewal of orders. Alliances are not just vital to order maintenance: negotiating and renegotiating the alliance agreements on which current security regimes are based will be a key determining factor in the survival, evolution, or reconstruction of the current international order. Such an alliance-based reconstruction of international order is desirable, possible, and perhaps even likely. In *Arguing about Alliances: the Art of Agreement in Military-Pact Negotiations*, Paul Poast contends that the compatibility of states' strategic plans is the key determining factor in such negotiations – thus making them more critical to international order.

The discussion above strongly suggests that significant changes to the current international order are underway. Attempts at peaceful transition to a "post-liberal order"[77] or a post-American order[78] are not pre-destined to succeed, particularly without adequate attention to alliances. Alliances are the "very foundation"[79] of the current international order and are relatively inexpensive.[80] During the current transitional period, smaller states may

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[73] *Ricostruzione: Talleyrand a Vienna (1814-1815)*, 370.
[74] Lascurettes, *Orders of Exclusion*, 28–32, 236.
[75] Shifrinson, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*.
[76] Lebow and Zhang, *Justice and International Order*, 240–75.
[77] Arie M Kacowicz and Benjamin Miller, "The Problem of Peaceful Change Revisited: From the End of the Cold War to the Uncertainties of a Post-Liberal Order," *International Studies Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 301, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viy025.
[78] Amitav Acharya, *The End of American World Order*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA: Polity, 2018); Amitav Acharya, *A Multiplex World: The Coming World Order*, 2023, https://anthologies.newlinesinstitute.org/emerging-world-order-after-the-russia-ukraine-war/a-multiplex-world-the-coming-world-order/.
[79] Norrlof, "Hegemony and Inequality," 66.
[80] Nye, "The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump."

play a greater role in shaping emerging orders,[81] making the process of alliance negotiation and re-negotiation even more important, particularly if populist politics and nativism weaken the US position internationally.[82] In short, allies have agency, and the extent to which both their conceptions of justice and their strategic aims align is likely to affect the shape of emerging international orders decisively.

What changes are likely? Will states be able to renegotiate the current order to update rules and decision-making procedures, leaving principles and norms intact? Or will they abandon the current principles and norms, leading to new regimes?[83] Examining changes in regimes is critical, as they are building blocks of orders.[84]

Security regimes are central to the current international order, and alliances are central to security regimes, which enable states to restrain their behavior thanks to the belief that others will reciprocate,[85] often making decisions jointly, rather than individually [86]. Security regimes are also among the most challenging to develop and maintain, and multiple conditions must be obtained: great powers must support them; actors must believe others value cooperation; they must not believe that expansion is necessary for their security; and war must be seen as costly [87]. These challenges mean that the negotiation of alliances is unlikely to be easy, and doing so successfully is essential to constructing or reconstructing orders, which is essential to constraining violence among states party to those orders.

Whether designing regimes and institutions for a "post-liberal order"[88] or adapting the current order, negotiating the organization of alliances will be central. *Arguing about Alliances* offers a handy framework for analyzing the origins and, by implication, the sustainability of alliances through the lens of strategic concordance. The book's central finding – that war plan compatibility is the key factor determining successful alliance negotiations – can be constructively applied to the ongoing process of renegotiating international order or replacing it. Poast's[89] observation that "many grand strategic visions are simply infeasible if pursued noncollaboratively" sheds light on a way ahead for the US and its allies.

Why, Poast asks, do states manage (or not manage) to agree on alliance treaties? Through a detailed, multi-method analysis, Poast finds and conveys that alliance agreement depends essentially on compatibility with the war plan. He also finds that in situations where war plan compatibility is low, then outside options (what Cooley and Nexon call "exits") become key determining factors. Given that such exits are prevalent in the current context, strategic concordance among allies appears essential to the maintenance or reconstruction of the alliances that form the basis of current security regimes.

Both Poast's statistical analysis and his case studies (the 1901 Anglo-German alliance treaty negotiation and the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty) are well done, and extremely convincing. The quantitative analysis progresses from tabulations and bivariate correlations to multivariate regression analysis, which should leave

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[81] Goh and Sahashi, "Worldviews on the United States, Alliances, and the Changing International Order."
[82] Norrlof, "Hegemony and Inequality"; Nye, "The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump"; Jordan Becker et al., "Transatlantic Shakedown: Presidential Shaming and NATO Burden Sharing," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, April 21, 2023, 00220027231167840, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231167840.
[83] Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 185–205.
[84] Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Integrating Theories of International Regimes," *Review of International Studies* 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 3–33.
[85] Jervis, "Security Regimes."
[86] Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 299–324.
[87] Jervis, "Security Regimes."
[88] Maria Josepha Debre and Hylke Dijkstra, "Institutional Design for a Post-Liberal Order: Why Some International Organizations Live Longer than Others," *European Journal of International Relations*, October 29, 2020, 1354066120962183, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066120962183.
[89] *Arguing about Alliances*, 7.

readers convinced that his theory tests well under a multitude of conditions and modeling choices and is not a relic of any data torturing or p-hacking.[90] Poast systematically addresses typical statistical pitfalls like selection bias and omitted variable bias, as well as the effects of outliers and coding assumptions.

Poast's insight is that under most conditions, states must pursue grand strategic visions collaboratively, and that systematizing such collaboration in the form of alliances depends on strategic concordance, which offers some potential escape routes from the dire situation that *Exit from Hegemony* and *Only the Dead* convey. To what extent are allies diverging (or converging) strategically? "Knowledge and understanding can affect regimes. If regimes matter, then cognitive understanding can matter as well."[91]

While *Arguing about Alliances* focuses on war plan compatibility, broader strategic compatibility may be even more important for negotiating and renegotiating alliance terms going forward.[92] States' understanding(s) of their strategic environment can offer insights into both their perceptions of outside options, and their broad strategic compatibility among them.

Certainly, the security community and hegemonic socialization literature suggest a similar outcome, although the opposite causation to Poast's model. Instead of necessarily starting with compatible war plans, states are attracted to orders and alliance systems due to any of several material benefits and public goods that orders and alliances offer.[93] The density of interactions between elites of prospective and new members and elites of the hegemon itself and of other secondary states, who have already internalized the hegemon's strategic worldview, leads the former to gradually adjust their beliefs to the older members.[94] The higher the "density," or percentage of participants within a network who have already internalized the hegemon's worldview, norms, and preferences, the greater the likelihood of such transfer occurring.[95]

Regardless of whether cognitive understanding leads to alliance formation and maintenance or whether the reverse is true, we contend that such cognitive understanding is discernable and can be measured in terms of dimensions of strategic culture as articulated in national strategic documents.[96] Becker[97] demonstrates, with an automated content analysis of over 300 national strategic documents, that in at least two critical dimensions (transatlanticism and the importance of international legal norms for the use of force), the US and European countries are not significantly diverging in terms of strategic approaches. Figure 2 visualizes these trends. Future empirical work can use analysis of national strategies to assess convergence or divergence among allies and members of security regimes. *Arguing about Alliances* suggests that to the extent that those approaches converge

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[90] R. H. Coase, *Essays on Economics and Economists* (University of Chicago Press, 1995); Christopher H. Achen, "Let's Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, no. 4 (September 1, 2005): 327–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940500339167; Philip A Schrodt, "Seven Deadly Sins of Contemporary Quantitative Political Analysis," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (March 1, 2014): 287–300, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313499597.

[91] Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 497–510.

[92] Matthew Fuhrmann et al., "Roundtable 12-7 on Arguing About Alliances: The Art of Agreement in Military-Pact Negotiations," H-Diplo | ISSF, January 29, 2021, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-7.

[93] Emanuel Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post—Cold War Transformation," *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2008): 195–230; Karl W. Deutsch, "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area," in *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, ed. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander Stubb, 4th edition (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1957).

[94] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44, no. 3 (ed 1990): 291, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003530X.

[95] Jon C. Pevehouse, "With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 3 (2002): 529, https://doi.org/10.2307/3088403.

[96] Becker and Malesky, "The Continent or the 'Grand Large'?"

[97] "Chapter 17: Strategic and Military Culture," in *Oxford Handbook of NATO*, ed. Mark Webber and James Sperling, forthcoming, https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.19148.64643.

– or at least do not diverge – the basic security components of the current international order can be preserved, reformed, or reconstructed. Likewise, the hegemonic socialization literature highlights how strategic convergence and strong support for the legitimizing ideology reduces the attractiveness of exit options. It allows the hegemon to maintain the order more cheaply because it does not need to constantly offer rewards and threaten punishment to achieve compliance and cooperation.

Figure 2: Atlanticism and Importance of International Legal Norms over Time – Standard Deviation and Mean (Source: Becker 2021)



In short, alliances are central to international order. Members of the current US-led order are likely to negotiate new alliances or negotiate new terms for old alliances. Strategic concordance —measured quantitatively or qualitatively —can still be a strength for the US and its allies.

The Economic Underpinnings of Order (and Stability?)

The works considered thus far have largely focused on the military and alliance component of international order, but Dale Copeland's[98] *A World Safe For Commerce* centers international politics, order, and stability around international trade. Copeland is significantly more optimistic, though hardly complacent, about the future of the international order and its stability than Cooley, Nexon, Lebow, or Zhang. At the same time, his work

[98] Copeland, *A World Safe for Commerce*.

should alert policymakers to the risks of overreacting to perceived challenges to the order and misattributing motives to a revisionist China.

A great merit of Copeland's book, along with the others reviewed here, is that he avoids two extremes. He neither dogmatically reifies traditional international relations paradigms, treating them as inflexible doctrine, nor rejects the potential of "grand" or wide-ranging theories in their entirety in favor of simplistic hypotheses testing.[99] In contrast to these extreme approaches, Copeland provides comprehensive theories and treats traditional paradigms in a serious but nuanced and non-dogmatic manner. This was true of his earlier work, which incorporated competing liberal and realist theories about the relationship between economic interdependence and war into a new theory based on future expectations of trade.[100] A *World Safe for Commerce* builds on but moves well beyond Copeland's trade expectation theory to provide a comprehensive theory of international politics and foreign policy. Whereas the former reconciled realist and liberal theory, the latter explicitly reconciles two variants of structural realism – offensive and defensive realism – with a new theory of "dynamic realism."[101]

In Copeland's words, "Offensive and defensive realism become what physicists call 'special cases' within the larger framework: the former operate as individual theories only under narrow boundary conditions specified by the latter."[102] The theory is "dynamic" in two ways. First, it is dynamic because it explains which of the two special cases will best elucidate state behavior in particular circumstances. Second, the theory is also dynamic because it recognizes the "action-reaction dynamic" that drives states to reassess adversary character type, and with it, future economic expectations, which "over time can push all actors to a place that neither of them could have fully anticipated…"[103] Of note in this explanation, whereas both forms of structural realism tend to focus on military power and treat economics as ancillary,[104] trade and commerce are central to Copeland's story.

The key insight that Copeland takes from offensive realism is that all states are incentivized to grow their power in an uncertain world. They are all, at least in part, power maximizers who can never be entirely complacent with the status quo and, thus, all revisionists at heart. Central to this power maximization is continual economic expansion. States seek this growth for two reasons. First, in the post-French Revolution era of mass movements, growth is necessary for social stability. Second, an expansive realm of commerce is an economic requirement for great powers to maintain a strong defense against external threats and internal subversion.

Great powers maintain and expand their economic power by trading in three realms: first, a core realm of states among which the great power has a powerful military and political advantage over the other great powers; second, a realm of politically and militarily neutral states that trade freely with multiple great powers; and third, a realm that consists of other great powers' cores. If great powers could keep their commercial activity within their own core, there might be little impetus for conflict, at least over economic issues. However, a combination of factors, including the need for economies of scale, shortage of internal factor endowments (land, labor, and capital), and a modern economy that requires a diverse array of raw materials – some of which may not exist within the core – forces great powers to extend commerce into the second and even third realms. This inevitably means bumping into and threatening access to other great powers.

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[99] For a critique of this second trend in international relations, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (January 2013): 427–57, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066113494320.
[100] Dale C. Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 5–41; Dale C. Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
[101] Copeland, *A World Safe for Commerce*, 51.
[102] Copeland, 20.
[103] Copeland, *A World Safe for Commerce*, 3, 50.
[104] See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 206–9.

Yet, great powers do not consistently war over resources and, in fact often, cooperate. Herein lies defensive realism's contributions and offensive realism's shortcomings. While defensive realism's assumption that all or most states are status quo security seekers is belied by observable reality, it, unlike offensive realism, recognizes the dangers entailed in the security dilemma and the conflict spirals it can create. It also recognizes the importance of feedback loops as states reciprocally judge each other by past and current actions. Copeland adopts the concept of the security dilemma – that the measures one state takes to make itself more secure can make others less secure – and applies it to trade. The steps a state takes to secure trade, whether building a navy to secure sea lanes or placing troop contingents on third-party territory, can threaten the commerce of other great powers.[105] The navy that can preserve open sea lanes can also close them, which can in-turn engender a feedback look of fear and naval buildups on a potential adversary's part. Rational statesman, even those who seek to expand their commercial sphere, will weigh the risks of the trade-security dilemma and spiral escalation against the benefits of expansion.

So, how do states and statesmen determine how to walk this line? Copeland suggests that two variables drive their decisions: a state's anticipated future economic and military power and the state's assessment of the "character type" of its adversary.[106] When a state expects abundant future access to trade, and, with it, economic expansion, it has little need to be aggressive. When it anticipates a future drop in military and economic power, it will have a powerful incentive to secure its needs aggressively through hardline policies. Likewise, when it perceives its potential adversary to be a rational security seeker, it can adopt soft-line policies and avoid security dilemma-induced spirals. However, an adversary that is either irrational, that is, it demonstrates pathologies that undermine reasoned decision-making, or that privileges goals such as ideological advancement, prestige for its own sake, or glory over security, is dangerous and may require containment or deterrence through hardline policies.[107]

The framework has implications for the stability of the current international order, especially concerning the US and China – powerful, highly economically interdependent competitors involved in intense security competition. Copeland suggests that the future of US-China relations, and the stability of the international order, depend on two key questions: will China overtake the US in economic power? and to what degree will China act as a rational security seeker? (Of course, these two questions can be asked in reverse about the US.) His theory is far from parsimonious with its numerous interrelated variables and feedback loops, but the answers to these questions – and the ways that the answers may change over time – provide an array of potential future scenarios that he explores.

While Copeland does not place probabilities on these scenarios, he does offer policy advice for the maintenance of stability. First, avoid pushing adversaries with slowing growth to believe they will face deep economic decline due to US policies. Such adversaries are likely to respond to diminishing future economic expectations by seizing what they will need in the future now. In line with Copeland's earlier work, policies that endanger China's economic future increase the likelihood of military conflict. At the same time, those that continue mutually beneficial interdependence can constrain the use of force and promote peace. If China's growth rate does continue to decline, it may counterintuitively be in the interests of both the US and a stable international order to facilitate a soft landing.[108]

Second, both US and Chinese leaders must recognize that the potential of unforeseen future economic threats incentivizes "*all* great powers…to expand their economic spheres."[109] This is especially true in China's case, given its domestic stability challenges. Still, neither side should assume that the other's attempts at maintaining

[105] Copeland, *A World Safe for Commerce*, 35–36.
[106] Copeland, 3–4, 49–53.
[107] Copeland, 36–48.
[108] Copeland, 388–89.
[109] Copeland, 389. Italics added.

or expanding economic spheres are necessarily driven by irrationality, ideology, or hostile intentions. Further, both must recognize how their actions can create reciprocal feedback loops that change the other's perception of their character and intentions.

Finally, and closely related, be weary of conflating states' actions to protect domestic cohesion and stability with irrationality, glory or status seeing, or ideological advancement. Statesmen have a natural tendency to view ambiguous actions by their adversaries as hostile or nefarious, even when they are not.[110] The rational imperatives for economic expansion are especially acute in China, with 90 percent of its 1.4 billion people living on a third of its land, limited arable farmland, a sizable non-Han ethnic population, a history of domestic revolts and external exploitation, and a US history of democracy promotion.[111]

None of this is to say that China is or will be a rational security seeker in the future – but it is to caution against unthinking reactions or dangerous, unexamined assumptions. Unfortunately, there are good reasons to suspect both China and the US will be prone to underestimate each other's rationality and misread each other's objectives. Copeland suggests four factors dominate states' assessment of each other's character type, and each diverges greatly in this case, weighing against accurate mutual assessments: political ideology (collectivism versus individualism), foreign economic policy (state-centric mercantilism versus free markets), religion (atheism versus a largely Christian history tempered by religious and philosophical tolerance), and nationalism (Han ethnonationalism versus civic nationalism).[112] The wide gap in each of these areas makes dangerously inaccurate perceptions of state character type, both ends and rationality, more likely.

The assessment is not all negative, however. Copeland sees several US advantages in its efforts to maintain a favorable order – all be it one with possible modifications. Even if China's economy does surpass the US's, its GDP per capita will remain a fraction of the US's long into the future, limiting its ability to convert economic power into forward military capabilities. Nor is it sufficient to just compare country-to-country GDP. When considering the two country's core economic spheres, the US sphere will continue to be larger than China's well into the future. The US also benefits from what Copeland refers to as the FDR legacy. Despite China's attempts to expand its economic influence, China's allies and close partners are limited to North Korea, a handful of states in central Asia and Africa, and, now, Russia. By contrast, the US maintains an extensive network of military allies and close political and economic partners. It also considerably influences its allies' economic policies, including policies toward China. The dollar remains the world's dominant currency. By contrast, despite accounting for 18 percent of global GDP, China accounts for only 4 percent of global currency reserves.[113] This is unlikely to change, as making its currency convertible would likely lead to a flood of elites out of the country.

None of this suggests complacency. If anything, the importance of allies in this analysis points to one of the central themes of this review. Its importance should make Cooley, Nexon, Lebow, and Zhang's analyses even more concerning – and provide even more reason to give attention to Poast's assessment of alliance formation. At the same time, Copeland offers some strengths of the US position and the stability of the current order that others may miss while pointing to multiple potential sources of US-China mutual misperception. Together, these factors may recommend a deliberate, cautious approach moving forward.

Copeland's analysis also raises important concerns about the most desirable ideological structure of the international order going forward. Whether bounded or global, advocates of the traditional US lead order have at least claimed to value (but often failed to promote in practice) democratic domestic governance, respect for

[110] Robert Jervis, *Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics*, New Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).
[111] Copeland, *A World Safe for Commerce*, 377–80, 390–93.
[112] Copeland, 42–47, 380–82.
[113] Copeland, 382–85.

human rights, and an open global economy. Institutionalized open global commerce – currently under attack in many Western domestic polities – can play an important role in maintaining high future expectations of economic growth and, with it, stability. However, for China, the focus on democratization and human rights presents a direct threat to the stability of the current regime. One should expect China to see policies advancing these goals as direct and intentional threats to its regime, while it may paradoxically point out mismatches between Western rhetoric and action on these issues as forms of hypocrisy that delegitimize the supposed political philosophy underpinning the so-called liberal or rules-based order. Any rethinking of international order will have to contend with the tension between these normative ideological values and stability.

CONCLUSIONS

Orders keep those living in them relatively safe and secure,[114] at least in part because they are built to keep threats at bay.[115] The current order has, thus far, achieved as much for the US and its allies. However, that order is under stress and may even be collapsing.[116] While the contours of this stress and its results are still emerging, it seems relatively clear that some form of adaptation, reinvention, or reconstruction is likely to be required. Negotiation of alliance terms will play a critical role – thinking about strengths and weaknesses at the national and multilateral levels is always important, but perhaps now more than in previous eras: the US-led order and its associated institutions and organizations may be experiencing a critical juncture or inflection point, which can stimulate adaptation.[117] The extent to which members of the current order remain diplomatically embedded with one another will shape their ability to marshal and apply resources collectively,[118] which Poast[119] reminds us is a requirement for many grand strategies.

Lebow and Zhang highlight that the US must think more deeply about norm and value contestations if it wants to transform the current Western-oriented order into a truly global order. To what extent should the US even aspire to lead a global versus a bounded order?[120] If Lascurrettes is correct, the purpose of order is to exclude threats. Regardless of the exact geographic reach of the US-led order, it will likely continue to be contested both from within and along its peripheries. Therefore, the US will need to think not only about how it maintains and rejuvenates its core alliances, but also how it effectively reaches out to its partners. In other words, the US must refocus on its legitimizing ideology and transcend historical normative dichotomies[121] to fundamentally transform its relationship with its strategic partners.

Renegotiating collective security and defense arrangements will be difficult but not impossible. While there is disagreement as to the extent to which the Trump administration was a cause[122] or a consequence[123] of an

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[114] Braumoeller, *Only the Dead*.
[115] Lascurettes, *Orders of Exclusion*.
[116] Lebow and Zhang, *Justice and International Order*; Cooley and Nexon, *Exit from Hegemony*.
[117] Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, "The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism," *World Politics* 59, no. 3 (April 2007): 341–69, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100020852; Seth A. Johnston, *How NATO Adapts: Strategy and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance Since 1950* (JHU Press, 2017).
[118] Marina E. Henke, *Constructing Allied Cooperation: Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in Multilateral Military Coalitions* (Cornell University Press, 2019).
[119] *Arguing about Alliances*.
[120] John J. Mearsheimer, "Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order," *International Security* 43, no. 4 (April 2019): 7–50, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342; G. John Ikenberry, *A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order* (Yale University Press, 2020).
[121] Lebow and Zhang, *Justice and International Order*; Edward Keene, *Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[122] Norrlof, "Hegemony and Inequality"; Nye, "The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump."
[123] Alexander Cooley, "Ordering Eurasia: The Rise and Decline of Liberal Internationalism in the Post-Communist Space," *Security Studies* 28, no. 3 (May 27, 2019): 588–613, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1604988; Cooley and Nexon, *Exit from Hegemony*.

eroding international order, it is likely that some significant adjustments will be required in its wake. Walter Russel Mead[124] compared Donald Trump to Napoleon. The extent to which members of the current international order can recreate the "constructive spirit" that animated the reconstruction of European order after Waterloo will be central in shaping the emerging international order. The safety and security of much of the earth's population may depend upon such a constructive spirit. *Only the Dead, Rising Titans, Exit from Hegemony, Orders of Exclusion, Justice and International Order, Arguing about Alliances*, and *A World Safe for Commerce* are all important academic contributions in such a constructive spirit. Scholars of international affairs can make further contributions by building on their authors' work both theoretically and empirically.

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[124] "What Trump Has in Common With Napoleon -," Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-trump-has-in-common-with-napoleon-11588784608.

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https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/20/the-quiet-reformation-of-bidens-foreign-policy/.

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Chapter 2 – Beggar Thy Ally? Alliance Politics and International Security in an Era of Economic Nationalism

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ABSTRACT

What does an emerging era of economic nationalism mean for alliance politics and policy? Although students of defense and international relations have long acknowledged the connection between economic nationalism and security, the defense policy implications of the current wave of economic nationalism remain murky. We bring together existing research on alliance management, industrial policy, alignment, and burden sharing to argue that as policymakers in the United States and its allies in Asia and Europe grapple with challenges from China and Russia, they will need to balance the need for industrial autonomy with the need for alliance coordination. An ideological dilemma arises; how to manage a "re-nationalization" of industrial policy for the purposes of preserving an order that defines itself as open. To navigate this dilemma, policies should avoid closing the door on future cooperation with adversaries, while prioritizing current cooperation with allies.

Interdependence remains a central feature of international relations, but the increasing rhetoric of competition and economic nationalism is striking. Both major party candidates for the 2024 U.S. presidential election nod to economic nationalism. Donald Trump's "Tariff Man" approach to international trade is well known,[125] and the Biden administration seeks to promote strategic sectors of the national economy through industrial policy with an explicit eye toward international competition.[126] China has taken a more stridently nationalist approach to economic development than in previous years.[127] Economic nationalism is central to Vladimir Putin's ascendancy in Russia,[128] with the Russo-Ukrainian war consolidating this element of Russian foreign policy.[129] Concurrently, key members of the U.S.-led international order like the EU,[130] Japan,[131] and Australia[132] have all formally developed defense industrial strategies in the last two years. With the line between commercial and military technology becoming blurred,[133] industrial policy and defense policy are often indistinguishable as well.

[125] Jean-Christophe Boucher and Cameron G. Thies, "'I Am a Tariff Man': The Power of Populist Foreign Policy Rhetoric under President Trump," *The Journal of Politics* 81, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 712–22, https://doi.org/10.1086/702229.

[126] For example, the 2024 U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy notes $893 million in Department of Defense investment in "five critical sectors (kinetic capabilities, microelectronics, energy storage and batteries, strategic and critical materials, and castings and forgings)."

[127] Astrid HM Nordin and Mikael Weissmann, "Will Trump Make China Great Again? The Belt and Road Initiative and International Order," *International Affairs* 94, no. 2 (2018): 231–49; Nien-Chung Chang Liao, "The Sources of China's Assertiveness: The System, Domestic Politics or Leadership Preferences?," *International Affairs* 92, no. 4 (July 1, 2016): 817–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12655.

[128] Iver B. Neumann, "Russia's Europe, 1991–2016: Inferiority to Superiority," *International Affairs* 92, no. 6 (November 1, 2016): 1381–99, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12752.

[129] Damian Strycharz, "More than Putin: Managed Pluralism in Russia's Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 100, no. 2 (March 4, 2024): 655–74, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae005.; and Peter Rutland, "The Contradictions in Putin's Economic Nationalism: From Western Partner to Fortress Russia," *Russian Politics* 8, no. 1 (March 7, 2023): 24–47, https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00801002.

[130] European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "A New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU Readiness through a Responsive and Resilient European Defence Industry" (Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, March 3, 2024).

[131] Government of Japan, "Defense Buildup Program," December 16, 2022, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/plan/pdf/program_en.pdf.

[132] Australian Government, "2024 Integrated Investment Program," 2024.

[133] Yoram Evron and Richard A. Bitzinger, *The Fourth Industrial Revolution and Military-Civil Fusion: A New Paradigm for Military Innovation?* (Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2023).

The bipartisan *zeitgeist* in the U.S. reflects a global mood – the U.S.[134] and its allies in Europe[135] and Asia,[136] to say nothing of their rivals, see economic and industrial policy as central to deterrence and resilience, as well as national security and sovereignty. Economic nationalism affects strategy, either directly or through explicit efforts to mitigate its effects through cohesion and solidarity.

What does this trend toward economic nationalism mean for alliance politics and policy? From a policy perspective, how should the United States and its allies coordinate policy during a time of increasing economic nationalism? Despite risks, economic nationalism can be "perfectly benign" when "applied judiciously."[137] Drawing on recent research on alliance management, industrial policy, and burden sharing, we argue that although an international order characterized by rival blocs presents risks and is unlikely to optimize economic development, it need not mean a repetition of the disastrous economic nationalism of the early 20th century.[138] How countries and alliances address the "nationalist dilemma," or the tension between self-sufficiency and economic growth,[139] is key.

Rising to grand strategic challenges in a period of resurgent economic nationalism requires ensuring that the U.S. and its allies do not "beggar" one another by addressing national economic issues at the expense of allies, weakening themselves relative to adversaries and damaging cohesion.[140] At the same time, they must balance competition against rivals with the need to hold out the possibility of future cooperation.

This requirement to balance developing allies' capabilities without provoking excessive fear among rivals has clear policy implications: despite limitations, "Friendshoring"[141] represents the best available approach in the current environment. First, by linking economic benefits to strategic alignment, friendshoring encourages cooperative behavior in friends and competitors alike – the latter are more likely to initiate conflict if they perceive future cooperation to be unlikely.[142] Second, it strengthens the overall capabilities of friendly states, leaving them better able to cope with conflict. Third, it helps "bind"[143] allies, guarding against adversary attempts at "wedging."[144]

This logic is consistent with important recent work on great power competition and trade. Copeland identifies three "realms" of great power commerce: first is a great power's own economy and those of its immediate neighbors and military allies, second is neutral states or those who trade with all the great powers, and third is a rival great power's economy, along with those of that rival's neighbors and military allies. By encouraging

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[134] Victor D. Cha, "Collective Resilience: Deterring China's Weaponization of Economic Interdependence," *International Security* 48, no. 1 (July 1, 2023): 91–124, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00465.
[135] European Commission, "An EU Approach to Enhance Economic Security," Text, European Commission, June 20, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_3358.
[136] David E. Adler, "Why 'Economic Security' Became Magic Words in Japan," *Foreign Policy* (blog), June 20, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/20/japan-china-economic-security-strategic-threat/; Helen Mitchell, "Unlocking Economic Security: A Strategic Playbook for Australia," March 13, 2024, https://www.ussc.edu.au/unlocking-economic-security-a-strategic-playbook-for-australia.
[137] Dani Rodrik, "Doing Economic Nationalism the Right Way," Project Syndicate, November 7, 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/east-asian-model-vindicates-economic-nationalism-by-dani-rodrik-2023-11.
[138] Charles Schrecker, "The Growth of Economic Nationalism and Its International Consequences," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939)* 13, no. 2 (1934): 208–25, https://doi.org/10.2307/2603137.
[139] Marvin Suesse, *The Nationalist Dilemma: A Global History of Economic Nationalism, 1776–Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108917087.
[140] Cohesion refers to "The degree to which members are able to agree on goals, strategies, and tactics, and coordinate activity for attaining those goals (Aaron Bazin and Dominika Kunertova, "An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO," *Military Review* January-February (2018), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/..)"
[141] Emily Benson and Ethan B. Kapstein, "The Limits of 'Friend-Shoring'" (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2023), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep47343.
[142] Dale C Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (1996): 5–41.
[143] Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "Binding Strategies in Alliance Politics: The Soviet-Japanese-US Diplomatic Tug of War in the Mid-1950s," *International Studies Quarterly* 62, no. 1 (March 1, 2018): 108–20, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx070.
[144] Yasuhiro Izumikawa, "To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics," *Security Studies* 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2013): 498–531, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.816121; Timothy W. Crawford, *The Power to Divide*, *The Power to Divide* (Cornell University Press, 2021), https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781501754739/html.

friends to cooperate, the U.S. and its allies can enlarge their first realm by inducing states into the second realm. By increasing their own economic strength through trade, they can better defend and coerce should the need arise while enhancing their ability to spoil adversarial efforts to coerce states in the first and second realms.

Managing economic nationalism among allies also affects allies' defense capabilities materially. A flurry of emerging national defense industrial strategies attempts to mitigate the nationalist dilemma by focusing on the need to assure domestic production and maintenance of key military capabilities, while even more strongly emphasizing the need for cooperation and coordination with allies. These aims are not contradictory but are simply present manifestations of how states manage the nationalist dilemma. Successful policies will manage to retain national freedom of maneuver while cooperating with allies, deterring adversaries, and holding out the possibility of greater cooperation in the future. For example, NATO's Defence Production Action Plan helps coordinate this strategic approach across the North Atlantic Alliance. Agreed at the Vilnius Summit,[145] linking defense industrial policy to the Defence Investment Pledge (as the 2014 Wales Pledge[146] did) and aiming to "accelerate joint procurement, boost production capacity, and enhance allies' interoperability." Similar policy coordination with allies in the Indo-Pacific would also further this aim and could be pursued, inter alia, through NATO's partnership programs, in coordination with the relevant NATO committees.[147]

Economic Nationalism and International Security

Economic nationalism is the belief that the nation and the economy should be congruent.[148] Operationally, it is the idea that a state's economy should serve nationalist goals. Scholars largely agree on the centrality of "the economic foundations of military power,"[149] but unlike economic nationalists, economic liberals contend "that economic specialization produces a gain in productive efficiency and national income," with international trade offering benefits in national economies, while creating positive interdependence that is "a force for peace."[150] Both economic nationalism and economic liberalism can "backfire when taken to extremes,"[151] but can work well when pursued judiciously. In the simplest of terms, economic nationalists seek to shape economies in the service of nations, whereas liberals focus on individuals. Of course, states, which often represent nations, consist of and provide for individuals, so in practice, the two are difficult to disentangle.

Unsurprisingly, reality appears to have complied with neither theoretical approach, with states' expectations about future trade and their perception of their prospects in conflict interacting to drive the relationship between trade, peace, and war. Deglobalization might not be an empirical reality,[152] but *talk* of decoupling can

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[145] NATO, "Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2023)," July 11, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm.

[146] NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales," NATO, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

[147] The Conference of National Armaments Directors, the Defence Policy Planning Committee, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group, and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. Focusing on reinvigorating the Industrial Advisory Group, a public-private cooperative entity, could be particularly helpful to engage partners.
Outside NATO, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, in Pillar 1 of AUKUS, are cooperating to produce a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia, and AUKUS Pillar 2 is expected to deal with other advanced capabilities, with possible additional partners such as Japan, South Korea, Canada, and New Zealand.

[148] Suesse, *The Nationalist Dilemma*.

[149] Edward Meade Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert (OUP Oxford, 1986).

[150] Robert G. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, 1st edition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987), 172–73.

[151] Rodrik, "Doing Economic Nationalism the Right Way."

[152] Uri Dadush, "Deglobalisation and Protectionism" (Bruegel, November 17, 2022), https://www.bruegel.org/working-paper/deglobalisation-and-protectionism.

lead states to worry over future trade and access to key materials, increasing the risk of conflict.[153] Whether one calls it "de-risking" or "decoupling,"[154] rivals may fear losing market access regardless.

Economic nationalism has played a role in U.S. policy since its founding. Alexander Hamilton, who drove Friedrich List to theorize economic nationalism and inspire practitioners around the world, is generally seen as an economic nationalist who sought to render the United States "independent of foreign nations for military and other essential supplies."[155] But Hamilton also saw tension between liberalism and nationalism and sought to balance them.[156] This tension has been a recurrent theme in U.S. trade and security policy. Today, the Biden administration explicitly seeks to "more deeply integrate domestic policy and foreign policy" to mitigate the risks of "overdependence" highlighted by the Russo-Ukrainian war, leading observers to call Biden a "secret Hamiltonian."[157]

Similarly, the Chinese growth model reflects a not-so-secret Listian approach, which, like Hamilton's, was economically nationalist but not mercantilist. List sought to expand Adam Smith's arguments about economics to incorporate the political and strategic nature of trade.[158] China highlights its "state-led approaches to development," explicitly pointing to the centrality of Hamilton in the economic history of the U.S..[159] Similarly, the EU has developed its own Defence Industrial Strategy,[160] as have Japan[161] and Australia,[162] and progressives in the UK see "securonomics" as a vehicle for state-led development amid insecurity.[163] Though they vary in their use of economically nationalist language, each of these documents arises from and are shaped by a context of economic nationalism.

In this context, if Bidenomics is a modern variation of Hamiltonianism, "Trumpian economic nationalism" is different – what Eric Helleiner calls a "distinct variety" of American economic nationalism.[164] The Biden administration has "continued and intensified" the Trump administration's policies toward China and the Inflation Reduction Act has alarmed European and Asian allies of the US.[165] Still, whereas Biden might navigate the conflicting aims of economic expansion and independence (what Suesse calls "the nationalist dilemma"[166]) by tightening relations with allies, Trumpists would likely do so by rendering the U.S. a bloc unto itself. European policy experts argue, for example, that while a second Biden administration "would protect the transatlantic bond and give time and support to assume greater responsibility for their turbulent continent and neighborhood … A second Trump term would "exacerbate the instability Europe is already struggling to manage."[167] In Asia, Trump's "nationalist approach to trade" would "likely put immense pressure on states like

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[153] Copeland, "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations."
[154] Emily Benson and Gloria Sicilia, "A Closer Look at De-Risking," December 20, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/closer-look-de-risking; Agathe Demarais, "What Does 'De-Risking' Actually Mean?," *Foreign Policy* (blog), June 13, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/23/derisking-us-china-biden-decoupling-technology-supply-chains-semiconductors-chips-ira-trade/.
[155] Alexander Hamilton, "Final Version of the Report on the Subject of Manufactures" (University of Virginia Press, December 5, 1791), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007.
[156] Christine Margerum Harlen, "A Reappraisal of Classical Economic Nationalism and Economic Liberalism," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (1999): 733–44.
[157] Jacob Soll, "There Is a Secret Hamiltonian in the White House," *The New York Times*, March 10, 2024, sec. Opinion, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/10/opinion/biden-hamilton-china-chips.html.
[158] David Levi-Faur, "Friedrich List and the Political Economy of the Nation-State," *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 1 (1997): 154–78.
[159] Shaun Breslin, "The 'China Model' and the Global Crisis: From Friedrich List to a Chinese Mode of Governance?," *International Affairs* 87, no. 6 (2011): 1342.
[160] European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "A New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU Readiness through a Responsive and Resilient European Defence Industry."
[161] Japan, "Defense Buildup Program."
[162] Australian Government, "2024 Integrated Investment Program."
[163] Rachel Reeves, "Time for Securonomics," *IPPR Progressive Review* 30, no. 3 (2023): 150–54.
[164] Eric Helleiner, "Varieties of American Neomercantilism: From the First Years of the Republic to Trumpian Economic Nationalism," *European Review of International Studies* 6, no. 3 (2019): 7.
[165] Eric Helleiner, "Economic Globalization's Polycrisis," *International Studies Quarterly* 68, no. 2 (June 1, 2024): sqae024, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqae024.
[166] Suesse, *The Nationalist Dilemma*.
[167] Arancha González Laya et al., "Trump-Proofing Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, February 2, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/trump-proofing-europe.

Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore."[168] Japan worries that a second Trump administration would restore tariffs on Japanese steel and follow an even more aggressive trade policy than he did in his first term.[169] In Korea, the Biden administration was able to "solve" problems with electric vehicle subsidies.[170] Whether a second Trump administration would view Korea's concerns as a problem worth solving is doubtful.

The inclusiveness (or exclusiveness) of trading blocs and political orders will affect conflict and cooperation in significant ways. U.S. allies like Korean President Yoon have linked trade and geostrategy explicitly: "cooperation between countries in the realms of security, economy, and advanced technologies has been increasingly regarded as a package deal, giving rise to the trend of bloc-forming among countries…We will align and cooperate with mutually trusted countries."[171]

How the U.S., its allies, and its adversaries manage Suesse's "nationalist dilemma," will thus be a defining challenge. Risks are legion. Despite the benefits of trade openness within blocs,[172] such blocs may keep peace among their members at the expense of driving conflict externally.[173] The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Ruchir Agarwal makes an explicit connection between economic nationalism and industrial policy, noting that the desire to establish national champions competes with desires for economic growth and financial and fiscal stability. The IMF itself has good reason for institutional interest in the effects of economic nationalism and active defense industrial policies championing domestic production, as it focuses on the stability of the international monetary and financial system in support of the World Trade Organization's efforts to ensure smooth, predictable and free international trade under a set of agreed rules and dispute resolution mechanisms. The challenge is clear: documents like the U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy emphasize cooperation with allies, but they also include "buy American"[174] provisions aimed at expanding "support for domestic production,"[175] which may alarm allies as much, if not more than, adversaries.

The challenge of establishing boundaries, consolidating alliances, and preparing for future conflict while communicating openness to mutually beneficial future relations with adversaries is a balance to be struck, not a prize to be won definitively. Doing so requires policymakers to mitigate vulnerabilities associated with interdependence without closing doors on opportunities for cooperation as defense and related industries re-nationalize – now and in the future.

"Friendshoring" by shifting supply chains to allies and partners, or "nearshoring" to neighboring countries,[176] rather than "onshoring" with entirely domestic supply chains offers three advantages: first, by signaling a lack of interest in autarky and a commitment to free trade conditioned on peaceful circumstances, it communicates an openness to future trade with current adversaries should relations become more pacific, thereby reducing the likelihood of conflict.[177] The U.S. and its allies pursued such a balance during the Cold War:[178] the General

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[168] Joshua Kurlantzick, "What a Second Trump Term Could Mean for Southeast Asia," *The Japan Times*, May 8, 2024, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/commentary/2024/05/08/world/second-trump-term-southeast-asia/.
[169] Lionel Barber, "Why America's Longtime Ally in Asia Is So Anxious About Trump 2.0," POLITICO, April 9, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/04/09/japan-prepares-second-trump-presidency-00151150.
[170] Chad P. Bown, "How the United States Solved South Korea's Problems with Electric Vehicle Subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act | PIIE," July 26, 2023, https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/how-united-states-solved-south-koreas-problems-electric-vehicle.
[171] Yoon Suk Yeol, "Davos 2023: Special Address by Yoon Suk Yeol, President of the Republic of Korea," World Economic Forum, January 19, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/01/davos-2023-special-address-by-yoon-suk-yeol-president-of-the-republic-of-korea/.
[172] Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," *The American Political Science Review* 83, no. 4 (December 1989): 1245.
[173] Bear F. Braumoeller, *Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
[174] Kathryn Levantovscaia, "Reading between the Lines of the New US National Defense Industrial Strategy," *Atlantic Council* (blog), February 14, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/reading-between-the-lines-of-the-new-us-national-defense-industrial-strategy/.
[175] Department of Defense, "The National Defense Industrial Strategy," January 2024, https://www.businessdefense.gov/NDIS.html.
[176] Because Copeland places both allies/partners and neighbors in the "first realm," we use the term "friendshoring" henceforth to designate both practices.
[177] Dale C. Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970–74 and the End of the Cold War 1985–91," *Security Studies* 9, no. 1–2 (September 1999): 15–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419908429394.
[178] Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade."

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) explicitly aimed to prevent "free riding and beggar-my-neighbor policies,"[179] and, as the Cold War reached its conclusion, the United States and its allies helped the Soviet Union gain GATT observer status, (Czechoslovakia was a founding member of GATT, Poland joined in 1967, Romania in 1971, and Hungary in 1973).[180] Moscow also signed an agreement on trade with the European Community in 1989.[181] Similarly, China joined the WTO in 2001, albeit with controversy that has only increased in subsequent years.[182] The relationship between trade and security can also go in the other direction, with alliances helping members weather trade disputes.[183]

Second, friendshoring maximizes the aggregate economic and military power of friendly states. NATO's founding treaty explicitly links "self-help and mutual aid,"[184] but U.S. alliances in Asia also link the two through "industrial and operational military integration."[185] Finally, friendshoring closes gaps between allies that adversaries can otherwise exploit.[186]

Resilience within allies and across alliances

The U.S. and its allies' management of the nationalist dilemma - with both one another and with adversaries - has important implications for cohesion, resilience, and deterrence. Economic cohesion supports deterrence: allies tied together economically may grow stronger and are better placed to coordinate their activities against those that threaten their common interests. In contrast, "beggar thy ally" approaches undermine cohesiveness with allies exporting unemployment and other economic bads to each other. During the interwar Great Depression, when the U.S. had no military alliances, "beggar thy neighbor" had such effects, with massive tariffs damaging the U.S.'s Western European partners, further fragmenting the world economy, and deepening political polarization around the globe to the benefit of hostile ideologies like Nazism. Of course, cohesive alliances could, in principle, threaten rivals by creating security dilemmas,[187] but, in a world of Russian revanchism, growing Chinese assertiveness, and democratic backsliding, stronger alliances are arguably the better option for deterring conflict than a loosening of those relationships.[188]

Such strengthening depends in part on consolidating and improving national and collective resilience. Resilience within allies and across the alliance is an explicit priority for NATO,[189] supporting deterrence. NATO calls resilience "the capacity to prepare for, resist, respond to and quickly recover from shocks and disruptions" and expects allies to "enhance their resilience through the development of their national defence capacity, assured access to critical infrastructure and the development of back-up plans in the event of crises" to "deter, counter or recover from threats or disruptions."[190]

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[179] Martin Daunton, *The Economic Government of the World: 1933-2023* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2023).
[180] Leah Haus, "The East European Countries and GATT: The Role of Realism, Mercantilism, and Regime Theory in Explaining East-West Trade Negotiations," *International Organization* 45, no. 2 (1991): 163–82.
[181] EU Publications Office, "Agreement between the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation - Declaration by the USSR - Joint Declaration, CELEX1" (Publications Office of the European Union, December 18, 1989), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/45079ca2-c6c3-4d49-be49-1a696201b07e/language-en.
[182] Thomas Dorsey et al., "The Impact of WTO Accession," in *China: Competing in the Global Economy*, by Wanda S. Tseng and Markus Rodlauer (International Monetary Fund, 2023).
[183] Tongfi Kim, *The Supply Side of Security: A Market Theory of Military Alliances* (Stanford University Press, 2016).
[184] NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO, April 4, 1949, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
[185] Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, "Operational and Industrial Military Integration: Extending the Frontiers of the Japan–US Alliance," *International Affairs* 94, no. 4 (July 1, 2018): 755–72, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy097.
[186] Crawford, *The Power to Divide*.
[187] Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010183.
[188] Alexander Cooley et al., "Estimating Alliance Costs: An Exchange," *Security Studies* 31, no. 3 (2022): 510–32.
[189] NATO, "Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3," NATO, August 2, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm; NATO, "2022 Strategic Concept," June 29, 2022, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.
[190] NATO, "Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3."

While conversations about resilience often focus on individual countries, resilience across alliances is also vital to support deterrence and defense. Economic and trade cohesion is material, visible, and measurable. U.S. policymakers have a long history of "maintaining a core economic power sphere that would ensure access to key trading partners…" and have been inclined to peace and free trade when confident that trade supported such access. When it did not, U.S. leaders have not hesitated to respond forcefully.[191] As rivalry with Russia and China accelerates, management of this reflex to avoid friction with allies will acquire greater significance. Just as adversaries seek to undermine societies in target states,[192] they seek to undermine alliance cohesion – resilience must be undertaken within, but also among allies. Doing so requires effective management of economic tension between allies – a "beggar thy ally" approach puts alliance cohesion at risk and should be avoided.

Accordingly, new defense industrial strategies have emphasized the relationship between cooperative defense industrial policy and resilience. The European Defense Industrial Strategy notes the importance of prioritizing "collaborative investments," contending that "partnerships should be leveraged to enhance readiness and resilience."[193] Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol linked economic, strategic, and industrial cooperation explicitly: "Those countries that share the universal values of freedom, human rights, and the rule of law are banding together through their economies and industries. This solidarity based on these universal values is the most strategic choice."[194] Finally, the U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy seeks to "engage allies and partners to expand global defense production and increase supply chain resilience."[195] The "nationalist dilemma" is apparent in these national strategies as well: Australia notes that "undertaking essential sustainment activities for critical guided weapons domestically will also improve Australia's security and resilience. Using the Mark 48 torpedo as an example, the Government will work with the U.S. and other key partners to explore opportunities for weapons system co-sustainment activities."[196]

Resilience thus applies to alliances and security partnerships as well as within states. For example, Ukrainian physical resilience and resolve support Ukraine's resistance against Russian aggression. The same is true of Ukraine's external supporters – Putin's strategy to divide the West over the war makes that apparent.[197] So while the key locus of resilience may be at the national, or even local, level, resilience of relationships *among* allies and partners, such as EU-Japan cooperation initiatives,[198] is critical. Thus, the U.S. and its allies should ensure that "best practices" in total defense are "uploaded"[199] at the alliance and trans-theater levels.

Aside from coordinating resilience activities with a particular focus on economic and industrial resilience, allied strategists must bring together thinking on alliances, partnerships, and alignment across theaters.[200] NATO's global partners program is a useful platform for such cross-regional cooperation, with programs oriented toward resilience. By building resilience in coordination, allies can ensure they are not inadvertently beggaring one another with national economic, industrial, and resilience policies. Rather than re-nationalizing supply chains, for example, allies should secure multinational supply chains, prioritizing "friendshoring" over

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[191] Dale C. Copeland, *A World Safe for Commerce: American Foreign Policy from the Revolution to the Rise of China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2024).
[192] Alexander Lanoszka, "Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe," *International Affairs* 92, no. 1 (2016): 175–95; Ryuta Ito, "Hybrid Balancing as Classical Realist Statecraft: China's Balancing Behaviour in the Indo-Pacific," *International Affairs* 98, no. 6 (November 2, 2022): 1959–75, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiac214.
[193] European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "A New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU Readiness through a Responsive and Resilient European Defence Industry."
[194] Office of National Security, Office of the President, Republic of Korea, "The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration's National Security Strategy: Global Pivotal State for Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity," 2023.
[195] Department of Defense, "The National Defense Industrial Strategy."
[196] Australian Government, "2024 Integrated Investment Program."
[197] Robert Person and Michael McFaul, "What Putin Fears Most," Journal of Democracy, March 2022, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/what-putin-fears-most/.
[198] Jean-Claude Juncker and Shinzo Abe, "The Partnership on Sustainable Connectivity and Quality Infrastructure between the European Union and Japan," September 27, 2019, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/partnership-sustainable-connectivity-and-quality-infrastructure-between-european-union-and_en.
[199] Tanja A. Borzel, "Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 2 (2002): 193–214.
[200] Luis Simon and Zack Cooper, "Rethinking Tradeoffs Between Europe and the Indo-Pacific," *War on the Rocks*, May 9, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/rethinking-tradeoffs-between-europe-and-the-indo-pacific/.

"onshoring."[201] Because of the centrality of defense industrial policy and the risks that "beggar thy ally" approaches pose to NATO's progress on resilience, NATO should consider adding a seventh specialized Resilience Planning to coordinate and to harmonize defense industrial policy.

Alliances, Deterrence and Defense – the intersection of national and alliance resilience

The coordination of national resilience and strengthening alliance-wide resilience might come into tension with initiatives to re-nationalize critical industries. Allies must, therefore, overcome the "nationalist dilemma" to ensure deterrence and defense. The Russo-Ukrainian war has tested the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 3, which demands that allies "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,"[202] requiring allies to strengthen their own military capabilities and defense industrial bases. Russia's initially bungling aggression in Ukraine has allowed allies to address Article 3 shortfalls before allies themselves are decisively engaged. Coordination of national resilience, as well as capabilities and capacity, is essential to deterrence and defense. [203]

Burden-sharing across allies remains a critical element of cohesion and capacity. It reinforces deterrence and defense since capabilities and capacity give decision-makers more and better options to respond to an adversary.[204] It is also relevant to defense industrial policy, since beggaring allies can undermine burden-sharing by stoking nationalist anti-alliance sentiment.

It is also related to defense industrial policy, and avoiding beggaring allies can support more equitable burden-sharing by distributing the positive spillovers from defense spending more equitably.[205] Adequate investments in capabilities and capacity in accordance with Article 3 are essential to the ability to "restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area"[206] in accordance with Article 5. Pre-existing defense expenditures predicted NATO members' military assistance to Ukraine, even controlling for both proximity to and energy dependency on Russia.[207]

Korea's intensive provision of munitions to Ukraine is evidence of both the global nature of the conflict and the importance of maintaining national defense industrial bases in the absence of acute conflict.[208] If Russia had attacked NATO territory instead, then the defense of the impacted members would fall disproportionately on those with the ability. This issue is not abstract: concerns about whether Canada can fulfill its Madrid Summit pledge to upgrade the enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup in Latvia to a brigade after decades of under-investment arguably has forced Latvia to make more investments on its own defense than it might have wanted to do.[209]

Another area where economic and societal resilience intersects with the Russo-Ukrainian War and broader deterrence and defense globally is defense industrial policy. The U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy

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[201] Laura Alfaro and Davin Chor, "Global Supply Chains: The Looming 'Great Reallocation,'" Working Paper, Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2023), https://doi.org/10.3386/w31661; Benson and Kapstein, "The Limits of 'Friend-Shoring'"; Tongfi Kim, "The U.S.-South Korea Alliance and the Deterrence of China's Aggression against Taiwan," *CSDS Policy Brief*, November 15, 2022.

[202] NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty."

[203] Jane Kaufmann, "How to Buy Friends and Influence States: A Structural Estimation of Competing Aid Sources" (States, Societies and Security in the 21st Century, United States Military Academy, West Point, 2024).

[204] Fenella McGerty et al., "NATO Burden-Sharing: Past, Present, Future," *Defence Studies* 22, no. 3 (July 3, 2022): 533–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2082953.

[205] Jade Guiberteau, Lucas Hellemeier, and Kaija Schilde, "Defense Industrial Policy in a Changing International Order: Rethinking Transatlantic Burden-Sharing," *Defence Studies* 24, no. 1 (January 2, 2024): 166–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2023.2279615.

[206] NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty."

[207] Alexander Lanoszka and Jordan Becker, "The Art of Partial Commitment: The Politics of Military Assistance to Ukraine," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 39, no. 3 (May 4, 2023): 173, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2162758.

[208] Mark F. Cancian and Chris H. Park, "Can South Korean 105-Millimeter Ammunition Rescue Ukraine?" March 22, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-south-korean-105-millimeter-ammunition-rescue-ukraine.

[209] Toms Rostoks and Alexander Lanoszka, "Success Assured? Appraising the Canadian-Led Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup in Latvia," *Macdonald-Laurier Institute* (blog), April 2, 2024, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/success-assured-canada-latvia-enhanced-forward-presence-battlegroup-toms-rostoks-alexander-lanoszka/.

(NDIS) highlights both economic resilience and economic deterrence.[210] As the NDIS aims to strengthen the U.S. Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB), allies in Europe and Asia aspire to do the same.[211] Economic deterrence, according to the NDIS, requires enhancing domestic production while diversifying supplier bases; promoting flexible acquisition; increasing workforce readiness; and promoting fair and effective market mechanisms supporting a resilient defense industrial ecosystem in the U.S. and its "close international allies and partners."[212]

So, as many strategists focus on U.S.-China interactions in the U.S.'s "third realm," alliance managers must focus on enlarging and consolidating its "first realm." This focus is not incompatible with economic nationalism in the Hamiltonian sense, but policymakers in Washington, Brussels, Tokyo, and Seoul must be conscious of "beggar thy ally" risks, as well as economic interdependence between U.S. allies in China's immediate geographic neighborhood.[213]

Such "beggar thy ally" risks are important because alliances, partnerships, and alignments do not emerge spontaneously or naturally but result from political processes.[214] This insight applies both to the U.S.'s "first realm" and to China's – particularly if one considers its "no limits"[215] partnership with Russia to place the two states in one another's "first realm." Great powers seek to shape alignment with economic engagement and foreign aid.[216] Though the literature on aid provision and alignment has not generated a consensus on the relationship between the two,[217] recent work finds that China and the U.S. use aid as a tool of geostrategic competition – higher aid provision corresponds with closer ideal point alignment in the UN General Assembly,[218] and the process advantages first movers, punishing states who seek to regain lost ground in a non-aligned or contested state.[219]

Regardless of the outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election, it appears clear that economic nationalism is on the rise globally. As the U.S. and its allies pursue strategies of strategic and industrial autonomy, they must consider *from whom* they would like to be autonomous, avoiding beggaring one another as they gird for competition with China, Russia, and other adversaries.

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[210] Department of Defense, "The National Defense Industrial Strategy."
[211] European Commission, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, "A New European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU Readiness through a Responsive and Resilient European Defence Industry"; Japan, "Defense Buildup Program"; Japanese Ministry of Defense, "National Defense Strategy," December 16, 2022; Office of National Security, Office of the President, Republic of Korea, "The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration's National Security Strategy: Global Pivotal State for Freedom, Peace, and Prosperity."
[212] Department of Defense, "The National Defense Industrial Strategy," 43.
[213] G. John Ikenberry, "Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia," *Political Science Quarterly* 131, no. 1 (2017 2016): 9–44.
[214] Alexander Lanoszka et al., "Alignments and Alliances: Origins and Change" (States, Societies and Security in the 21st Century, United States Military Academy, West Point, 2024).
[215] Patricia M. Kim, "The Limits of the No-Limits Partnership: China and Russia Can't Be Split, but They Can Be Thwarted," *Foreign Affairs* 102, no. 2 (2023): 94–105.
[216] Andrew G Long and Brett Ashley Leeds, "Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements*," *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no. 4 (2006): 433–51; Paul Poast, "Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945," *International Organization* 66, no. 2 (April 2012): 277–310, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000069; Kim, *The Supply Side of Security*; Benjamin O Fordham, "Trade and Asymmetric Alliances," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 6 (November 1, 2010): 685–96, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310381689.
[217] Georg Strüver, "What Friends Are Made of: Bilateral Linkages and Domestic Drivers of Foreign Policy Alignment with China," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12, no. 2 (April 1, 2016): 170–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12050; Damian Raess, Wanlin Ren, and Patrick Wagner, "Hidden Strings Attached? Chinese (Commercially Oriented) Foreign Aid and International Political Alignment," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 18, no. 3 (July 1, 2022): orac010, https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac010; Ngaire Woods, "Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in Development Assistance," *International Affairs* 84, no. 6 (2008): 1205–21.
[218] Michael A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten, "Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 2 (February 1, 2017): 430–56, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715595700.
[219] Kaufmann, "How to Buy Friends and Influence States: A Structural Estimation of Competing Aid Sources."

CONCLUSIONS

The international order is changing, perhaps fragmenting, with economic nationalism increasingly salient among policymakers. We argue that while the division of the world into rival camps is not desirable, such a structure appears to be emerging. The risk of violence in a period of shifting boundaries between rival international orders is considerable.[220] Policymakers should be acutely aware of those risks and should manage them carefully – including and perhaps especially in the economic arena, where "trade-security dilemma(s)" and, specifically, how states choose to manage them, can drive either cooperation or conflict.[221] In the case of the latter, strong alliances remain critical and should be maintained assiduously.

Policymakers must thus balance the need to ensure their national security amid uncertainty about other states' intentions with the need to reassure those same states about their own intentions. Critical to this balance is coordinating allied economic statecraft (not least, defense industrial policies) with allies and leaving doors open to future cooperation with adversaries. This sort of flexibility supports resilience – at the economic, societal, and military levels –within countries and across alliances. Such resilience supports deterrence. However, the ability to coordinate and harmonize is not automatic – alliances can weaken, and allied countries' national politics pose real risks of such weakening or de-alignment.

The policy implications of this requirement to manage the nationalist dilemma with both allies and rivals are significant – questions like the putative acquisition of U.S. Steel by Nippon Steel are not one-offs but will continue to arise. Such "friendshoring" could help strike the required balance, and "onshoring" as an expression of economic nationalism may risk creating fissures in relationships that are critical to competing with dangerous rivals.[222]

Empirical research can assess how order is fragmenting or coalescing and how economic relations and interacting defense industrial policies affect such alignment. But the U.S.-led order faces myriad challenges, ranging from aging populations and a general "crisis in retention and recruitment of armed forces,"[223] to competition with rivals using "economic leverage to create strategic dependencies, enhance influence and subvert the rules-based international order."[224] As war rages in Ukraine, uncertainty abounds. Members of the U.S.-led international order cannot afford to "beggar thy ally" – if economic nationalism and rival blocs are the order of the day, it is in their interest to have as inclusive and cohesive a bloc as possible.

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[220] Braumoeller, *Only the Dead*.
[221] Copeland, "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace," 16.
[222] Sarah Bauerle Danzman, "The US Steel Deal Is a Test of Friendshoring—and the US Is Failing," *Atlantic Council* (blog), January 8, 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-steel-deal-is-a-test-of-friendshoring-and-the-us-is-failing/.
[223] Rudy Ruitenberg and Andrew Chuter, "Hiring Woes Bedevil European Nations Stocking up on Weapons," Defense News, January 10, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/01/10/hiring-woes-bedevil-european-nations-stocking-up-on-weapons/.
[224] NATO, "2022 Strategic Concept."

Chapter 3 – Cracking Open the Black Box: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in an Era of Great Power Rivalry

Maryum Alam and Scott Limbocker

ABSTRACT

Domestic politics are more critical than ever to understand the sources, conduct, and consequences of American Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy. This paper addresses three intellectual and policy-relevant questions. First, how do domestic politics affect decision points in the foreign policy process? Second, how can domestic politics in allies and partner states affect their cooperation with the United States as it navigates a complex and dynamic strategic environment? Third, how can the United States address the multi-faceted challenges of maintaining the international order? To answer these critical policy questions, we offer three suggestions. First, a healthy nonpartisan and political non-interference norm in democracies with civilian control of the military should not devolve into an unhealthy ignorance about domestic politics shaping elected officials' choices. This point is especially appreciated in US civil-military relations but should also be considered in regimes with varying levels of democratic participation and civilian oversight of the military. Second, strategic analyses must systematically encompass the domestic realities of partners and adversaries. This includes the internal divisions within those states and points of domestic polarization on salient foreign policy issues specific to those countries. Third, regional expertise, whether in the form of area studies or comparative politics, will remain critical. Senior leaders should consider developing trusted networks of such expertise to tap, both internal and external to DoD. Such expertise needs to be cultivated even (and perhaps especially) in regions that are not currently politically salient.

INTRODUCTION

Long gone are the days of consensus in foreign policy, both in the US and abroad. Bipartisanship on foreign policy issues is rare as partisan and ideological polarization rises – and where bipartisanship exists—such as US Congressional bipartisanship on China (Bryan and Tama 2022; Tama 2023) —it is not clear how durable it will be in the long-term. Foreign policy issues are expected to affect voting behavior in both the US and allied states, especially as Western support for Ukraine and Israel have polarized domestic publics. These patterns are part and parcel of the changing landscape of foreign policy discourse and implementation. Domestic politics have never been more integral to our understanding of the foreign policy process, whether we like it or not, or whether we believe foreign policy should be left to the elites. Since strategists are perpetually searching for the sources of policy preferences, it is critical to crack open the domestic black box. Leaders are increasingly sensitive to these domestic political dynamics as foreign policy becomes salient at both elite and mass levels of analysis. This essay synthesizes ongoing cutting-edge research at the intersection of domestic politics and foreign policy to consider the landscape of US domestic politics and foreign policy and how polarization and public opinion will touch future foreign policy choices.

While there may be some questions about the coherence of public attitudes towards foreign policy (Holsti 1992; Kertzer and McGraw 2012; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017; Kertzer 2018), it is clear that the US public accesses these attitudes when voting (Aldrich et al. 2006; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009; Gelpi 2010, 2017) and political parties' foreign policy platforms are distinct enough from one another that voters can use them to distinguish between parties and candidates when voting (Cavari and Freedman 2019; Kertzer, Brooks, and Brooks 2021). It is time for analysts to jettison the tired notion that politics stops at the water's edge.

This essay emerges from a working group bringing together scholars in these two research traditions to understand the interplay between leaders, elites, and the public in the initiation, conduct, and outcomes of war. We offer new theoretical and empirical insights into the mechanisms by which the public and leaders navigate the sources and consequences of foreign policy. The public's opinion on how to use force or diplomacy will also be taken more seriously by leaders in this age of polarization because a homogenous base souring on an international engagement will potentially sway the elected officials' opinions rather than risk losing in an election. This contributes to the study of the sources and consequences of leader decision-making and an understanding of democratic constraint in the study of foreign policy. Importantly, these findings have implications for the way to think about how countries develop their positions when engaging with partners abroad. Failing to grasp the domestic audiences driving the positions of partners will lead to suboptimal engagements with allies.

Strategists should prepare for civilian leadership to be more beholden to these forces than in the past. We argue that given the salience and polarization of foreign policy in domestic politics in the US and its allies, policymakers must deeply understand domestic politics in their own countries while maintaining a non-partisan professional ethic. Policymakers must also consider domestic politics in terms of allies, partners, and adversaries. It is critical that strategists recruit, retain, and train as necessary regional experts in the form of area studies and comparative politics experts, valuing these skillsets globally and not just in current "hot" areas.

Navigating a Complicated Strategic Environment under Domestic Constraints

The public's role in international affairs is growing.

Advice: A nonpartisan norm in the military cannot devolve to a naive ignorance about domestic politics shaping elected officials' choices.

A partisan polarization in a country will create larger swings in foreign policy preferences.

Advice: Require analysts to brief and be experts on the domestic realities of partners prior to any engagement with those partners.

No action taken by any country or its military can be expected to live in a purely international or domestic vacuum.

Advice: Regional expertise will become more valuable. As certain areas across the globe become more salient, senior leaders should consider developing trusted networks of expertise to tap, both internal and external to DoD.

It takes two to tango: leader-public foreign policy connection

While the US is central to an analysis of foreign policy coming from the US government, nothing described above about the US would only apply to an American audience. All countries, especially democratic ones electing officials to run their country, have domestic considerations and policy concerns that will shape their behaviors and outcomes internationally. Autocracies increasingly must consider core constituencies such as elites, militaries, and other domestic groups that can threaten regime stability. This seemingly obvious claim is gaining more attention from international relations scholars who have examined the role of leaders in international security and conflict over the past two decades. An initial wave of scholarship focused on questions of whether leaders' matter, with recent research now turning to the study of "how." How do internal conditions affect leader decision-making, and to what extent are leaders affected by domestic shifts before, during, and after war? Conversely, how do leaders and domestic audiences learn from experiences during and after periods of war?

Leader preferences and foreign policy behavior in democracies

The first insight from current research is that foreign policy decision-makers—most notably executive leaders—are balancing the costs and benefits of pursuing a foreign policy from various levels of analysis. These include not only the human or financial costs but also due to the individual and national reputational costs of implementing a foreign policy.

First, current scholarship finds that leader decision-making can be complex, multidimensional, and issue specific. Leaders are not uniform, rational actors, and there is important variation in leader foreign policy decision-making. Goldfien et al. argue that leader reputation is multidimensional, and each reputational trait should be studied with respect to one another. Specifically, they focus on the relationship between leader resolve and compliance, and how this affects propensity towards international security and cooperation. Resolve and compliance are essential components influencing a state's ability to achieve favorable outcomes in global affairs. However, they often present a tension: modern international law aims to deter military aggression by increasing the reputational costs, turning military crises into tests of compliance. The study contends that actions demonstrating a willingness to fight may create a track record of non-compliance, as compliance is associated with cosmopolitan welfare concerns that might indicate a state's unwillingness to bear the costs of war. Relatedly, Fiorelli finds that combat exposure, rather than non-combat military service, increases the likelihood that members of Congress authorize the use of military force. This was empirically supported in the case of the AUMF in 2001. These pieces have important implications for understanding how and why leaders form foreign policy preferences and how they inform their foreign policy decisions.

In a similar vein, Alam focuses on the contexts and attributes that affect leader time preferences for the use of force abroad. She develops an interactionist theory of time horizons by examining the impact of situational (leader culpability) and dispositional (leader support) conditions on time horizons for foreign policy commitments. Leaders may be culpable from various audiences—domestic or international—and sensitive to actors threatening their tenure and survival in office. On the other hand, dispositional conditions capture individual attributes and preferences for the use of force. Both situational and dispositional conditions affect how long leaders are willing to endure the political, military, and material costs of upholding costly coercive policies such as economic sanctions and military interventions. Alam's work is the first to critically model and assess time preferences in foreign policy and addresses not just questions about why leaders uphold coercive foreign policies, but how long they may be willing to do so. Further, her work speaks to leader decision-making in autocratic and democratic regimes alike. Future work will analyze time preferences in US and cross-national

samples through survey experiments and intend to uncover how people balance costs in the short- and the long-term, as well as how this decision-making may vary across cultures and political regimes.

These findings suggest that leaders have nuanced approaches to understanding and exploring foreign policy decision-making and are both, directly and indirectly, sensitive to the domestic political repercussions of pursuing coercive foreign policies that involve conflict escalation or engaging with adversaries—especially if these policies are costly to domestic publics. As the reputational and political costs of these policies increase and jeopardize leader tenure in office, we expect leaders to align with public preferences and maintain the status quo.

Public Preferences and Reactions to Foreign Policy

Given leader sensitivity to public preferences, what determines public preferences on foreign policy? The literature on public opinion has long established that the American public holds a foreign policy that can, at times, constrain foreign policy-making if the public has 1) a coherent attitude about foreign policy, 2) can access these attitudes when they vote, and 3) the political parties hold distinct foreign policy platforms so that voters can use their attitudes to distinguish between candidates (Aldrich et al. 2006).

The following line of research focuses on the role of public opinion and mass political preferences on leader decision-making. Dr. van Beek questions whether hawkish leaders enjoy an advantage when pursuing peaceful foreign policies, such as rapprochement, and whether public preferences for conciliation affect how they perceive leaders and foreign policies. He finds that hawkish leaders enjoy such an advantage, allowing leaders like Nixon to go to China over his dovish counterparts. His results have implications for future Sino-American relations and which types of leaders may enjoy political flexibility as they consider diplomacy. Conklin focuses on a different kind of public preference: between past human costs of war and future foreign policies. He tests the casualty-averse thesis in public opinion research and finds that past casualties shape post-war culture and decrease support for extroverted international policies in the post-war era. In the absence of strong cues, such as casualties, the public may rely on other information to form foreign policy preferences.

Andrew Goodhart takes on the question of how U.S. leaders may mobilize the public without causing racial backlash. Goodhart recognizes a fundamental dilemma in which policy justifications are often needed to mobilize the public to support some foreign policy objective; however, mobilization often creates "in-groups" and "out-groups," which can marginalize domestic minorities. A contemporary example of this phenomenon is the COVID-19 pandemic and the perception of Asian-Americans as a threat, along with the surge in hate crimes against Asian-Americans between 2019 and 2020, which in turn reduces civic engagement and enhances support for the CCP (Han, Riddell, and Picquero, 2023). To evaluate how leader rhetoric affects mobilization and domestic backlash, Goodhart sets up a survey experiment in which he presents respondents with a fictional vignette about the fatal intercept of a U.S. military aircraft by the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and measures the effects on views of China and Chinese-Americans, support for armed intervention, and differences in prejudices based on interviewees' responses (Goodhart, 2024)

Schwartz and Tierney investigate a "rally-around-the-flag" hypothesis: can foreign threats reduce domestic polarization? They propose a novel argument that links domestic polarization and threat perception: when there is a bipartisan elite agreement, vivid foreign threats may spur domestic unity. They find support for this claim in survey experiments and offer an optimistic interpretation: domestic polarization may not necessarily jeopardize coherent foreign policy and grand strategy. Instead, policymakers and elites may mitigate the effects of polarization by effectively articulating and communicating their perception of foreign threats to the American public. These authors help us understand how domestic audiences process contemporary foreign policy issues by specifying the conditions under which foreign threats may reduce domestic polarization.

Alam and Conklin explore whether the American public holds distinct preferences for grand strategy as well as the role of political polarization on grand strategic preferences. The present issue is that the public's opinion of US international involvement is generally informed using the media, which is incentivized to cover stories of violence, conflicts, disasters, and scandals over less extreme and rare events. They contend that elite—especially partisan—cues will be most salient to inform. The authors note that, in general, the public can and will form foreign policy preferences even in the context of political polarization; however, in the presence of elite cues, a sense of tribalism may be activated in which many citizens will fall in line with the grand strategies supported

by the elite figure with whom they support or most identify with (Alam and Conklin, 2024). The authors design a study in which they present respondents with a series of three different grand strategy preferences, each endorsed by an elite (Republican, Democrat, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), and ask respondents to rank them based on their preferences. The authors' initial findings indicate that grand strategy preferences among the public are largely influenced by elite cues and which policies are endorsed by political elites (Alam and Conklin, 2024). Thus, this study calls into question the extent to which foreign policy and grand strategy are elite-driven rather than based on the preferences of the broader public. More importantly, this work forms a foundation for future work on public preferences for various grand strategies such as restraint, liberal internationalism, and conservative primacy, and informs debates for the domestic foundations of American Grand Strategy. Leaders and policymakers should anticipate greater public participation in these debates, which can and will affect the extent to which the US will have a more assertive role on the world stage.

Dan Vallone draws attention to common themes and trends related to U.S. citizens' attitudes on foreign policy. Overall, Americans are primarily concerned with domestic issues and see greater threats within the country than abroad (Vallone, 2024). He also notes that domestic political polarization exacerbates the extent to which both parties see the other as an "existential" threat. This internal political division also has effects on foreign policy development—the war in Gaza has fractured the Democratic Party and the war in Ukraine has divided the Republican Party. At the same time, there is bipartisan consensus on China as a growing threat to the U.S. and there remain ample signs of support for NATO despite some partisan splits (Vallone, 2024). In spite of these trends, signs suggest that foreign policy issues are becoming more salient in the lives of American citizens. Vallone identifies several important implications of this research: the need for more and greater voices shaping narrative on foreign policy, the need for new political infrastructure, and the newfound hope for more positive developments in the future that will position the U.S. for more effective foreign engagement.

Partisanship and polarization will likely affect mass preferences for policy and how elites communicate with the public. A press release analysis of Senator Sinema conducted by Woodaz, Mitchell, and Tran explores how party affiliation may affect public-facing speech. Political elites often change their public discourse in strategic ways to justify policies or actions, and different mediums of communication may have different content and messages. The researchers conducted a web scrape of 800 press releases, comprised of 400 from Senator Sinema (a Democrat turned independent from Arizona) and 400 from Senator Kelly (a Republican from Arizona), and ran a sentiment analysis before and after Senator Sinema's partisan switch from Democrat to Independent. The results of the analysis indicate a 15.6% reduction in fear-based language on behalf of Senator Sinema (Woodaz et al., 2024). The researchers note that this effect could be an attempt to build a new voting coalition in her constituency and highlight that it may be unnecessary to use charged language to mobilize her voting base against the other party (Woodaz et al., 2024). This work emphasizes the importance of how political rhetoric may be changed and manipulated to influence the electorate.

Domestic Political Constraints in Allied and Partner States

Domestic politics are not only of importance in the US context as it formulates, articulates, and executes its foreign policy and grand strategy. American foreign policymakers should weigh the domestic considerations of our partners, allies, and even adversaries as they engage with the US. Toms Rostoks of the Latvian National Defence Academy presented survey data from an original, nationally representative survey of Latvians conducted in 2023. The intent of the study was to better understand Latvians' confidence that NATO allies would provide military assistance if Russia invaded. Dr. Rostoks also explored whether there were meaningful differences in attitudes related to tripwire deterrence between Latvia's Russian and Latvian-speaking populations. The overarching context for the research project is the concept of tripwire deterrence, where tripwire forces are deployed to the Baltic states as part of NATO Enhanced Forward Presence. Dr. Rostocks' work builds on the recent challenges (Holsti 1992; Kertzer 2018; Kertzer and McGraw 2012; Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017) raised by Paul Poast and Dan Reiter, among others.

Dr. Rostoks's findings indicate that Latvians feel NATO would provide military assistance, though there is broad concern that Europe cannot defend Latvia without US support. There were notable distinctions between Russian and Latvian speakers–for example, Latvian speakers felt that NATO was more powerful than Russia, and Russian speakers felt the two groups were roughly equal. Notably, Latvians appear confident that public opinion in NATO ally countries would support military assistance to Latvia if Russia invaded. These findings

uncover public preferences for US engagement with our NATO partners as they face a resurgent Russia, and have important implications for our understanding of tripwire deterrence. Similarly, Mimi Fabe highlights how the Philippine government is navigating its strategic competition with China. Her analysis focuses on overwhelming public support amongst the Filipino people for active US engagement in the Indo-Pacific, despite reluctant and mixed support for the Marcos regime domestically. These studies emphasize the idea that while the US domestic public has grown weary of international engagement, there is still substantial demand for US involvement within the publics of our allies and partner states. US support for democratic institutions, civil liberties, and free and fair political participation promise a first-line defense in a world that increasingly faces democratic backsliding.

On the other hand, Goldsmith, Horiuchi, Matuch, and Powers offer insights into how publics in other states are growing weary of American involvement in international politics. They focus on how domestic threats to U.S. democracy affect foreign public opinion about the U.S. and other Western democracies. Democratic backsliding is a critical concern both domestically and abroad. It can have major implications for future US efforts to maintain consensus and order in an era of complex strategic competition. The authors hypothesize that democratic backsliding deteriorates both U.S. soft power and U.S. status in the world (Goldsmith et al., 2024). To test these hypotheses, the authors survey citizens from nine different countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and present them with news articles about democratic decline in the U.S. and then ask respondents about soft power status and status perceptions (Goldsmith et al., 2024). The results of the study suggest that backsliding decreases perceptions of democracy yet does not necessarily affect views of U.S. material power or stability (Goldsmith et al., 2024). This study is important to how democratic backsliding can degrade foreign public opinion of the U.S. and hamper foreign policy priorities that require security cooperation from democratic allies. In the future, the authors plan to conduct further testing by fielding surveys in Indo-Pacific countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and India.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

The influence of public opinion, while growing, should not outweigh the voices of other actors in determining the US' actions abroad. The military traditionally holds a substantial and justified position in foreign policy formulation and execution, especially as the accelerating rate of US military interventions progressively defines the US involvement in the world. While it is not new for leaders to have to balance the interests and opinions of multiple parties, the increasing polarization of domestic politics has heightened elected officials' responsiveness to public opinion, notably that of their own voter base.

Additionally, social media has brought a greater awareness of US foreign involvement to younger generations who can watch conflicts around the world unfold in real-time. In the future, public perception of US involvement in the world will be broadcast to anyone with internet access. The bright line of the geographic boundaries between countries that could also act as a filter and gatekeeper to information abroad is gone. As such, any action taken by traditional actors in foreign affairs will have both a domestic and international audience. While there might be little to be done about changing this dynamic, military and state advisors can recognize that it exists and respond to that reality when formulating policy. To avoid unanticipated externalities from a decision, a constant inventory of how this choice will reverberate to different audiences should be mandatory in the decision-making calculation.

Due to accentuated domestic constraints, leaders are forced to strike a balance between aligning with the foreign policy position of their voter base, which is, at best, partially informed, and the recommendations of diplomatic and military advisors. Traditional and social media only show a partial reality of US international involvement, which can widen the gap between what the public understands and the policies they support and what military and state advisors know and their policy recommendations.

The synthesis of these studies underscores the importance of the interaction of public opinion and foreign policy and how the government may build support for specific foreign policy directives domestically and even internationally. Public opinion and foreign policy are much more interconnected and interdependent than political leaders may realize or hope it would be. While a particular political rhetoric may either mobilize or marginalize certain populations, or while domestic political developments like democratic decline may decrease perceptions of U.S. democracy and thus weaken U.S. influence abroad, these dynamics are highly

interconnected. Public opinion and foreign policy interactions are essential to U.S. national security and the domestic political landscape within the U.S.

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Chapter 4 – Modernizing a Strategy of Deterrence

J. Alexander Thew, Alexandre Debs, and Jeffrey Spear

ABSTRACT

Understanding the logic of deterrence as a means of geopolitical strategy has largely remained unchanged since the early days of the Cold War and the advent of the nuclear age. While post-Cold War strategy primarily focused on nonproliferation and institution building, deterrence has returned in vogue as multipolar dynamics factor more heavily into international affairs. Strategies of deterrence have evolved to incorporate non-nuclear options for leveraging national power. This essay captures contemporary ideas around deterrence theory and its application within the U.S. security strategy as an extension of panel discussions at the West Point Security Seminar in February 2024 and introduces this special edition.

In a 1788 letter to President George Washington, Thomas Jefferson wrote, "the power of making war often prevents it. And, in our case, would give efficacy to our desire of peace."[225] These immutable words, now inscribed into the granite of West Point's Jefferson Library, appropriately articulate an enduring dilemma of military strategy: that to secure peace, the most absolute means and commitment toward war are necessary. Perhaps unbeknownst to him at the time, Jefferson described a key tenet of a strategy of deterrence, now a cornerstone of American 21st-century strategy.

The most recent decade's geopolitical dynamics have given rise to new challenges in the global security environment. The 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia Spetsnaz demonstrated a new means to challenge the sovereignty and international norms of statehood in actions short of war.[226] Russia's subsequent invasion of Ukraine has catalyzed renewed debate over collective defense alliances and regional stability. All the while, China seeks to expand its influence around the world, and in the South China Sea specifically, creating tensions with U.S. allies in the region.[227] These actions represent the greatest challenge to the US-led global order since the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. At the same time, the U.S. must contend with the threat of regional actors, including North Korea, which controls a small and expanding nuclear arsenal, and Iran, which has an active nuclear program and may eventually acquire nuclear weapons. Preserving peace and preserving U.S. global leadership relies ever more on strongly deterring adversary action.

Deterrence is widely credited for having kept the Cold War *cold*.[228] And the application of nuclear deterrence has long been well understood. However, our understanding of the logic of deterrence has generally remained relatively unchanged since the early days of the Cold War. It is unclear if nuclear deterrence in the modern era follows the template of the Cold War when applied to novel threats. Furthermore, the general public may oppose the use of nuclear weapons, as discussed in the literature on the "nuclear taboo."[229] Achieving aims through displays of strength with the muted aid of nuclear weaponry requires updates to deterrence strategies.

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[225] "From Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 4 December 1788," *Founders Online,* National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-14-02-0111. [Original source: *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 14, *8 October 1788–26 March 1789*, ed. Julian P. Boyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958, pp. 328–332.]

[226] Tor Bukkvoll, "Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas," *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* 46, no. 2 (June 1, 2016), https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.2917.

[227] Elleman, Bruce A. "INTRODUCTION: Evaluating China's Maritime Strategy in the South China Sea." In *China's Naval Operations in the South China Sea: Evaluating Legal, Strategic and Military Factors*, xvii–xxiv. Amsterdam University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1zqrn98.7.

[228] Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

[229] See, e.g., Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." *International organization* 53, no. 3 (1999): 433-468; Daryl G. Press, Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino. "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons." *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 1 (2013): 188-206; Tyler Bowen, Michael A. Goldfien, and Matthew H. Graham. "Public Opinion and Nuclear Use: Evidence from Factorial Experiments." *The Journal of Politics* 85, no. 1 (2023): 345-350.

This question was taken up by various panelists at the West Point Security Seminar at the United States Military Academy on 7 and 8 February 2024. To understand its contemporary role, we take a fresh look at deterrence theory in encouraging continued improvement to strategy. The following essay recounts a variety of challenges, recommendations, and rich discussion on the future of deterrence pursued there, with a specific focus its military elements.

Deterrence: Key Insights from the Cold War and Beyond

The early days of the nuclear age produced some profound insights about the diplomatic effects of nuclear weapons, which have endured to this day. The first insight is that because of the terrible destruction that they can generate, nuclear weapons should serve to deter conflict between states. Bernard Brodie put it in these terms in 1946: "Thus far the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose."[230]

By the same logic, nuclear weapons could be known as the "weapons of the weak." In the pre-nuclear age, a state had to prevail militarily before it could inflict unacceptable damage on its enemy. Not so in the nuclear age. As Thomas Schelling explained in 1966: "*Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy.*"[231]

In a similar vein, scholars argued that the combination of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles allowed to two distinct approaches for deterrence: deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.[232] Deterrence by denial seeks to deny an enemy the ability to achieve its objective. Deterrence by punishment aims to impose unacceptable costs if the enemy conducts an attack.

The fact that nuclear weapons could generate unacceptable costs allowed states to enforce the status quo and prevent military escalation, even if they did not have the advantage in the balance of conventional forces. For example, NATO relied on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a Soviet invasion of Europe, even a takeover of West Berlin, which was otherwise vulnerable as it was located deep within Communist territory.

This confrontation over West Berlin also highlighted the different diplomatic purposes of nuclear weapons, which illustrated a more general truth, according to Schelling: it is easier to deter than it is to compel.[233] Deterrence is an attempt to prevent an adversary state from "starting something." Compellence is an attempt to convince the adversary to "do something."[234] Given the high costs associated with nuclear war, it may be difficult for a state to convince its adversary that it would really escalate to nuclear war if its demands were not met.

To overcome the fact that nuclear threats strain credulity, Schelling suggested that states could take a variety of steps: they could remove the option of backing down or "burn bridges;"[235] they could engage in brinkmanship, running the risk of disaster, producing "threats that leave something to chance;"[236] they could pretend to be mad.[237] Again coming back to the example of West Berlin, committing troops to such a vulnerable location was the equivalent of burning bridges. Such troops acted as "trip wires," convincing the Soviets that if they did attack this target, NATO would have to respond with significant escalatory measures.[238]

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[230] Bernard Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946, p. 76).

[231] Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966, page 22, emphasis in the original).

[232] Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence by Denial and Deterrence by Punishment* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, 1959), pages 1-2.

[233] Ibid., page 100; also pages x, 69-78.

[234] Ibid., page 69.

[235] Ibid., page 43.

[236] Ibid., page 91.

[237] Ibid., page 37.

[238] Ibid. page 47.

This logic of nuclear deterrence became broadly accepted and remained an active area of research until the end of the Cold War.[239] After the collapse of the Soviet Union, attention shifted away to the causes of nuclear proliferation. If nuclear deterrence held between two nuclear superpowers, we could be less certain that it would hold against smaller nuclear powers, and it became even more important to understand the causes of proliferation.[240] The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing nuclear threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin have again brought to the forefront the importance of understanding the principles of nuclear deterrence.[241]

Incorporating principles of deterrence in strategy does not exclusively relate to nuclear weapons. The 2020 updates to U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) joint planning documents identified flexible deterrent options as "preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions tailored to signal and influence an adversary's actions" by incorporating all elements of national power.[242] Of course, operational decision-making by military commanders leaves acts of diplomacy, intelligence, and economic tools to a synchronous whole-of-government approach in pursuit of deterrence effects. Tactical activities, such as force readiness and positioning, along with weapon system emplacement, are options withheld by military commanders. Presidential authority over the movement and deployment of the nation's strategic deterrent, its nuclear arsenal, already has strict command and control processes.

For that matter, evolving deterrence doctrine to include non-nuclear options for operational commands demands novelty. The 2022 National Defense Strategy emphasizes "integrated deterrence" across government functions to improve on GWOT-era stovepiping and authorities limitations.[243] Integrated deterrence hinges on "reduc[ing] a competitor's perception of the benefits of aggression relative to restraint."[244] In addition to defining two aforementioned categories of deterrence - by denial and by punishment (or, "cost imposition"), the National Defense Strategy adds a third in pursuing "deterrence by resilience." Here, the focus is on quick reconstitution of degraded defense capabilities in the face of an attack, drawing out an adversary's resources beyond their anticipated use.[245]

All this play on cost/benefit calculation in defense strategy has reoriented U.S. defense priorities and initiated the process to align financial resources with much-needed modernization of equipment, force structure, military partnerships, and joint defense capabilities. However, DoD still retains little agency to integrate activity outside of the span of its own authorities. Therefore, the biggest gap appears to occur at the theater operational level, where deterrence requires synergy across government functions but aims to achieve limited, and precise effects. Much of the U.S. joint doctrine discusses potential flexible deterrent options including economic sanctions and public messaging without addressing specific procedures for integrating government entities in theater-level military campaigns in pre-war phases. This identifies the critical missing component to the fresh interest of

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[239] See, e.g., Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*; Charles L. Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Robert Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Kenneth D. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *The American Political Science Review*, 84, No. 3 (1990): 731-745.

[240] See, e.g., Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint." *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 126-169; Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (1996): 54-86; Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs. "The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation." *International Security* 39, no. 2 (2014): 7-51.

[241] For recent challenges to some of the above literature on nuclear deterrence theory, see, e.g., Brendan Rittenhouse Green, *The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press. *The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2020).

[242] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Planning Appendix E: Flexible Deterrent Options and Flexible Response Options*, JP 5-0 (Washington DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2020), https://irp.fas.org/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf.

[243] U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2022), https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF

[244] Ibid. page 8.

[245] For a review of the concept of deterrence, see, e.g., Tim Prior, "Resilience: The 'Fifth Wave' in the Evolution of Deterrence" in *Strategic Trends 2018*, (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, ETH-Zurich), Chapter 4, 63-80.

https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/ST2018-06-TP.pdf.

"integrated deterrence" as prominently articulated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. As the U.S. seeks to align its geopolitical strategy with the principles of deterrence, consideration for a tailored approach, along with integrated government capabilities, will be necessary. Considerations and several specific recommendations for improving these aims follow.

New Challenges: Deterring Diverse Threats

Luke Tyree argues that deterrent strategies are significantly different in the current environment than they were during the Cold War. Then, the U.S. confronted a fellow nuclear weapon state in the Soviet Union. Nowadays, the challenges of the modern geopolitical environment are multidimensional. According to Tyree, two types of risk are present: uncertainty of competitor actions, and potential failure in the execution of strategy.

Foremost, the advent of a "tri-polar" world that incorporates the U.S., China, and Russia raises strategic uncertainty exponentially. Similar to the theory of a complex adaptive system, strategic actions aimed at one adversary will affect unrelated political environments. This dilemma manifests itself in the current debate over U.S. support for Ukraine's military. If the U.S. commits more resources to the European theater, there may be opportunities for adversary states such as China to move with more latitude in its own region. At a lower scale, investment decisions also signal a commitment toward a specific goal. Investment in dual-capable aircraft (DCA), of interest to European security, comes at the cost of developing a nuclear-tipped unique sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). The initial cancellation of this program puts into question strategic deterrent options in maritime theaters.[246] However, the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act mandated DoD to establish a SLCM-N program of record. Budget constraints will continue to force tough decisions when time is essential to deter adversary maneuvers.

Matt Kuhlman, for his part, argues that China has sought to fill gaps left by the U.S.. He presents compelling evidence that China's prioritization of soft power on the African continent, in aggregate, presents a formidable counterbalance to western power structures. Integration of economies, arms sales and transfers, and a large cadre of military attaches and diplomats seek to further embed African affairs with a Chinese led order. There remains inadequate response to Chinese foray that threatens to peel back layers of international order led by the U.S. in the Global South.

NATO, Nuclear Deterrence in Europe, and Military Effectiveness

How, then, can these trends be countered? Maria Mälksoo discusses the role that enhanced forward presence plays in denying the westward advancement of Russian forces, for example. Mälksoo presents this strategy as a "trip wire" defense, pushing NATO's commitments eastward to ward off Russian incursions and protect key strategic allies in central and western Europe. Bryan Frizzelle advocates for updates to NATO's headquarters operations to become more of a warfighting body. Frizzelle argues that the ultimate deterrent is demonstrating to Russia that "regional" battle plans are executable. NATO's existence is not nearly deterrent enough. NATO needs to return to battle groups and an ability to wage combat cogently for Russia to be fully dissuaded from an attack on its member states. This is deterrence by resilience applied in the multinational realm.

Enhanced forward presence has its downsides, however. Staging foreign troops requires host-nation political acceptability as well as military credibility. Both aspects are not costless and require dedicated and sustained support in the long run. Victoria Henley's view is that some military deployments shore up allied political relations rather than achieve a strategic goal. This exacerbates the dilemma of enhanced forward presence as a deterrent, considering a military presence that is too heavy creates a security dilemma for adversary states that may provoke conflict rather than dissuade it.

Not to mention, the U.S. will face a resource constraint as geopolitical dynamics require shifting attention. The adage "to defend everywhere is to defend nowhere" recalls the issue of maintaining a deterrence strategy with emerging threats in the Indo-Pacific. Maximilian Hoell explores options for NATO to take on a more European-centric role in securing continental defense against Russian encroachments. This translates into the

[246] Robert G Bell, "Modernise, Expand or Complement? NATO's Nuclear Posture in the post-2022 Strategic Environment," *Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy*, In-Depth, no. 11 (March 2024): 1–20.

additional buildup of armed forces by NATO's European member states and further investment in a "Eurodeterrent" specifically through the British and French strategic nuclear forces. America would do best, in his view, by encouraging such a transition amongst its allies sooner, in anticipation of meeting security challenges head-on instead of reacting to them once already in play. Wannes Verstraete similarly explores the apparent disengagement by certain European states from nuclear deterrence and the effect this has on the ability of Europe to become self-reliant in its security position.

One persistent theme in the discussion of nuclear modernization was the need to adapt U.S. military doctrine to incorporate both the elevated likelihood of a nuclear battlefield and an understanding of deterrence in mission planning. The doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework should account for all modern security challenges articulated thus far.

Carlton Haelig highlights lessons learned from organizational changes during the Carter administration. The U.S. Marines successfully developed maritime prepositioned forces, whereas the Army's innovation on light divisions was structurally too large to be a viable rapid response force. Credible deterrence requires flexibility in the age of fewer and more consolidated geographic basing. Rapid insertion of combat power and military forces into operational theaters necessitates a fresh look at task organization, prepositioned weapon and ammunition stocks, and updated doctrine. Effective conventional deterrents must let go of the Desert Storm era mass buildup requiring months of planning time. Forces must be able to be present within hours of crises emerging to factor into the potential costs of adversary action.

Looking ahead, Chris Whelan, Jim Platte, and Michael Bonura argue that greater effort must be spent on educating and training forces to grapple with the consequences of nuclear strikes, radiological effects, and targeting. While the principles of deterrence first appeared in joint doctrine as recently as 2006, similar updates have not been filtered into U.S. Army manuals or training guidance. Conventional nuclear integration (CNI) may be a popular discussion topic, but the integration of deterrence into strategy at the operational level has yet to be formalized in professional military education beyond introductory concepts.

Declaratory Posture and Alliance Dynamics

The U.S. nuclear deterrent is especially credible when broadly supported by public opinion at home and in allied states. In the U.S., the idea of a "no first use" policy remains popular among policy circles. However, the Obama Administration eventually rejected this policy in both the 2010 and 2018 nuclear posture review.[247] Strategic ambiguity, therefore, remains the modus operandi of the U.S. strategic deterrence mission. Extended deterrence on behalf of multinational partners and allies also requires idiosyncratic consideration.

Legal restrictions in the South Pacific impose hurdles on the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Due to the establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, Australia could not host nuclear weapons on its territory. However, Australia and similar allied states could contribute in non-nuclear ways to U.S. extended deterrence. Malcolm Davis discussed a peripheral security and sustainment mission that Australia can provide to the American Navy's survivable nuclear deterrent patrolling in its region, yet outside of the free zone.

In Europe, Michal Onderco found in a survey of five key states, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, conducted in May 2023, that only half of the respondents believe that nuclear weapons deter offensive military action. Public opinion affects U.S. strategic deterrence abroad as well among domestic constituencies. If allied states do not support nuclear deterrence, the risk may not only be that they would reluctantly rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. They may also seek alternative means of deterrence. Indeed, Brandon Behlendorf and Hayley Peterson identify that regimes lacking nuclear weapons turn to other weapons of mass destruction to achieve a deterrent effect in backing their own foreign policy. The credibility of a deterrent strategy requires as much domestic introspection and proper salesmanship as does its targeted effect elsewhere around the world.

CONCLUSION

[247] Harvey, John R. "Assessing the Risks of a Nuclear 'No First Use' Policy," *War on the Rocks*, July 5, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/07/assessing-the-risks-of-a-nuclear-no-first-use-policy/.

The three ways of deterrence described in the 2022 National Defense Strategy collectively aim to reduce a competitor's perception of the net benefits of action relative to the status quo. Imposing costs, whether real or perceived, on an enemy demands creativity. Heterogeneous preferences in political and military objectives should inform how deterrence strategies are employed. No longer are geopolitical conflicts defined by territorial pursuit or military might, as had been the case in prior world wars. Similarly, the nature of warfare is evolving beyond the "hearts and minds" of the early 2000s counterinsurgencies experienced in the Middle East.

Identifying what a potential adversary values the most is critical to an effective strategy of deterrence. Therefore, deterrence strategies must be applied specifically to achieve limited effects against individual enemies. Russia may very well desire additional territory in Europe from U.S. NATO allies – an objective for which conventional deterrence (enhanced forward presence) and nuclear deterrence may work well. China's focus on economic integration and dependence begs for a different tool. Economic levers of power, including the resiliency of a reserve currency in settling international trade as well as influence over international trade law, may be more useful. The Iranian and North Korean regimes perhaps value survival above all else. Being prepared to target their sources of power with financial and conventional means may be more relevant.

The following essays expand in more detail on these avenues on which a U.S. strategy of deterrence can be enhanced. Whether arms control continues to be a viable means of risk reduction is yet unknown. Yet, deterring China and Russia, among other adversaries, requires a fresh look at available options. Military campaign plans require ever more integration with other government resources, functions, and entities. In this low-probability, high-consequence environment, a tailored strategy is key.

Chapter 5 – People Management in Modern Militaries

Lee Robinson and Vincenzo Bove

ABSTRACT

What are the implications of strategic competition for personnel management in modern militaries? As NATO devotes more resources to confronting the security challenges posed by Russia's war with Ukraine, this expansion comes at a time when allied militaries are struggling to attract recruits for military service. The ability of these states to address recruiting shortfalls is likely to shape the response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine and future security challenges. While some aspects of the military staffing crisis may be due to current economic and social factors, we argue that attracting citizens for military service will likely be a persistent problem for Western allies. The magnitude of the problem and its implications for strategic competition demands a comprehensive assessment of people management policies for modern militaries. Drawing on recent scholarship presented at an international security research symposium at the United States Military Academy, West Point, we argue that a holistic approach to effective people management for Western militaries should address three key factors: professional identity (defining the military profession's role in society), attracting human capital (modernizing recruitment and retention policies), and developing human capital (developing and implementing policies that foster workforce education and training).

As NATO allies face pressures to increase their defense spending and capabilities, they do so in an environment where their ability to meet military personnel strength levels is declining. To align the demand for military human capital requirements with the supply of citizens willing to serve in uniform, states must either be less ambitious in their force requirements or pursue new policies to attract and retain citizens for military service. We focus on the latter point, presenting three factors that should guide policies to address military personnel shortfalls: professional identity (defining the military profession's role in their society), attracting human capital (modernizing recruitment and retention policies), and developing human capital (developing and implementing policies that foster workforce education and training).

We first describe how the evolving concept of military professionalism challenges NATO allies to articulate the roles and relationships connecting military forces with the societies they serve. We then examine several pressures that constrain the ability of NATO states to attract the number and type of people to meet current and emerging security challenges and provide considerations for responses to these pressures. We conclude with a discussion of the human capital development of service members while in uniform and as they transition back into society following military service as a final key factor in a holistic approach to people management policies for Western militaries.

Volunteer, Employee, or Professional? Concepts of Professionalism in Western Militaries

It is common for scholars and practitioners to refer to the military as a profession.[248] At stake in the challenge of meeting human capital requirements for Western militaries is whether there exists a professional identity that provides meaningful information about what it means to be in the military profession. Surveys of European

[248] Nathan Finney and Tyrell Mayfield, eds., *Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).

militaries demonstrate that what it means to be a military professional is not well understood.[249] From institutional autonomy to the dynamics of volunteer forces, the concept of military professionalism encapsulates a wide array of attributes, mirroring evolving norms and practices within armed forces globally.

Moreover, the concept of military professionalism has different meanings for different groups. In addition to *what* is a profession, it is unclear *who* is a member of the military profession. This confusion shapes not only the way allied publics think about and support militaries, but also how militaries perceive themselves and their roles within societies.[250] The implication is that scholars and practitioners have work to do in establishing a conception of military professionalism that is relevant for members of the military and understood by the society it depends on to fill its ranks.

Scholars are addressing the need for a more helpful concept of what it means to be a member of the military profession, but much work remains.[251] A point of agreement is that the term profession confers a special status beyond a job or occupation, with members of the profession establishing the requirements for accreditation and progression within a specific domain of expertise.[252] At the dawn of the Cold War, Samuel Huntington contended that military professions should be given autonomy over a specified domain of expertise, which for the military is the management of violence.[253] Under his theory of objective control, a professional military would stay subordinate to civilian authority and maximize their effectiveness through conditions that allowed them to enforce rules and standards of conduct within their own profession.

As Morris Janowitz noted shortly after the publication of Huntington's theory, objective control is not realistic in practice. The boundaries that define the military's domain of professional expertise are contested, as are the different ways in which a person could serve in the military.[254] The term military professional, therefore, has different meanings for different groups, with the result that conceptions of the military profession lead to tensions rather than clarity for academics, members of the military, and the societies that they serve.[255]

These seminal works focused on the U.S. case to develop a framework for how its military should conceptualize its role within the U.S. system of government. As a new generation of scholars develop a concept of military professionalism suited to the contemporary era, we argue that broadening this perspective to account for the unique political and societal dynamics across western militaries is an imperative. An effective conceptualization of a military's professional jurisdiction will likely vary depending on each country's unique capabilities, historical relationships, institutional arrangements, and strategic objectives among other factors. Professions fight to defend the boundaries of their jurisdiction, so we should expect the military to play a leading role in this

[249] Kristine Eck and Chiara Ruffa, "What does military professionalism mean?", mimeo, (Sciences Po, Paris, 204).
[250] Ibid.
[251] See Don Snider and Lloyd Matthews, eds., *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005); Casey Landru, "Evolution of Defining the Army Profession," in *Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics*, ed. Nathan Finney and Tyrell Mayfield (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018); Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor Jr., *The U.S. Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace, and Politics* (London: Cass Military Studies, 1999); Risa Brooks, "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States," *International Security* 44, no. 4 (April 1, 2020): 7–44, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00374.
[252] James Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," in The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 39–60.
[253] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957).
[254] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
[255] Brooks, "Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States."

debate.[256] However, to bring clarity to the military's domain of professional expertise across Western allies, elected leaders will need to voice what is the appropriate jurisdiction for the military in pursuit of national goals.

Traditionally, scholars have viewed the military as a professional institution. Service was seen as a calling, often accompanied by notions of civic duty and sacrifice for the nation.[257] Citizens might be drafted or volunteer out of a sense of responsibility. Yet, the rise of the "postmodern" military has challenged this view.[258] In contrast, recruitment emphasizes material benefits, drawing it closer to a labor contract than a volunteer agreement. This entails transitioning from a traditional, duty-bound identity towards a more occupation-oriented one. This shift reflects changing societal perceptions, where military service is increasingly viewed as "a job among others, like any civilian job" rather than a unique profession that serves, but is separate from, civil society.[259]

The language of a profession may help Western militaries communicate more clearly with the societies they serve and draw from to join their ranks.[260] The concept of a profession taps into aspects of civic duty in its responsibility to serve society, and it also appeals to the benefits one would receive from joining a profession where a person is compensated for developing expertise in a specified body of knowledge.[261] We contend that establishing what that body of knowledge is, and who it applies to, is a source of tension that should be addressed.

Evolving Professional Identities in a Changing Security Environment

Professional identities across western militaries are shaped by the functional demands placed upon them to meet the security demands of the state and the societal imperative to represent the values of the society that they serve.[262] Europeans generally support a global security role, but hesitate when missions seem distant and lack clear threats to their immediate security. The Iraq and Afghanistan Wars fueled this "intervention fatigue" across the continent, shaping public opinion even in non-participating countries.[263]

While success in major combat operations is an obvious functional demand for any military, other areas are more contested. Stabilization operations, strategic deterrence, homeland security, intelligence, and cybersecurity are areas where other organizations may stake a claim to professional jurisdiction. Insofar as these domains deal with threats to the security and territorial sovereignty of the state, conflicts arise with other agencies, leading to tensions regarding the military's *raison d'être* and view of its role as guardian of the state.[264] There will undoubtedly be overlap in some of these jurisdictions between the military and other organizations and communities among western allies. Ambiguity in the boundaries of these jurisdictions contributes to confusion within the military

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[256] Andrew Abbott, *The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).
[257] Ronald R. Krebs and Robert Ralston, "Patriotism or Paychecks: Who Believes What About Why Soldiers Serve," *Armed Forces & Society* 48, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 25–48, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X20917166.
[258] Charles Moskos and James Burk, "The Postmodern Military," in *The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World*, ed. James Burk (New York: Routledge, 1994).
[259] Johan Österberg, Joel Nilsson, and Nina Hellum, "The motivation to serve in the military among Swedish and Norwegian soldiers. A comparative study," *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 11, no. 1 (2020): 30-42.
[260] Thomas Crosbie and Meredith Kleykamp, "Fault Lines of the American Military Profession," *Armed Forces & Society* 44, no. 3 (2018): 521–43.
[261] Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession."
[262] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.
[263] Fabrizio Coticchia and Francesco N. Moro, "Peaceful legislatures? Parliaments and military interventions after the Cold War: Insights from Germany and Italy," *International Relations* 34, no. 4 (2020): 482-503.
[264] Vincenzo Bove, Mauricio Rivera, and Chiara Ruffa, "Beyond coups: terrorism and military involvement in politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 26, no. 1 (2020): 263-288.

on its role, as well as a lack of understanding among elected leaders and civil society on the military's responsibility to develop expertise in these areas.

As states consider professional jurisdictions, resolving tensions on who is eligible to join the profession is also a source of contention. Some restrictions, such as fitness standards, may make sense functionally for some specialties within the profession, but not for others. Conversely, military leaders may resist loosening standards for recreational drug use that put the military at odds with evolving societal norms. Resolving these tensions requires military and elected leaders to balance functional and societal demands in ways that depend on each state's unique domestic political situation and external security environment.

While the functional and societal imperatives provide a useful framework for resolving these tensions, two evolving aspects should be considered. First, as polarization intensifies in Western countries,[265] scholars note that increasing polarization may influence how the public views the military.[266] In the U.S., the military is increasingly perceived through a 'tribal' lens, either as a tool of right-wing parties or as an institution threatened by left-wing parties.[267] Across Europe, similar dynamics to those observed in the U.S. are emerging as liberals express growing concern that European militaries harbor conservative tendencies and are breeding grounds for right-wing extremism.[268]

This political polarization risks alienating partisans who feel the military does not reflect their values. The perception that the military is "captured" by opposing political forces also exacerbates the civil-military divide. In turn, if militaries are seen as loyal to a particular ideological perspective, this has important consequences for drawing upon a wide societal demographic to fill its ranks.

Second, the growing rejection of expertise within societies has important implications for the methods that militaries employ to attract members to join the profession.[269] Institutions broadly are experiencing a decline in trust, and the military is not immune to this phenomenon.[270] This is all the more important when the role of the military moves away from objectives which can be clearly linked to defending the state. Given the variation in polarization across member states,[271] understanding the challenges militaries face in the unique context in which they operate is an important area of research.

A Human Capital Model Hard Pressed From Many Sides

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[265] Twan Huijsmans and Jonathan Rodden, "The Great Global Divider? A Comparison of Urban-Rural Partisan Polarization in Western Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies*, March 7, 2024, 00104140241237458, https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241237458.

[266] Ole R. Holsti, "Politicization of the United States Military: Crisis or Tempest in a Teapot?," *International Journal* 57, no. 1 (2002): 1–18; Michael Robinson, *Dangerous Instrument: Political Polarization and U.S. Civil-Military Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).

[267] Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 15, no. 2 (2021): 12-37.

[268] Recent controversies, such as the discovery of a network of right-wing extremists within the German Special Forces Command, illustrate this concern.. Conversely, conservative factions in Europe criticize efforts to promote equality, diversity, and inclusion (ED&I), fearing compromise to military values and effectiveness.

[269] Thomas Nichols, *The Death of Expertise: The Campaign Against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[270] Lydia Saad, "Historically Low Faith in U.S. Institutions Continues," *Gallup*, July 6, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/poll/508169/historically-low-faith-institutions-continues.aspx.

[271] Laura Silver, "Most across 19 Countries See Strong Partisan Conflicts in Their Society, Especially in South Korea and the U.S.," November 16, 2022, https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/11/16/most-across-19-countries-see-strong-partisan-conflicts-in-their-society-especially-in-south-korea-and-the-u-s/.

The issue of usefully defining military professionalism in the context of the strategic challenges facing Western militaries exists in a larger backdrop of pressures on the human capital models that militaries employ to fill their ranks. Russia's annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of Ukraine, attacks on cargo vessels in the Strait of Hormuz stemming from the larger conflict in Gaza and tensions in the Middle East, and the persistent challenge of China's espionage and aggression in the South China Sea signals the urgency of military preparedness for western nations which is reflected in the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept.[272] These security demands push up against a human capital model under significant strain to provide sufficient forces to meet the priorities established by western nations. Although the alliance does not disclose capability targets, military personnel shortfalls are prominently featured in today's headlines with the accompanying worry that such shortfalls will hinder the alliance's capability to respond to strategic challenges.[273]

Attracting the number and type of citizens required to meet the demands of Western nations first requires grasping the reasons for the decline in citizens' willingness to serve in the military. This understanding should shape responses to the human capital model that militaries use to attract new recruits. We highlight three pressures and corresponding responses to guide these efforts.

Cultural Differences

Huntington introduced the idea of a "civil-military gap" to capture the perceived divide—both physically and ideologically—between the U.S. military community and civil society.[274] Building upon Huntington's influential contribution, several scholars have identified analogous political, attitudinal, and behavioral rifts in other countries.[275] The widening of the civil-military gap, particularly in cultural and demographic dimensions between societies and the militaries that serve them, is an area that deserves attention in addressing military recruiting dynamics.[276] Although some evidence indicates that the civil-military gap is increasing in alliance countries, scholars need a firmer empirical understanding of the relationship between civil-military gaps and the allure of a military career among member states.

The motivation to join the military relies on alignment with its norms and values, fostering a sense of obligation, duty, and loyalty.[277] These elements serve to compensate, at least partially, for the demanding working conditions and rigorous training involved.[278] A growing disparity in value systems indicates that the military culture is increasingly disconnected from its surrounding society, resulting in a decline in the institution's prestige and diminishing the allure of pursuing a military career.[279]

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[272] Tardy Thierry, "NATO's New Strategic Concept," September 2022, https://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=778.
[273] Jack Detsch, "NATO Doesn't Have Enough Troops," April 10, 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/10/nato-troop-numbers-russia-ukraine-war/; Laura Kayali and Joshua Posaner, "Europe's Soldiers Keep Quitting, Just When NATO Needs Them," *Politico*, March 18, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-russia-ukraine-war-defense-france-germany-soldiers-army/.
[274] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.
[275] Gerhard Kümmel, "Military identity and identity within the military," *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* (2018): 477-493.
[276] Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen et al., "Conceptualizing the Civil-Military Gap," *Armed Forces & Society* 38, no. 4 (2012): 669–78.
[277] Krebs and Ralston, "Patriotism or Paychecks: Who Believes What About Why Soldiers Serve."
[278] Charles C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," *Armed Forces & Society* 4, no. 1 (October 1, 1977): 41–50, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X7700400103.
[279] Tom St. Denis, "Future Soldiers: 'The Few ...' Military Personnel Trends in the Developed World," *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 4 (2015), http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no4/page12-eng.asp; Tibor Szvircsev Tresch and Christian

One area of focus on the civil-military gap centers on contact within familial and social spheres. Military careers are characterized by intergenerational transmission, as recruits often have close relatives who served.[280] The end of conscription programs in the U.S. in 1973 and across Europe in the latter half of the 1990s posed significant challenges for military recruiters. This shift resulted in fewer segments of society gaining exposure, either directly or indirectly, to the military's corporate identity, values, and ethos.[281] With the gradual disappearance of the "citizen-soldier" and the transition to professionalized military organizations; militaries became increasingly insulated. As modern militaries are smaller in size than was the case for previous generations, fewer and fewer young people know someone personally who served in the military. The military's culture, therefore, seems increasingly distant and inaccessible to those unfamiliar with it.[282]

A second explanation reflects a broader issue: a gradual misalignment between the values upheld by young Western citizens and those promoted by the military. European youths are increasingly drawn to values such as human rights, freedom of speech, and gender equality,[283] which are at odds with fundamental military principles like obedience, sacrifice, and group solidarity. In the U.S., less than one in two young people interviewed in 2015-16 thought they would encounter "people like them" in the military, while a majority was concerned about the psychological implications of the profession.[284]

These shifts in societal values and priorities indicate a growing discrepancy between civilian and military that deserves further study. As Western militaries learn more about these differences, military institutions may need to adapt their approaches to recruitment and engagement, aligning with contemporary societal values while maintaining an essential military ethos. Additionally, fostering greater understanding and dialogue between civilian and military communities could help bridge gaps and ensure a stronger, more cohesive society. More effective means of communicating with the public may be productive in attracting people to military service, which should be informed by research on civil and military values across Western societies.

To communicate across this cultural gap more effectively, two recommendations display some promise as Western militaries modernize their human capital models. First, most citizens that the military wants to reach are on social media platforms. Producing relevant, engaging content is a must for modern militaries to reach audiences that would otherwise have no connection with a member of the military.[285]

Second, militaries would benefit from specialized workforces whose full-time duty is recruitment. In a comprehensive review of its recruitment practices, the U.S. Army found it was out of step with practices in large private sector organizations. Whereas the U.S. Army previously relied upon servicemembers to rotate through positions as recruiters, most large organizations have a specialized recruiting workforce. The U.S. Army recently announced plans to create a specialized recruiter career field to equip these servicemembers with the certifications, professional development, and training to compete in the labor market more effectively.

Leuprecht, eds., *Europe Witihout Soldiers? Recruitment and Retention across the Armed Forces of Europe* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2012).

[280] Beth J. Asch, "Navigating current and emerging army recruiting challenges," *What Can Research Tell Us* (2019).

[281] Vincenzo Bove, Riccardo Di Leo, and Marco Giani, "Military culture and institutional trust: evidence from conscription reforms in Europe," *American Journal of Political Science* (2022).

[282] James Mattis and Kori Schake, *Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (Washington, D.C: Hoover Institution Press, 2016).

[283] European Parliament Youth Survey Report (2021). Available online: https://bit.ly/45kBZZP.

[284] Beth J. Asch, "Navigating current and emerging army recruiting challenges."

[285] Hannah Smith, "Social Media Can Be a Weapon, and It's Time US Troops Get Trained on It," *Task and Purpose*, June 30, 2022, https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/us-military-social-media/.

Changing Labor Market

The model that many Western militaries rely upon for career advancement is increasingly out of step with the preferences of most people in the labor market. Even during peacetime, factors such as frequent relocations, international assignments, uncertain deployments, and the regimented hierarchical rank structure all contribute to perceived hardships of military service compared to employment in the private sector or non-uniformed positions in the public sector.[286] Not surprisingly, evidence from recent surveys of U.S. servicemembers indicates they perceive that civilian employment offers better opportunities for a stable lifestyle, work/life balance, and flexibility.[287] Although there is not clear evidence of such perceptions across western militaries over time, spending cuts occurring across Europe since the 2000s further complicate recruitment and retention efforts. Available evidence suggests that scholars and policymakers should closely examine the perceived and actual differences between military employment and the private sector.

Furthermore, the demands of frequent moves, separations for deployments, and uncertainty in future job locations were more palatable when most military families were single-income households. Evidence from the U.S. indicates this is no longer the case as most service members have a spouse in the civilian labor market.[288] The model of a single-earner household able to move frequently does not match the preferences of many people, but understanding how this dynamic differs across labor markets is a factor that scholars should consider. Add to these trends the fear of death that some respondents associate with service in the military, the benefits of military service do not outweigh the costs associated with military service.[289]

In sum, the gradual normalization of the military profession has increasingly linked decisions to serve to economic incentives within military organizations, alternative employment options, and a sufficient work-life balance. Western militaries can respond by increasing the military wages relative to civilian salaries, which has been shown to lead to higher-quality recruits, as do monetary bonuses.[290] Similarly, to mitigate the dramatic sacrifice in lifestyle that military careers impose, Western militaries can adjust their personnel management practices to account for the preferences of their labor force while also balancing the requirements for military readiness. Modern data capabilities enable militaries to query and access much more information about their people than in the past to inform assignment considerations. Increasing a servicemember's agency in assignment considerations, to include the ability for more flexible work conditions where appropriate, will lower the barriers to service and enable militaries to be more competitive in the labor market.

Western militaries can also adapt to the modern labor market by adjusting their onboarding practices. Military services must be able to assess a candidate more quickly for military service and shorten the time between the accession decision and the start of training. Whereas numerous professions offer the opportunity to commence employment within a matter of weeks, some military positions entail a waiting period of several months. Policies such as enabling a potential recruit to test out jobs for a short period before enlisting may also help to reduce barriers to serving based on a lack of familiarity with the military.[291]

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[286] Beth J. Asch, James R. Hosek, and John T. Warner, "New economics of manpower in the post-cold war era," *Handbook of Defense Economics* 2 (2007): 1075-1138.
[287] Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), "Department of the Army Career Engagement Survey," June 2023, https://talent.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/DACES-Third-Annual-Report_Final.pdf.
[288] Department of Defense, "2021 Demographics: Profile of the Military Community" (2021).
[289] Office of People Analytics, "Fall 2020 Propensity Update," 2020.
[290] Beth J. Asch, Paul Heaton, James Hosek, Francisco Martorell, Curtis Simon, and John T. Warner. "Cash incentives and military enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment." RAND National Defense Research Institute (2010).
[291] Constant Meheut and Daria Mitiuk, "Troop-Starved Ukranian Brigades Turn to Marketing to Attract Recruits," March 30, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-military-recruits.html.

Changing Labor Pool

As scholars and policymakers explore the connection between variation in labor market conditions and recruiting efforts, a related area of inquiry is the quality of the human capital within these labor markets. In the U.S. case, eligibility to serve remains low among 17-24-year olds due to lack of a high school diploma or equivalent, a criminal record, indebtedness, or performance below the minimum physical fitness requirements.[292] European militaries are grappling with similar eligibility hurdles as a diminishing proportion of young individuals meet the criteria for service, owing to a range of factors such as obesity, educational shortcomings, mental health issues, and prior criminal records. Notably, the prevalence of obesity among European youth poses a substantial concern, with approximately one-third of potential recruits failing requisite fitness assessments.[293] For instance, as of 2010, an estimated 37% of volunteers were unable to meet the physical fitness standards set by the German Bundeswehr.[294] Compounding these eligibility challenges is the aging demographic profile of European populations, resulting in a slower expansion of the pool of recruitable young individuals.

Given these pressures, a recent study indicates that for countries with smaller military forces, a conscription force should be considered, given the costs of military spending to man an all-volunteer force.[295] Assuming that conscription is not a politically viable option, western militaries must find ways to appeal to the pool of eligible candidates for military service. Data analysis capabilities provide militaries with tools to forecast retention probabilities of current servicemembers, thereby shaping policies to attract people with the human capital qualities expected to be in short supply while also targeting incentives for current personnel.[296]

Militaries can also consider broadening the pool of those eligible to serve, with careful tradeoffs between relaxing standards for enlistment and military effectiveness. Adjusting age requirements, physical and academic qualification test standards, and standards for previous drug use or criminal activity are tools that some services have instituted or considered instituting. The U.S. Army developed the Future Soldier Preparatory Course program to help recruits interested in enlisting to meet accession standards.

Developing Human Capital

The qualities of the workforce determine an organization's human capital is determined by the qualities of the workforce and the organizational arrangements that enable an organization's people to be more productive.[297] Policies fostering human capital development are an important part of militaries' efforts to compete in the labor market for potential servicemembers. Since public organizations are limited in their ability to compete with private sector organizations on wages, especially for highly skilled employees, other levers such as security of

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[292] Thomas Novelly, "Even More Young Americans Are Unfit to Serve, a New Study Finds. Here's Why.," *Military.Com*, 2022.
[293] Tom St. Denis, "Future soldiers:"the few..." military personnel trends in the developed world."
[294] Dieter Leyk, Thomas Rüther, Max Wunderlich, Andrea Heiß, Gerd Küchmeister, Claus Piekarski, and Herbert Löllgen, "Sporting activity, prevalence of overweight, and risk factors: Cross-sectional study of more than 12 500 participants aged 16 to 25 years." *Deutsches Ärzteblatt International* 105, no. 46 (2008): 793.
[295] Jan Kofroň and Jakub Stauber, "Spending on Personnel or Equipment: Panel Analysis of Military Expenditures in the NATO Countries 2005–2019," *European Security*, n.d., 1–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2293075. See also Vincenzo Bove and Elisa Cavatorta, "From conscription to volunteers: budget shares in NATO defence spending." *Defence and Peace Economics* 23, no. 3 (2012): 273-288.
[296] Alan Gelder et al., "Retention Prediction Model - Army" (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, July 2023), https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/r/re/retention-prediction-model---army-weai-2023-defense-sessions/d-33558.ashx.
[297] Margaret M. Blair, "An Economic Perspective on the Notion of Human Capital," in *The Oxford Handbook of Human Capital*, ed. Alan Burton-Jones and J. C. Spender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 49–70.

job tenure and opportunities to develop expertise in areas under their professional purview are aspects of military service that may attract people.[298]

To transition the U.S. military to an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) following the Vietnam conflict, policymakers emphasized social mobility through skill development and generous education benefits to attract high-quality recruits.[299] Recent evidence from the U.S. indicates that service in the Army does contribute to significant increases in post-service annual earnings, with an increase in average earnings of over $4,000 in the 19 years after enlisting, with larger gains for minority servicemembers.[300]

A difference today compared to the start of the AVF in the U.S. case is that many organizations compete with the military in offering education benefits to their employees without the hardships that come with a military lifestyle. How Western militaries differentiate opportunities for human capital development compared to other organizations is an important factor that will shape the health of military forces.

Lastly, each member that serves in the military will return to life as a civilian. How militaries prepare servicemembers for this transition is a factor to consider in the broader examination of developing human capital throughout military service. As veterans transition to local communities, they serve as ambassadors—good, bad, or indifferent—for the branch where they served in uniform. With surveys indicating concerns about physical or psychological distress as a reason young people do not consider joining the military, the strength of the veteran population is a factor likely to shape the strength of the future military.

In the U.S., the Department of Veterans Affairs administers a program to compensate military service members for physical or mental health conditions that developed while serving in the military or that were made worse while serving. The costs of this program have skyrocketed over the past few years, with average annual payments increasing from about $12,000 in 2000 to $21,000 today. Policy changes regarding eligibility led to an expansion of the share of veterans receiving disability compensation to grow from 8-10% between 1954 and 2000 to nearly 30% today.[301]

This evidence highlights that the tail in expenses for a servicemember can be large. As militaries consider how to prepare veterans for transition, policies that support veteran health, employment, and educational benefits require careful management to foster positive outcomes for veterans and future enlistees in their communities. Research that develops and tests hypotheses regarding such programs and their effects on outcomes is an imperative to inform policies focused on developing human capital with the military services across alliance states.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

As an expanded NATO seeks to strengthen its security commitments, its success will rely in part on reversing a pattern of shortfalls among member states that have struggled to meet force requirements. Effective solutions will reflect the needs of member states and be shaped by their unique circumstances, but sharing approaches among member states may help to overcome obstacles to attracting, retaining, and developing citizens for uniformed military service.

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[298] Sean Gailmard and W. Patty John, "Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise," *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 4 (2007): 873–89.
[299] Jennifer Mittelstadt, *The Rise of the Military Welfare State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).
[300] Kyle Greenberg et al., "Army Service in the All-Volunteer Era," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 137, no. 4 (November 1, 2022): 2363–2418, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac026.

We argue that policymakers should focus their efforts on three areas to adapt their people management practices. First, better defining the military profession will aid in aligning societal expectations with military requirements. Second, modernizing recruitment and retention policies should account for cultural differences between those in the military compared to the broader society, changes in the labor market, and a shifting labor pool. Lastly, policies that foster human capital development can help militaries compete more effectively in the labor market. The militaries of tomorrow will depend on how well states adapt their practices today across these three areas.

Chapter 6 – Implementing a Defense Industrial Strategy for the 21st Century

Caleb Stenholm

ABSTRACT

What drives existing gaps in the US industrial base? Does the government need to intervene to rebuild the industrial base and drive economic growth? If so, what industrial policy tools take advantage of DoD's comparative advantages and existing market incentives? This paper agrees with the common consensus that systematic undercapitalization in the allied industrial base poses a national security threat and DoD must work with allies and partners to strengthen hardware innovation and production capability at the lowest possible cost. The DoD can do this by developing or using existing tools that leverage US comparative advantages in capital markets, intelligence collection, and cyber security to spur growth in critical technology areas and build a robust industrial base to deter conflict while fostering economic growth.

The US industrial base[302] is a strategic deterrent by providing a scalable production base for materiel in a major conflict. Over the past thirty years, market incentives have driven the US economic base[303] towards software and services, which degraded domestic manufacturing capability and now pose a national security risk. War games indicate the US will dominate the first days and weeks of a near-peer conflict but could lose in the months or years that follow due to supply chain issues and inability to produce war material.[304] To build a resilient industrial base, DoD can encourage private investment in the industrial base using capital market interventions and protect key assets with advanced intelligence collection and cyber security capabilities.

Industrial policy tools include everything from early-stage research and development funding, government loan programs, the government demand signal, to trade policy.[305] The US has a robust history of industrial policy efforts often fragmented spatially and temporally across different departments and administrations.[306] The DoD is in a unique position to influence a long term industrial policy strategy and a suite of tools that combine the planning horizons and abilities of the DoD with the decentralized nature of the American economy to build industrial capacity.

This paper proceeds in 3 sections. The first section discusses the economic systems that led to the industrial base's current state. The second section discusses three key industrial policy tools that leverage DoD comparative advantages and market incentives to revitalize the industrial base. The paper concludes with a call to work across the government and with allies to rebuild the allied industrial base in a cost-effective manner, which leverages comparative advantages.

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[302] Defined as the portion of the US economy focused on manufacturing and raw materials production.
[303] Defined as the total economy (measured using GDP in this paper).
[304] Seth Jones, "Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment: The Challenge to the US Defense Industrial Base" (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1/23), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88.
[305] Réka Juhász, Nathan J. Lane, and Dani Rodrik, "The New Economics of Industrial Policy," Working Paper, Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2023), 4, https://doi.org/10.3386/w31538.
[306] William Bonvillian, "Emerging Industrial Innovation Policies in the U.S." (Working Group 12D, West Point, NY, February 8, 2024).

The State of the US Industrial Base

The lack of a domestic manufacturing capability poses a national security risk to the US and its allies. Disruptions in global supply chains led to shortages of key items during the COVID pandemic,[307] and Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine is testing the US's ability to support allies with Due to market failures, the US economic base has skewed heavily towards software production over the past 30 years due.[308] Investors and firms chose not to invest in hardware domestically or to produce abroad to maximize returns, while laborers shifted their skills to high-paying finance or software jobs. The systemic movement of labor and capital away from hardware technology has depleted the US industrial base.

The lack of a domestic manufacturing capability poses a national security risk to the US and its allies. Disruptions in global supply chains led to shortages of key items during the COVID pandemic,[309] and Russia's recent invasion of Ukraine is testing the US's ability to support allies with munitions and equipment for fighting a near-peer threat.[310] The US also risks falling behind on key innovative technologies such as quantum, AI hardware, biotech, and advanced manufacturing that could provide a decisive edge in a near-peer conflict and serve as the base of US innovation for the next 50 years.



Figure 1: Building the Industrial Base[311]

[307] Susan Helper and Evan Soltas, "Why the Pandemic Has Disrupted Supply Chains | CEA," The White House, June 17, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/written-materials/2021/06/17/why-the-pandemic-has-disrupted-supply-chains/.
[308] Juhasz, Lane, and Rodrik cite coordination and information externalities as two common market failures that require government intervention. This paper focuses primarily on information externalities, defined as the "discovery of which new activities can be produced at low enough cost to be profitable." Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik, "The New Economics of Industrial Policy," 10–12.
[309] Susan Helper and Evan Soltas, "Why the Pandemic Has Disrupted Supply Chains | CEA," The White House, June 17, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/written-materials/2021/06/17/why-the-pandemic-has-disrupted-supply-chains/.
[310] Jones, "Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment: The Challenge to the US Defense Industrial Base."
[311] Combined data from Stockholm's International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the World Bank and Trading Economics to visualize relative industrial bases. Included extraction, refining, and manufacturing in the Industrial Base and revenue from Defense Primes in the DIB category. "World Bank Open Data," World Bank Open Data, accessed April 8, 2024, https://data.worldbank.org; "Russia GDP From Mining," accessed April 8, 2024, https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/gdp-from-mining. "SIPRI Milex," accessed April 5, 2024, https://milex.sipri.org/sipri.

Figure 1 above illustrates the core problem facing the NATO industrial base's status as a deterrent. Despite having a much smaller (less than half of NATO) overall economic base, China and Russia's industrial base is only $1.7T smaller than the NATO industrial base and has tighter internal lines of transport. For large conflicts, nations need a robust industrial base that can be retooled to support the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) to build war material.[312] The near parity could encourage a strategic miscalculation about NATO's willingness to engage in protracted conflict.

Revitalizing US domestic hardware production requires understanding the root causes of the economy's shift towards software services. Fifty years of iteration on breakthroughs originally funded by DoD, such as the Internet, semiconductors, and AI,[313] drastically reduced the cost and time of developing and operating a software firm relative to a hardware firm. Investors and firms seeking to maximize returns have systemically invested in software instead of hardware technologies, which led to a decrease in US industrial capacity.



Figure 2: Funding Needs by Technological Maturity

Figure 2 shows how hardware requires more funding relative to software and how funding needs increase as technology matures. Hardware development also requires significantly more time. Software designers can cheaply and rapidly iterate on minimum viable products to improve a product, while hardware designers must physically build and test prototypes. When scaling, software producers purchase cloud computing to scale, while hardware firms must build expensive factories.[314] Investors seeking to maximize returns will nearly always choose software because it requires less money and time.

[312] *Freedom's Forge* covers the US's transition from an industrial base to the Defense Industrial Base in the years prior to WWII. Arthur Herman, *Freedom's Forge* (Penguin Random House), accessed April 9, 2024, https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/208564/freedoms-forge-by-arthur-herman/.
[313] James Manyika and William H McRaven, "The U.S. Needs a New Strategy to Keep Its Edge in Innovation" (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/report/keeping-our-edge/.Council on foreign relations - internet came from DARPANET and the NSA developed some the first AI models to decipher encrypted communications.
[314] Will George, "R7 West Point" (Panel 12C: Capital Markets Interventions, West Point, NY, February 7, 2024).



Figure 3: Funding Sources by Phase of Technological Progress[315]

Figure 3 shows how private funding and DoD funding aligns with the R&D and commercialization processes. The DoD allocates development funding for DoD products using technology readiness levels (TRL). Firms normally take technologies developed using grant funding and turn them into products using private funding (pre-seed, seed, rounds A, B, C,etc.) for civilian use cases. Government or non-profit funding typically reduces technical risk through grant funding, while private capital reduces the risk associated with building a company and selling into a market.

The model above provided adequate support for the DIB when the US had an industrial economy during the Cold War.[316] Private investment funded commercialization for many advanced manufacturing technologies, which drove improvements in the industrial base. Defense manufacturers in the DIB simply compiled components purchased from domestic manufacturers into complex DoD products. Resources within the DIB were focused on developing technologies that only DoD needed.

The rise of technologies that lower the cost of software innovation relative to hardware forces investors to prioritize investments in software companies to achieve the highest returns. The shift in capital flows starves the industrial base of capital.[317] Workers, likewise, choose to work for and gain equity in companies that grow quickly in value. The US labor force is now overwhelmingly biased towards services and business admin jobs.[318] When faced with this choice, researchers, entrepreneurs, and investors all chose software.

[315] Author's Graphic.
[316] The Industrial Production Index has only grown 13% since 1992, while overall GDP has grown by nearly 65%. "Federal Reserve Economic Data | FRED" (St. Louis, MO), accessed July 9, 2024, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
[317] Only 8% of venture capital investment went to hardtech firms from 2010 – 2021, Jason Rathje, "OSC Slides West Point Seminar" (Panel 12C: Capital Markets Interventions, West Point, NY, February 7, 2024).
[318] Only 16% of workers work in manufacturing or mining. "OEWS Employment and Wage Statistics," accessed April 5, 2024, https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/area_emp_chart/area_emp_chart.htm.



Figure 4: Gaps in the Industrial Base

Figure 4 illustrates how the hollowed-out US industrial base undercuts defense technology development efforts using Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as a use case. The area in red represents gaps in industrial capacity due to years of chronic under-investment in hardware technologies. The US cannot efficiently produce components for the current generation of UAS and is underinvesting in the early-stage technologies necessary for next-generation UAS systems. The lack of an industrial base leads to more expensive military systems (increased TRL funding, often at the expense of basic and applied research funding) and brittle supply chains incapable of supporting a near-peer conflict.

In a pure market economy[319] with no security concerns and zero transaction costs, rebuilding the industrial base would be regarded as economically inefficient. Investors, firms, and workers allocate their time and money to ideas which generate the highest return on their investment – the peak of economic efficiency. A robust industrial base can offset some of the economic costs incurred through market manipulation through positive economic spillovers associated with reducing transaction costs.

Hardware innovation requires idea generation, talent, and infrastructure to support idea generation, commercialization, and scaling to be physically located in the same area to reduce transaction costs.[320] For the past decade, hardware firms seeking to scale need to travel to Asia to meet with manufacturers and ship prototypes back and forth with negative impacts to early-stage innovation in the US.[321] Rebuilding industrial capacity domestically will allow firms to access the manufacturing capabilities and talent for rapid prototyping and scaling and increase economic growth.

[319] China's nonmarket interventions in solar cells, battery production, and semiconductor production are well documented. Stella Yifan Xie, "China Is Making Too Much Stuff—and Other Countries Are Worried," *Wall Street Journal*, November 10, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/china-is-making-too-much-stuffand-other-countries-are-worried-f949cd27.
[320] Cameron Davis et al., "Building Innovation Ecosystems: Accelerating Tech Hub Growth" (McKinsey and Company, n.d.), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/building-innovation-ecosystems-accelerating-tech-hub-growth#/.
[321] Chia-Hsuan Yang, Rebecca Nugent, and Erica R. H. Fuchs, "Gains from Others' Losses: Technology Trajectories and the Global Division of Firms," *Research Policy* 45, no. 3 (April 1, 2016): 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.12.005.

The DoD's Industrial Base Strategy

Economic incentives lead to a systemic flow of capital towards software development, which starves the industrial base of funding necessary to drive innovation and development. The DoD must incentivize the production of components and advanced processes with the long-term goal of building a sustainable ecosystem of hardware development technologies. Targeting the component and processes layer of the industrial base will bring down costs for DoD end products, provide a scalable industrial base to act as a strategic deterrent, and drive economic growth. To do this, DoD could build new tools to encourage private market investment in sectors essential to the industrial base, invest in idea generation, and protect firms from exploitation from nation-state intelligence collection techniques.[322]



Figure 5: Virtuous Hardware Development Cycle[323]

To accomplish this, Congress should consider allocating DoD a patient budget in a timely manner that transcends colors of money and encompasses the total cost of ownership from RDT&E to scaling operations and maintenance.[324] Different technologies require varying degrees of funding based on prior research levels, private demand, commercial viability, capital markets, and labor availability. Legacy programs require large amounts of operations and maintenance funding that could be divested and reinvested into new systems. Adopting a capabilities approach will allow DoD to stretch dollars to deliver maximum impact to taxpayers over a long-term planning horizon.

Encouraging Private Capital Market Investment

The DoD can expand the use of loan programs to encourage private investors to fund hardware development in key technology areas by reducing the cost of capital to a competitive rate. Building a DoD debt capability that provides loans to investors focused on early-stage hard tech development and hard technology firms that need capital to scale will help commercialize technologies essential to the industrial base. A DoD debt program

[322] These fall under the Resilient Supply Chains and Economic Deterrence pillars of the NDIS. "National Defense Industrial Strategy" (Department of Defense, January 2023), https://www.businessdefense.gov/docs/ndis/2023-NDIS.pdf.
[323] Author's Graphic.
[324] Rachel Kim, "Working Group 12D: Demand Side Interventions," April 2, 2024.

will reduce risk through diversification and align private sector investor expertise with national security objectives.

The government encourages private investment using grants, debt, or equity. Firms record grants on their income statement with no repayment requirement. Debt and equity are recorded on the balance sheet as liabilities. Equity holders are entitled to a portion of the firm's future profits, while debt holders must repay the debt principle plus interest.

Firm financing a $100M Project Expected to Yield $400M in five years			
	Grant	Loan*	Equity**
Firm's Investment	$ 75	$ 75	$ 75
Government Funding	$ 25	$ 25	$ 25
Repayment	$ -	$ 32	$ 100
Future Gain	$ 400	$ 368	$ 300
Firm's Rate of Return	**40%**	**37%**	**32%**
Cost to Government (profit)	$ 25	$ (7)	$ (75)
**Loan at 5% annual rate*			
***Purchased 25% ownership for $25M*			

Table 1: Grant, Debt, and Equity Comparison

Table 1 provides a brief overview of how a firm would seek to finance a $100M project. Grant funding reduces the capital required upfront to $75M without affecting future payoffs. Debt reduces upfront investment requirements but reduces future payouts to $368M due to debt repayment. Equity reduces upfront capital requirements in exchange for sharing future profits (considered the most "expensive" financing option), which reduces future payouts to $300M. Firms will normally seek grant funding first to reduce capital requirements before seeking loans or equity because of the higher returns. Riskier projects often require equity financing to compensate investors for a higher likelihood of failure.

From the government's perspective, each tool has various pros and cons. Grants play an important role in financing the development of technologies that are essential to society but have no identified commercial value. The government uses loans extensively to reduce the cost of capital to a competitive rate for less risky and more mature projects to foster outside investment. Government debt programs typical generate positive financial returns.[325] The US government does not make equity investments due to concerns over political interference and state capitalism.[326]

[325] "Estimates of the Cost of Federal Credit Programs in 2023 | Congressional Budget Office," June 24, 2022, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58031.Reference the CRS loan program report

[326] The government tries to avoid having a controlling stake in private firms whenever possible. Often referred to politically as "the third rail." The only exception has been the Fed bailouts, where the government eventually made around $109B as of August 2022. Paul Kiel, "The Bailout Was 11 Years Ago. We're Still Tracking Every Penny," ProPublica, October 3, 2019, https://www.propublica.org/article/the-bailout-was-11-years-ago-were-still-tracking-every-penny.



Figure 6: Strategic Gaps in the Industrial Base

Figure 6 illustrates how DoD funding sources address shortfalls in the industrial base by technological maturity and position in the supply chain. DoD grant funding from DARPA and various research labs is crucial in fostering basic and applied research providing a base of ideas for further development across the entire supply chain. Most purely military technologies advance along the top of the chart, driven by TRL funding.

The red space in Figure 6 represents funding gaps left by the US economy's transition to software development. Capital markets are unwilling to provide funding to commercialize and scale hardware technologies. Some technologies with military applications can apply for Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) funding to continue development and eventually Strategic Financing (STRATFI) or Tactical Financing (TACFI) funds to scale through AFWERX, but this does not address the root of the problem – the underlying components and processes necessary for advanced hardware development are starved of capital in the US. DoD's Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) is ideally positioned to implement capital market solutions to address the strategic capital gap.

The DoD can mitigate some of the risks associated with political interference,[327] leverage the benefits of diversification and foster company success by lowering the cost of capital for early-stage investors through loans in exchange for investing in key technology sectors. Instead of building and financing an entire apparatus focused on sourcing and investing in companies, the DoD can provide multiyear loans at low rates to investors who specialize in early-stage hard tech investing. The loans would increase the amount of capital flowing to hard-tech companies and increase capital flows to the sector by increasing hardware returns to be competitive with software investing. An OSC loan program targeted at investors will allow the DoD to take advantage of investor expertise and speed to quickly invest billions of mostly private dollars into early-stage hardware technology companies while diversifying risk to DoD.

[327] Political influence severely hampering the effectiveness of industrial policy is a common argument against industrial policy. Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik, "The New Economics of Industrial Policy," 6.

While loans to individual investors will empower capital to flow quickly to promising and new technologies, they are unlikely to fund building massive factories to scale production. The OSC can also help hardware companies scale by providing direct loans to companies with a proven technology and track records. The OSC could develop a direct loan programs office to provide loans to companies with hard assets that can cover the risk of default.



Figure 7: The Costs of Commercialization and Scaling with DoD Programs

Figure 7 provides an overview of how existing DoD funding programs relate to funding requirements, risk level, technological maturity, and funding stage for firms in the economic base. The area in red is another depiction of the capital market shortfalls but with an emphasis on funding levels and risk. Existing programs subsidize early technological development, which is relatively cheap compared to the commercialization and scaling process. Debt funding for investors and companies to scale will reduce the funding required and increase returns. Driving hardware development to near parity with software investment will shift private capital towards technologies essential to the industrial base.

The OSC could provide loans to crowd in large private investment at relatively little cost to DoD. The DoD can finance loans to investors[328] by covering the risk of debt default to the treasury department. If the treasury assumes a default rate of 5%, DoD needs to only provide $50M to issue $1B of debt. The $1B in debt will attract at least $1B of private capital, given the 1:1 matching ratio. Under these assumptions, DoD can leverage $50M of funding into $2B of investment from private markets. If managed properly, the program's interest payments could cover the cost of managing the program, with the remainder to be reinvested into the fund.

Loans allow DoD to be shielded from the risks of venture investment but still crowd-in private[329] capital towards early-stage companies. Investors reduce risk through diversification by making many non-correlated investments.[330] Many firms fail, but the few that prove successful increase in value enough to generate a positive

[328] Known as the Small Business Investment Company Critical Technology Initiative (SBIC-CTI) program.
[329] Juhász, Lane, and Rodrik, "The New Economics of Industrial Policy," 22.
[330] Harry Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection," *The Journal of Finance* 7, no. 1 (1952): 1.

return across the portfolio of companies.[331] Allocating loans to allows DoD to take advantage of diversifying risk in early-stage investments when the risk of failure is high.

Investors provide advice, access to networks, and exercise control over their investments. Funds have a high-level overview of an industry sector and often share lessons learned across their portfolio companies. Funds also often have access to deep networks of human talent and expertise. Finally, investors often obtain board seats or other forms of control that provide oversight on the use of resources.[332] Allocating loans to investors allows DoD to leverage external skilled human capital by aligning government and investor incentives to foster firm success.

As risk decreases and technologies mature, DoD can provide direct loans to assist with the scaling phase. The technology should be de-risked so that DoD can run a stable loan program in which 95% of loans succeed and 5% fail. The loans that fail would be covered by interest gained on other loans in the OSC's portfolio.

The DoD is uniquely positioned to take advantage of the US's dominance in capital markets and its comparative advantage as a source of patient capital to rebuild the industrial base weakened by years of offshoring. The Office of Strategic Capital could crowd in private capital to finance a new wave of industrial development centered on critical technology areas. Many of the firms financed by these programs would build key components and manufacturing processes for use by the broader economy, leading to a robust industrial base that would reduce the cost of defense programs, encourage economic growth, and act as a strategic deterrent.

Increase Funding to Idea Generation

Government funding for basic, applied, and developmental research plays a key role in encouraging the development of ideas that benefit society and de-risk technologies until they are commercially feasible. Unfortunately, federal R&D expenditures remained relatively stagnant until 2021.[333] The DoD can invest in a robust industrial base by increasing research funding and creating a robust technology transfer process to aid in commercialization.

DoD research funding[334] (6.1 & 6.2) has stayed nearly constant over the past 30 years. While overall RDT&E funding has increased, most of the increases went to TRL 6.4 – 6.7 funding, which does not create new ideas but turns existing research into new products.[335] The need for increases in TRL funding likely follows from the hallowing of the industrial base (described in Figure 2). The DoD should conserve RDT&E funding for basic, applied, and developmental research and crowd in private capital to fund the commercialization process.

The DoD runs a network of research labs and testing facilities, which lowers the cost of experimentation for all scientists. The DoD sponsors 10 Federally Fund Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), which partner with private researchers to advance technological development. The DoD funds University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs), which provide funding for research on universities with a strategic long term DoD

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[331] "How Venture Capital Works," accessed April 5, 2024, https://hbr.org/1998/11/how-venture-capital-works.
[332] Migena Pengili, "Deciding the Transformation of Defence: Public Private Partnerships & Organisational Learning" (States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century, West Point, NY, 2024), 4–5.
[333] The Biden administration drastically increased R&D funding. "Analytical Perspectives: Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2025" (Office of Management and Budget, 1/24), 47–48, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/analytical-perspectives/.
[334] See Figure 2 above.
[335] John F Sargent, "Department of Defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E): Appropriations Structure," June 25, 2018, 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44711/4.

partnership.[336] DoD facilities funding reduces the cost of innovation for the private sector by providing large-scale testing facilities.

DoD funded labs and academic institutions do not always discover technologies directly applicable to DoD technologies. Building robust technology transfer programs will allow society to benefit from these ideas by encouraging outside investment, allowing investors to profit from their research, and generating additional funding for DoD to reinvest in research.[337] These technologies contribute to US economic resilience, and some may even find their way back to DoD after being further developed for commercial use cases.

Protecting the Industrial Base

Much of DoD's industrial strategy outlined above relies on its comparative advantages in providing research funding and acting as a source of patient capital while leveraging private sector strengths. The DoD also has a unique set of intelligence collection and cyber security capabilities that are unrivaled in the private sector. Other nation-state actors often use predatory capital and cyber-attacks to acquire key intellectual property or hard assets. The DoD can leverage its intelligence collection capabilities to understand threat targeting of the industrial base and use cybersecurity assets to protect targeted firms. Consolidating data from the private sector, gathering additional data using advanced collection techniques, and protecting firms from advanced cybersecurity threats cannot be performed by private firms.

Private market transactions are notoriously opaque.[338] Investment firms closely guard proprietary data on private financial market transactions to maintain their competitive edge, leading to a fragmented understanding of malign actors.[339] If firms identify suspicious actors, they lack the resources to confirm and gather additional data to develop threat networks. The DoD is in an ideal position to build a common operating picture for intelligence collection to understand the threat's capital market strategy.

Using capital market activity to identify threat priorities would enable DoD to allocate scarce cyber command assets to protect the US industrial base. Malign actors often resort to cyber-attacks if they fail to obtain IP through acquisition. Small firms with valuable IP must invest huge sums of money to harden their networks against nation-state actors. Due to a capability mismatch, foreign intelligence entities will eventually steal the IP despite a firm's best efforts. While DoD cannot protect every firm in the industrial base, it can use a robust threat finance picture to allocate assets to protect or monitor firms at the biggest risk of attack. Building a robust threat detection capability based on capital market data will empower DoD to allocate resources to defend vulnerable intellectual property and infrastructure in the physical and cyber domains.

Teamwork Makes the Dream Work

The US industrial base gave Allied forces a decisive edge in World War II. From 1936 to 1942, DoD transitioned large portions of the US industrial base into the defense industrial base while investing heavily in new hardware technology to win the war. The revitalized US industrial base drove US growth for the latter half of the 20th

[336] Marcy E Gallo, "Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs): Background and Issues for Congress" (Congressional Research Service, April 3, 2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44629/6.
[337] "Office of Technology Licensing," accessed April 5, 2024, https://otl.stanford.edu/.
[338] A PitchBook license that provides data on private debt and equity transactions starts at $30k per year.
[339] *Panel 12C: Crowding Private Capital into the Industrial Base* (West Point, NY, 2024).

century.[340] The US must rebuild its hardware innovation capacity to act as a deterrent and drive another 100 years of economic growth.

The DoD does not need to rebuild the industrial base alone. The Departments of Commerce, Energy, Education, Labor, State, and Homeland Security want to foster economic growth and understand the need to rebuild the industrial base to foster a healthy economy. The DoD should work with the relevant stakeholders at the National Security Council or a National Industrial Policy Office to avoid duplicative efforts, leverage relevant expertise, and avoid repeating the same mistakes from previous industrial policy efforts.

Given budget constraints, existing labor force skills, and the extent of globalization, the US cannot realistically rebuild an industrial base capacity capable of fighting a near-peer threat alone. The US should work with allies to build a robust allied industrial base capable of rapidly scaling production to support a near-peer conflict. Nations need to specialize in their comparative advantages based on their domestic political situation[341] and position in global supply chains.

Hardware will continue to play a key role in the US national security strategy. The DoD can use capital market tools to encourage private investment in the industrial base, increase funding to basic, applied, and developmental research programs, and protect key technologies using intelligence and cyber security assets. This wicked problem will require using every tool at DoD's disposal, working with the private sector, government agencies, and our allied partners to solve. The US must build a robust industrial base to drive human progress into the 21st century and promote peace and prosperity.

[340] Blank, Steve, "Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley," accessed July 9, 2024, https://steveblank.com/secret-history/.

[341] Sanne Verschuren presented a paper arguing that nations may prefer hegemonic, strategic, tactical, or control-based weapons systems based on the domestic political environment and illustrated the different postures using missile defense systems. Sanne Cornelia J Verschuren, "Imagining the Unimaginable: War, Weapons, and Procurement Politics" (States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century, West Point, NY, 2024), 2.

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Chapter 7 – Manpower, Material, and Maneuver: Challenges and Opportunities in the Russia-Ukraine War

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ABSTRACT

Nearly constant adaptation has been a feature of both Russia and Ukraine's war effort since the first days of the full-scale invasion of February 2022. Understanding the challenges faced by Ukraine and Russia is currently fraught with partisan considerations and some assumptions about the conflict: that it is not relevant to US strategic interest, that the US should not be worried about Russia because they have proved incompetent, and that the US has already done enough to support the Ukrainians. We examine Ukraine and Russia's recent historical adaptations and present challenges in the spheres of manpower, material, and maneuver to provide recommendations for policymakers as they consider how best to support Ukraine, achieve US national interests in Europe, and adapt the US armed forces in response to emerging challenges that have been exposed in this large-scale combat operation. First, maintaining consistent economic and rationalized lethal aid support to Ukraine, as well as adapting sanctions against Russia, remain vitally important. Second, training support for Ukraine needs to be expanded and made more applicable to the current fight. Finally, senior policy and defense leaders need to address shortcomings in US and NATO preparation – namely limitations in defense industrial capacity, in mobilizing forces beyond the current Composition 1-3 plan, and in adapting to the challenges of establishing air superiority, of countering ubiquitous surveillance and drones, and of breaching the depth of fortifications seen in Ukraine. Without doing so, the US risks losing credibility in deterrence both in Europe and the Pacific, jeopardizing a stable and prosperous Europe, and squandering an opportunity to learn from an ongoing large -cale combat operation.

Nearly constant adaptation has been a feature of both Russia and Ukraine's war effort since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. On each side, the track record of adaptation has been mixed: some have succeeded, others failed, while potential adaptations not realized stand out as missed opportunities. US policymakers would do well to study the recent history of adaptation and counter-adaptation in Ukraine for valuable lessons in how to best support Ukraine's path to victory in the difficult months to come, and critical lessons for our own fighting force as we prepare for possible future conflicts. These lessons are especially important considering common misperceptions about the conflict: that it is not relevant to core US security interests, that Russian forces are incompetent, and that the US has already done enough for the Ukrainians. In this essay, we examine adaptations made by the belligerents in Ukraine in three spheres: manpower, material,[342] and maneuver. Examining Ukraine and Russia's adaptations since February 2022 will provide useful context for policymakers as they consider how best to support Ukraine, achieve US national interests in Europe and adapt US armed forces in response to emerging challenges in large -cale combat operations.

I. MANPOWER

Ukrainian Adaptations, Challenges, and Opportunities

After the failure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to respond effectively to the Russian invasion of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014-5, Ukraine's political and military leaders recognized the need to reform its armed

[342] We use material to address all industrial and economic advantages Russia has over Ukraine – not just solely in the sphere of military equipment and its defense industry (i.e., materiel).

forces and defense industry. Ukraine did so by strengthening democratic civilian control over the defense apparatus and by focusing on restructuring its organizational leadership, expanding its army size, and training leaders well while selectively modernizing equipment.[343] The most significant structural changes Ukraine made were to double the authorized contract (or professional) size of the army, to return to using conscription, and to build up a large reserve system and formalized Territorial Defense battalions.[344] To accomplish these goals, Ukraine recruited more contracted soldiers, developed an administrative infrastructure for the operational reserves and for conscription, and made far-reaching changes to the command structure.[345] The UAF also focused on qualitative developments – to include reorganizing brigade and lower headquarters along NATO lines, emphasizing professional training for junior officers and a strengthened NCO Corps, and increasing collective training events at the battalion and higher level, especially with other NATO forces.[346] These units gained combat experience by rotating along the line of control in Luhansk and Donetsk. These adaptations in recruiting, training, and mobilizing manpower were essential for Ukraine to be able to respond to the Russian offensive in February 2022 – but it took seven years to get there. Their trained personnel have taken heavy casualties since 2022 and are exhausted from over two years with no large-scale unit rotations off the front line.[347]

Since February 2022, Ukraine has successfully mobilized an estimated 300,000-400,000 additional military personnel and hundreds of thousands more in the Territorial Defense Forces and Transportation Services.[348] Despite this massive mobilization effort, Ukraine faces significant manpower challenges today, with fierce debate over the May 2024 mobilization law that reduced the minimum eligible draft age from 27 to 25 and increased penalties for avoiding conscription.[349] The UAF also struggles to rotate combat units off the line to recover, refit, and train.[350] Further, in order to train newly contracted and mobilized forces, the UAF has had to significantly adapt their training programs and rely upon NATO countries for support. Some Ukrainian military leaders have expressed frustration with the lack of a consistent NATO standard and of realistic training incorporating drones and defensive measures.

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[343] Deborah Sanders, "Ukraine's Third Wave of Military Reform 2016–2022 – Building a Military Able to Defend Ukraine against the Russian Invasion," *Defense & Security Analysis* 39, no. 3 (July 3, 2023): 312–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2023.2201017, 315.

[344] Ukraine expanded its authorized contracted strength from 130,000 in 2014 to 261,000 in 2022. Sanders, "Ukraine's Third Wave of Military Reform 2016-2022," 316.

[345] Sanders, "Ukraine's Third Wave of Military Reform 2016-2022," 315-6.

[346] Sanders, "Ukraine's Third Wave of Military Reform 2016-2022," 318.

[347] Ukraine has been very guarded about reporting casualties. President Zelensky confirmed that 31,000 had been killed as of February 2024. Kathryn Armstrong, "Ukraine war: Zelensky says 31,000 troops killed since Russia's full-scale invasion," *BBC News,* 25 February 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68397525. A Ukrainian organization has documented by name the deaths of 50,813 UAF personnel as of 1 July 2024, "UA Losses," https://ualosses.org/en/soldiers/. Accessed 1 July 2024. US officials estimated 70,000 UAF deaths and 100-120,000 wounded as of August 2023, with limited public updates since then. Helene Cooper, et. al, "Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say," *The New York Times,* 18 August 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/18/us/politics/ukraine-russia-war-casualties.html.

[348] The *Council for Foreign Relations* estimated Ukraine to have a total of 600,000 military personnel in April 2024. Max Boot, "Weapons of War: The Race Between Russia and Ukraine," *Council for Foreign Relations,* 24 April 2024, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/weapons-war-race-between-russia-and-ukraine.

[349] Daryna Vialko, "Zelenskyy signs mobilization law: Effective date revealed," *RBC-Ukraine,* 16 April 2024, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/zelenskyy-signs-mobilization-law-effective-1713275105.html.

[350] In addition, the average age of conscripted soldiers in Ukraine is 43. Sergii Kostezh, "What's up with Mobilization in Ukraine?" *Kyiv Post,* 21 March 2024, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/29886.

Russian Adaptations, Challenges, and Opportunities

The failures of the Russian armed forces (RAF) invasion in February 2022 also exposed several shortcomings in the organization of Russian manpower. The initial months of the invasion revealed that the haphazard command and control structure of the "Special Military Operation" was inadequate, that peacetime strength units lacked sufficient manpower (particularly infantry dismounts) and training to fight effectively, and that much of the equipment modernization was hollow or unevenly distributed.[351] The UAF killed over 15,000 RAF in the first four months – primarily contracted soldiers from airborne or special purpose forces – and Russian forces lost large amounts of modern equipment.[352] The RAF did not organize according to their doctrine and suffered from interference by President Putin who assigned favorite commanders, redistributed military units from organic commands, and micromanaged the campaign.[353]

In response to high casualties sustained by specialized troops and to the initial invasion's failure, President Putin activated the Special Combat Army Reserves in the spring of 2022 to replenish depleted units and in September 2022, announced a partial mobilization plan to conscript 300,000 troops (primarily from a pool of Russians with former military experience).[354] Further, Putin established a more streamlined chain of command in the fall of 2022.[355] Over the winter of 2022-2023, the RAF built new armies with the newly contracted soldiers. This growth has continued, resulting in a Russian army in 2024 that is 15% larger than it was in February 2022.[356] Analysts assess that the Kremlin believes it can sustain the current rate of attrition through 2025.[357]

However, while the RAF continues to be able to attract contracted soldiers, it still faces difficulties generating forces. For example, local officials in some regions have had to increase payments to attract people to sign contracts.[358] Discontent among the wives and mothers of soldiers mobilized in 2022 led Putin to stage a meeting with some of them in the winter of 2023 to prevent them rallying.[359] Some local officials are asking to close prisons because they have no more convicts.[360] The RAF has adapted tactics to preserve its more highly trained

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[351] For example, units not intended for high-intensity combat, such as the crowd control and riot response OMON, found themselves fighting with inadequate equipment in Kharkhiv. Mark Galeotti, *Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2022), 349.

[352] Galeotti, *Putin's Wars*, 350-351.

[353] Tom, Cooper, et al. *War in Ukraine, Volume 2: Russian Invasion, February 2022* (Warwick, UK: Helion & Company Limited, 2023), 34. Galeotti, *Putin's Wars,* 345-6.

[354] Robert Person, "Putin's Big Gamble," *Journal of Democracy* (September 2022), https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/online-exclusive/putins-big-gamble/. For reserves: Galeotti, *Putin's War,* 357.

[355] Vladimir Frolov, "New Commander, New Goals for Russia in Ukraine," *Carnegie Politika,* 1 November 2022.

[356] With an estimated 470,000 in the Russian Operational Group forces for Ukraine. Connor O'Brien, "Russian military replaced Ukraine battlefield losses 'far faster' than expected, general warns," *Politico,* 11 April 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/11/christopher-cavoli-russian-military-losses-00151718. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, "Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024," *Royal United Services Institute*, 13 February 2024.

[357] Watling and Reynolds, "Russian Military Objectives."

[358] Pavel Luzin, "The Kremlin Prepares for Winter in Ukraine," *The Jamestown Foundation: Eurasia Daily Monitor,* Vol. 20, 178, 16 November 2023, https://jamestown.org/program/the-kremlin-prepares-for-winter-in-ukraine/.

[359] The women's objections are not about the war, but the rotational policy. Pjotr Sauer, "'We're tired of being good girls': Russia's military wives and mothers protest against Putin," *The Guardian,* 25 December 2023.

[360] There are closures in Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk, and other regions, with up to 100,000 convicts reportedly conscripted. "Russia Begins Closing Prisons as both Convicts and Staff Head to War," *Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty,* 03 April 2024.

contracted infantry soldiers – implying a perception of unsustainable casualty rates among contracted soldiers.[361] These examples suggest that Russia's supply of soldiers is not endless, with political risks of future mobilizations a serious cause for concern for the Kremlin.

Implications for Policymakers

Combat manpower is not simply a matter of quantity – quality counts, too. The last two years have shown shortcomings in the international community's training support for Ukraine. Rectifying these shortcomings can help improve the capacity of Ukraine's fighting force beyond its current levels.

First, training facilities in Europe are inadequate to both support an increased NATO and US presence and provide meaningful support to Ukraine's mobilization, force regeneration, and force reconstitution programs. Second, Ukrainian forces have found "NATO Standard" to be more of a guideline and have had to overcome inconsistencies between units training at different training facilities. Third, in both training and doctrine, the US tends to emphasize maneuver-centric operations and tactics, which Ukrainian forces struggled to execute during their failed 2023 counteroffensive – largely because they did not have the airpower, munitions, breaching materials, and reserves to do so.[362] Fourth, US trainers have been less proficient in training how to develop and fight a deliberate defense; how to protect and camouflage forces, equipment, and command posts; and how to clear obstacles, mines, and booby traps at echelons below brigade.[363] Ukraine has done much to mitigate these training shortcomings by sending UAF members with recent experience on the front to be a quality control check at NATO facilities and to ensure that units are training according to Ukrainian doctrine. This should be encouraged and expanded but will require both sides to be more deliberate about sharing lessons learned from their experiences and from analyses of combat in Ukraine.

To maximize military benefit and political palatability, the training rotations at European facilities need to be both valuable for the Ukrainians *and* for the US and NATO forces. American political and military leaders perceive a readiness cost to continued rotations of brigade combat teams to Europe in support of assurance and deterrence operations. This perspective misses a crucial point: training rotations to Europe provide US forces with invaluable opportunities to train realistically, gather best practices from current practitioners, and provide a focused training environment not readily available in the US. Simultaneously, senior US military leaders should message policymakers about the significance of supporting the UAF for US national security interests. They should illustrate the value the US armed forces accrue by learning from working with the second largest army in Europe and their proximity to the largest land war since World War II. After the war, Ukraine will have one of Europe's largest and best-armed armies – and who could be a powerful ally and economic partner, weapons supplier, and customer for US weapons.[364]

Another challenge that must be overcome is limited training areas, which are also at too small a scale. These constraints force Ukrainian brigades to break up into smaller units to conduct training in multiple countries.

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[361] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, "Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of its Invasion of Ukraine," *Royal United Services Institute,* 19 May 2023, 3-6.

[362] Mariano Zafra and Jon McClure, "Four factors that stalled Ukraine's counteroffensive," *Reuters,* published 21 December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/MAPS/klvygwawavg/.

[363] Author discussions with junior and field grade level commanders about training Ukrainian forces at US and NATO training centers. Also, based on open-source Ukrainian feedback: posted by a UAF veteran from 2014-5 on 5 September 2023, https://x.com/Teoyaomiquu/status/1699193558685618235.

[364] Michael McFaul, "The Case for Supporting Ukraine is Crystal Clear," *Foreign Policy,* 16 November, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/16/ukraine-russia-war-us-congress-aid-weapons/.

There has been no deliberate NATO or US expansion of training areas that has kept pace with the increased demand for the throughput and scale required to train for large scale combat operations. The US training command in Europe has also not sufficiently scaled up to certify existing host nation training locations.[365] There are also bureaucratic hurdles to overcome to use drones on NATO and US training bases: burdensome exceptions are required to use commercial technology and to fly drones in training areas. These limitations frustrate the UAF, and mean US forces are not benefitting from Ukrainians' innovations. A more concerted commitment to improving the training experience for the UAF and for the rotational US and NATO units will aid both Ukraine's war effort and Allied readiness.

Russia's manpower situation also presents lessons and policy implications for the coalition opposing Moscow. Though Russian officials seem confident in their ability to absorb current levels of personnel attrition until the end of 2025, high casualties nonetheless pose political risks to the Kremlin. The Russian invasion since 2022 has cost an estimated 315,000 casualties (with 66-88,000 deaths since December 2023, compared to 18,500 in Chechnya, 15,000 in Afghanistan, and 6,500 in Ukraine from 2014-2022).[366] At these levels, maintaining a facade of normalcy while also escalating offensive operations becomes difficult, indicating a key opportunity for those opposing Russia. If Ukraine can impose enough costs in 2024 while defending against Russian offensives and preventing the RAF from making any significant gains, then Russia will increasingly face politically sensitive manpower challenges in 2025. The US and NATO's corollary lesson is clear: continued lethal aid support is vital to the UAF's ability to continue defending and forcing Russian leaders to make difficult choices about mobilizing manpower.

II. MATERIAL

Ukrainian Adaptations, Challenges, and Opportunities

In the aftermath of Russia's illegal offensive actions in 2014-5, Ukraine developed innovative ways to modernize on a limited budget: rehauling the state-owned defense enterprise (the Ukrainian Defense Industry); refurbishing old Soviet equipment; adopting tailored procurement; and leveraging civilian patriotic associations for funding, logistics support, humanitarian assistance, and innovation.[367] Further, the UAF focused on selectively modernizing equipment.[368] Continued international support and the ability of the civilian sector to scale up and adapt quickly has enabled the Ukrainians to counter Russia's distinct material advantage over Ukraine – but Ukraine is still reliant upon international support, particularly anti-air, artillery, and anti-tank munitions. Without this support, Ukraine will struggle to deter the RAF from integrating higher casualty-producing air and armored assets into combined arms and joint maneuver.

Since 2020 and accelerating after February 2022, Ukrainian political and industry leaders have taken significant steps to improve its defense industrial base. Nearly one-third of the Ukrainian gross domestic product is dedicated to defense spending, and political leaders have attempted to modernize the Ukrainian

[365] With the addition of three brigade combat teams and four NATO enhanced Vigilance Activity (eVA) battle groups, the training resources in some NATO countries are oversubscribed and cannot sustain multiple units attempting to do collective training at the company and higher level.

[366] Of those who have died, about 25% have been from existing RAF units, 19% have been convicts, over 10% each from newly mobilized units and from new volunteers, and 6% from privatized military companies. "How many Russian soldiers have died in Ukraine," *The Economist,* 24 February 2024.

[367] Sanders, "Ukraine's Third Wave of Military Reform 2016–2022," 315.

[368] Particularly, anti-tank weapons, UAVs, communications infrastructure, and technology to counter Russian electronic warfare systems. Sanders, "Ukraine's Third Wave of Military Reform 2016-2022," 320-1.

Defense Industry along with industry best practices on transparency, efficiency, and combating corruption.[369] Further, the Ukrainian private sector has provided much-needed innovation and production, particularly of drones. Another government project has successfully scaled up drone production from thirty to 200 manufacturers and significantly streamlined processes for contracts, clearance, and delivery to the front.[370] The UAF has also demonstrated innovative approaches with production capabilities down to the brigade level. Despite these efforts, Ukraine's defense and private industry are still unable to fully meet demands for munitions and equipment, so Ukraine remains reliant upon international support.[371]

Russian Adaptations, Challenges, and Opportunities

In the summer of 2024, Russia's material advantage over Ukraine remains significant. Since February 2022, the Russian defense industry has been on a wartime footing that enabled it to substantially expand production ability. However, the RAF's uneven modernization since 2012 and the challenges it presently faces to maintain the perception of a normal economy domestically show that the Russian material advantage has weaknesses that the US and its allies can exploit with improved sanctions.

The RAF's invasion of Ukraine in 2014-5 revealed that some of its structural modernization was hollow – Putin's establishment of state-run conglomerates in every branch of the arms industry created a heavily politicized defense sector beset by the rampant corruption that also corroded other sectors of Russia's economy.[372] Furthermore, Russia's defense industry remained reliant on Ukraine and Europe for electronic components used in its advanced technology.[373] Though heavily promoted as "modernized," many of Russia's proclaimed advances in weaponry were merely upgrades of designs from the 1970s-80s, some of which did not survive first contact in Ukraine in 2014-5 and 2022.[374]

The Russian defense industry has managed to expand production ability since 2022 despite sanctions. The Russian government projects national defense spending in 2024 will account for 6% of GDP (up from 3.9% in 2023 – and likely much higher as Russian officials mask defense spending under other labels in the budget).[375] Imports from China have fully replaced imports from Europe, the US, South Korea and Taiwan, while Russia's transition to lower cost and less advanced weapons have allowed Russian industries to get around sanctions by relying on purely civilian technologies.[376] Particularly devastating to Ukrainian defenses has been Russia's

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[369] For estimates of the percentage of GDP in the summer of 2024: Aaron O'Neill, "Ukraine: Ration of military spending to gross domestic product (GDP) from 2000-2022," *Statista,* 7 June 2024, https://www.statista.com/statistics/810835/ratio-of-military-expenditure-to-gross-domestic-product-gdp-ukraine/.

[370] Kateryna Bondar, "Arsenal of Democracy: Integrating Ukraine into the West's Defense Industrial Base," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,* 4 December 2023.

[371] Kateryna Bondar, "Arsenal of Democracy: Integrating Ukraine into the West's Defense Industrial Base."

[372] Cooper et al., *War in Ukraine*, 17-18.

[373] Cooper et al., *War in Ukraine,* 17-18.

[374] For example, cheap Chinese tires burst, poorly made or old bombs did not explode, and ration packs had expired (contributing to looting). Galeotti, *Putin's Wars,* 349.

[375] Maria Snegovaya et al. "Back in Stock? The State of Russia's Defense Industry after Two Years of the War," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, April 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/back-stock-state-russias- defense-industry-after-two-years-war, 6.

[376] Snegovaya et al. "Back in Stock?" 14, 21.

increased production and use of tactical First Person View (FPV) drones. Russian volunteers have also contributed to grassroots FPV drone production using imported components from China.[377]

Despite these material advantages, Russia also suffers from constraints due to depleting its reserve stockpiles, battlefield losses, limitations to advanced technology production, and labor shortages. A significant portion of the increased output in equipment has come from the refurbishment and modernization of pre-existing war stocks (many from the Soviet era), and the RAF has experienced heavy battlefield losses to its modern equipment.[378] Russia also cannot produce sufficient artillery shells to meet its current rate of expenditure, and Russian officials estimate that Russian industry cannot significantly increase production within five years.[379]

Further, Russian defense industries have struggled to scale up production and replacement of advanced platforms, such as aircraft, helicopters, and missiles, contributing to RAF reticence to risk those assets.[380] If the Russian air forces begin to feel more secure in using aircraft to support ground offensives, then the Ukrainian defenses will become increasingly vulnerable. It is therefore imperative that Ukraine continue to be able to inflict heavy losses on exquisite weapons platforms to discourage their full employment. Russian offensive operations have required months of stockpiling munitions to achieve quantities sufficient to launch new offensives, while emerging or specialized production plants have proven vulnerable to Ukrainian targeting and may also be vulnerable to disciplined sanctions.[381] The RAF have also proved less adaptive, settling upon a VT-40 FPV drone and mass producing it, which has resulted in the Ukrainians being able to more easily adapt counter measures against a singular version.[382]

Russian industry remains vulnerable to sanctions and is rife with corruption. Crucially, Russian industry does not have the ability to produce sufficient machine tools and components for its metalworking industry.[383] Even if Russia can find ways to buy equipment and components through third countries, they struggle with bottlenecks at border crossings and inflated costs of components.[384] Corruption at a small and large scale limits

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[377] Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 10.

[378] CSIS estimates that 86% of the main battle tanks that Russia produced in 2023 were refurbished. Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 7. Kyiv assesses that Russian forces have lost 11,142 artillery systems since February 2022 and that they lost 1,000 in the month of March 2024 alone. Ellie Cook, "Russia Lost Almost 1,000 Artillery Systems in March: Kyiv," *Newsweek,* 04 April 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-artillery-losses-ukraine-march-record-ammunition-1886316.

[379] In 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense assesses that it needs 4 million 152mm and 1.6 million 122mm artillery shells – while Russian industry assesses that it will only be able to produce 1.3 million 152mm rounds and 800,000 122mm rounds. Watling and Reynolds, "Russian Military Objectives and Capacity."

[380] Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 6

[381] Such as the UAF targeting the Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant in August 2023. Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 10.

[382] David Hambling, "Is Russian Drone Production Overtaking Ukraine?" *Forbes,* 1 July 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2024/07/01/is-russia-overtaking-ukraine-in-drone-production/.

[383] Pavel Luzin, "Chinese Machine Tools Serve as Russia's Safety Net," *The Jamestown Foundation: Eurasia Daily Monitor,* Vol. 21, Issue 9, 22 January 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-machine-tools-serve-as-russias-safety-net/.

[384] Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 34

the impact of increased investment in defensive industrial enterprises, resulting in unsafe munitions stocks, shortages of fuel, individual troop equipment, rations, and winter clothing for soldiers.[385]

Implications for Policymakers

Continued US commitment to supplying aid and strengthening sanctions can help address Ukraine's material deficit and erode Russia's industrial advantage. First, Ukraine's economy is in a much more dire position than Russia's - and requires a commitment from the US and Europe to invest in infrastructure, industry, and agriculture to help Ukraine's economy recover from the impact of the war and the intentional targeting of civilian infrastructure.[386] Beyond material support, Ukraine continues to be reliant upon lethal aid to counter Russia's material advantage. For example, the current Russian 5:1 artillery advantage (up to 12:1 in certain areas) can be reduced through consistent provision and a commitment to increase munitions and missile production.[387] Of particular importance will be continuing to supply air defense systems, missiles, and artillery rounds. These are necessary to allow Ukraine to deter the full use of Russian air forces and to allow units to rotate off the line to reconstitute or regenerate forces. Finally, the US and NATO should work to rationalize support to Ukraine by reducing the number of types of systems being provided and commit to production of ammunition, spare parts, and training on the most useful systems. This will help Ukraine to address its economic challenges, meet its present defensive needs, and prepare for future offensives.

Maintaining or expanding support for Ukraine also benefits the US defense industrial base. The current conflict has revealed the inadequacy of defense industrial production and the challenges inherent to scaling up production. While the January 2024 National Defense Industry Strategy sets out priorities that include creating resilient supply chains, ensuring workforce readiness, using flexible acquisition, and engaging economic deterrence, DoD will need to engage with Congress and industry leaders to effectively implement these initiatives.[388] One thing that DoD can most readily control without changes to the law is its acquisition process, which generally results in new equipment being fielded within eighteen months. Ukrainian and Russian technological adaptation and counteradaptation takes place within six to eight weeks; current DoD acquisition processes cannot meet that timeline and would place US forces at a significant disadvantage in a similar conflict.

The Russian challenges discussed above also present opportunities to the advance US interests. Russian economic vulnerabilities provide an opening for the US to continue to spearhead international support for updated and tightened sanctions – particularly by targeting Russia's oil revenues, addressing third-country intermediaries' violations, and targeting the civilian technology imports that Russia is using for military purposes – such as machine tools and components Russia needs to scale up specialized production of missiles and higher tech platforms.[389] Though sanctions have not dealt the promised devastating blow to the Russian economy, they have contributed to the Russian economy being significantly below its growth trajectory, will continue to

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[385] Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 35.

[386] Economic historian Nicholas Mulder argues that sanctions are less impactful than a commitment to aiding Ukraine's economy and that policymakers should not rely upon sanctions to deal a crippling blow to the Russian economy. Nicholas Mulder, "Sanctions Against Russia Ignore the Economic Challenges Facing Ukraine," *The New York Times* published 9 February 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/opinion/sanctions-russia-ukraine-economy.html.

[387] Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, "Making Attrition Work: A Viable Theory of Victory for Ukraine," *Institute for International and Strategic Studies,* vol. 66, no. 1 (February-March 2024), 9-10.

[388] "National Defense Industrial Strategy," *Department of Defense,* 16 November 2023, https://www.businessdefense.gov/docs/ndis/2023-NDIS.pdf, 10.

[389] Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 41.

hamper its future development, and has contributed to the exodus of educated professionals.[390] Policymakers and practitioners should continue to consider how to ensure sanctions remain adaptive to Russia's countermeasures and how they fit into a broader strategy of imposing domestic costs on the Kremlin for continuing the war and supporting Ukraine's economy.

III. MANEUVER

Ukrainian Adaptations, Challenges, and Opportunities

Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable tactical adaptability beyond rapidly mobilizing and training forces, expanding domestic production, and leveraging diverse equipment from international donors. These adaptations have included quickly incorporating new equipment (particularly drones) to offset Russian material advantage; improving their targeting processes; mastering rapid counterbattery fire; and displacing, dispersing, and camouflaging quickly and effectively.

In the months following the February 2022 invasion, the Ukrainians rapidly mobilized, established effective defensive lines in the east and south, took advantage of Russian disorganization to ambush the initial invasion forces, and provided unexpectedly stiff civilian and military resistance throughout the country. Territorial Defense Forces helped to defend critical facilities, establish roadblocks, and organize rapid response teams against Russian special purpose and reconnaissance forces behind front lines. The UAF also adeptly incorporated diverse weapons platforms from international donors, minimizing the Russian air and naval advantage. Some of the tactical adaptations the UAF learned from the 2014-5 invasion proved effective in 2022 – such as mastering rapid counterbattery fire, displacing quickly, and improving their Automatic Tactical Management Systems. The latter allows anyone with the app to mark enemy locations, find nearby artillery pieces, and coordinate for their fire.[391] Starting in 2023, the UAF has become particularly effective with FPV drones.[392]

From September to November 2022, Ukrainian forces successfully probed Russian lines and took advantage of ill-prepared and degraded forces around Kharkiv and Kherson in successful counteroffensives. Throughout the winter of 2022-2023, Ukraine continued to mobilize forces and prepare for a more significant counteroffensive. The Ukrainians also had to contend with massive attacks on their energy infrastructure, which spurred Ukraine to develop creative air defense measures such as passive detection measures using cell

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[390] Mulder, "Sanctions Against Russia." Predictions on growth from Leyla Latypova, "What Really Happened with Russia's Economy in 2022," *The Moscow Times,* 3 January 2023, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/03/what-really-happened-with-russias-economy-in-2022-a79856. Exodus of professionals from Masha Gessen, "The Russians Fleeing Putin's Wartime Crackdown," *The New Yorker,* 20 March 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/03/28/the-russians-fleeing-putins-wartime-crackdown.

[391] Cooper et al., *War in Ukraine,* 24.

[392] Given Ukraine's significant shortage in artillery rounds compared to Russia (Ukraine fires about 2,000 rounds a day compared to Russia's current rate of about 10,000 to 20,000), Ukraine has used the FPV to make up for their shortage of artillery – contributing to two thirds of Russia's tank losses in 2024. Jack Detsch, "Ukraine's FPV Drones Are Destroying Russian Tanks," *Foreign Policy,* 9 April 2024, https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/09/drones-russia-tanks-ukraine-war-fpv-artillery/.

phones.[393] During the spring of 2023, Ukraine trained 36,000 soldiers with US and NATO forces in preparation for a highly anticipated counteroffensive.[394]

That counteroffensive launched in June 2023 aimed at severing the connection between the Russian mainland and Crimea, with a conservative goal of retaking Tokmak and a more ambitious goal of securing Crimea.[395] Though successful in securing Robotyne, the UAF only advanced about 7.5km. While some US and NATO officials have criticized Ukraine for spreading its focus along multiple axes, they miss the larger problem. Even if the UAF had concentrated along one axis, it did not have sufficient artillery, close air support, or engineering assets to breach the tens of kilometers of defensive fortifications that the Russians had built over the winter and spring. As a result, Ukrainian forces were unable to degrade Russian defenses sufficiently, struggled to scale attacks beyond the level of three reinforced companies per brigade, and did not have the enablers to break through Russian defenses.[396]

In the fall of 2023, Russia launched offensives that achieved only small gains until Avdiivka in February 2024. Though the UAF has sometimes struggled with timing the withdrawal of forces in untenable locations, they have continued to impose heavy costs for all territory that the RAF takes.[397] By the spring of 2024, the UAF was under new leadership but still struggled to maintain defenses given a significant shortage in artillery rounds, challenges in generating replacement forces, and heavy casualties. However, Ukraine's military leadership has managed to improve the organization of the UAF by consolidating the joint services back in Kyiv and the front line under one joint command, as well as organizing the services to focus on force and equipment generation.

While Ukraine has made significant adaptations over the course of 2022-4, they still face a daunting task with success far from guaranteed. Ukraine's challenge in 2024 and beyond will be to maintain the current line of defenses and not cede vital lines of communication as it absorbs Russian offensive attacks. The UAF's focus must be on shoring up Ukraine's defenses and continuing to inflict maximum casualties on the Russians. While doing so, the UAF also needs to build manpower and regenerate forces; build and expand stockpiles of munitions, missiles, equipment, and spare parts; strengthen defensive fortifications in depth and develop a unit rotation plan; and ensure the RAF remains deterred from employing its air forces in support of offensives.

Russian Armed Forces Maneuver: Adaptations, Challenges, and Opportunities

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[393] "Ukraine conflict: Ukrainian air defence employs passive sensors for detection and tracking," *Janes,* 24 November 2023, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/weapons/ukraine-conflict-ukrainian-air-defence-employs-passive-sensors-for-detection-and-tracking.

[394] Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, "Ukraine's Western-Trained Brigades Begin to Enter the Fight," *The New York Times,* 23 June 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/23/us/politics/ukraine-military-training.html.

[395] Mariano Zafra and Jon McClure, "Four factors that stalled Ukraine's counteroffensive," *Reuters,* 21 December 2023, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/MAPS/klvygwawavg/#four-factors-that-stalled-ukraines-counteroffensive.

[396] Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, and Dara Massicot, "Hold, Build, and Strike: A Vision for Rebuilding Ukraine's Advantage in 2024," *War on the Rocks,* 26 January 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/hold-build-and-strike-a-vision-for-rebuilding-ukraines-advantage-in-2024/.

[397] Russia's weekly casualty rate in spring 2024 exceeded that of 2022. Olga Ivshina, "Russian losses in Ukraine by April: 51 thousand confirmed, average weekly losses remain higher than in 2022," *BBC News,* 19 April 2024, https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cld05vpy06eo.

After its disastrous first few months of the war, the RAF made considerable tactical adaptations, rectifying early errors in maneuver and developing robust defensive lines. According to Russian doctrine, the RAF should have established a Combat Management Group (GBU) earlier to coordinate the invasion and plan preparatory measures. Forces should have been concentrated with a three to one local military advantage and the invasion should have been preceded by a massed missile aviation strike to crater every Ukrainian runway, suppress air defenses, disrupt lines of communication, and demoralize troops.[398] The invasion would then proceed as a carefully coordinated combined arms operation.

This is not what happened. The GBU was established one day before the invasion and there was no mobilization – the RAF fielded units at peacetime strength (which generally meant they were understrength, especially in dismounted infantry).[399] The preparatory bombardment in February 2022 was cursory and Putin assigned tasks to favorite commanders, undermining command and control of organic units and leaving no clear priority between field commanders. Most commanders were given minimal to no advanced warning of the plan, and they had to deploy units not designed for heavy combat.[400] Though initial denial efforts (to include jamming on all frequency bands, harassing early warning radars with decoy UAVs, and a major cyber-attack that disrupted UAF communications) were relatively successful, the RAF was unable to capitalize on the disruption.[401] A significant number of Russian cruise missiles malfunctioned, allowing Ukrainian Air Defense units to displace and establish defensive shields.[402]

The RAF made significant structural and tactical adaptations in response to these initial setbacks. The RAF established a more effective chain of command for the Russian Operational Group of Forces, and in October 2022, Putin appointed General Sergei Surovikin commander with a mandate to switch to strategic defense and preserve the land corridor to Crimea.[403] Through the winter and spring of 2023, the RAF laid extensive obstacles, minefields, and defensive position in support of that objective. These measures still pose a formidable obstacle to Ukraine taking back territory.

Tactically, the RAF has demonstrated a willingness to deviate from doctrine as well as to adapt to threats posed by the UAF and to limitations in manpower and equipment. For example, the RAF has functionally stratified infantry into disposable, line, assault, and specialized troops.[404] The RAF has used disposable infantry (largely convicts and conscripted Ukrainians from occupied territory) to advance as skirmishers in small fire teams that help to identify Ukrainian firing positions or weak points in Ukrainian defenses. Reinforced companies from assault or specialized infantry (airborne, naval infantry, or specialized private military company units) then exploit positions or weak points discovered by these probing fire teams. Once the assault units seize terrain, line infantry occupy positions and begin digging in to hold terrain. This limits the casualties that the most highly trained units take, which became important given the high casualties sustained by contracted soldiers in early 2022 and the resulting decline in professional forces' quality.[405]

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[398] Galeotti, *Putin's Wars,* 345

[399] Galeotti, *Putin's Wars,* 350.

[400] Galeotti, *Putin's Wars,* 347.

[401] Cooper et al., *War in Ukraine,* 37.

[402] Cooper et al., *War in Ukraine,* 38.

[403] Frolov, "New Commander, New Goals for Russia in Ukraine."

[404] A categorization provided by Watling and Reynolds, "Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of its Invasion of Ukraine," ii.

[405] Mainly due to not being able to effectively train new contracted soldiers collectively. Watling & Reynolds,

Throughout 2023, armored forces rarely operated as maneuver units and instead served as fire support. They have adopted thermal camouflage techniques that allow them to supplement artillery, provide accurate direct fire support for assaults, and directly target Ukrainian troops rotating off the line.[406] Recent Russian advances in Donetsk (to include around Avdiivka) and Kharkiv oblasts show that the Russian forces are increasingly willing to use tanks in maneuver operations.[407]

One of the most effective adaptations the RAF made was to dedicate assets to defensive fortifications in depth. At a tactical level, multiple engineer companies support brigades and quickly construct obstacles, lay minefields, and build protective positions once assault forces seize terrain. On a more structural level, the Russians have dedicated engineering brigades who have been able to build extensive obstacle belts and trench systems behind the brigade's front lines, creating formidable defenses in depth – such as those securing the land bridge to Crimea.[408]

The Russians have further refined their Reconnaissance-Fires-Circuit (kill chain) and have consolidated artillery from battalion tactical groups into artillery tactical groups. Though facing munitions shortages, the RAF are using creative measures to suppress UAF's defensive positions, prevent the UAF from assembling effectively prior to offensives, hinder operations to relieve units on the frontline, and defend their own fighting positions. While the RAF does not necessarily coordinate all effects, they do layer and mass lethal and non-lethal effects in ways that the Ukrainian defenders cannot.[409] The RAF has created drone-to-artillery-battery networks that have commanders in the loop, but do not require them to fire – exposing Ukrainian positions to multiple echelons of drone reconnaissance and fires assets.[410] Though Russian military leaders have been reticent to use aviation assets where they can be threatened by Ukrainian air defenses, they have been able to achieve stand-off effects by launching glide bombs from above their lines and they still pose a significant threat to UAF offensives.[411]

Implications for Armed Forces

While the US armed forces have made significant changes to doctrine, force structure, and equipment over the past five years, adaptations by the UAF and RAF highlight opportunities to shore up gaps in experience, organization, and equipment.

"Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of its Invasion of Ukraine," 3-8.

[406] Watling & Reynolds, "Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of its Invasion of Ukraine," 15.

[407] David Axe, "The Russian Turtle Tank is the Weirdest Armored Vehicle of the Ukraine War" *Forbes,* 25 April 2024, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/04/25/the-russian-turtle-tank-is-the-weirdest-armored-vehicle-of-the-war-the-craziest-thing-is-it-might-actually-work/?sh=51b95f29441f.

[408] Kofman, Lee, and Massicot, "Hold, Build, and Strike: A Vision for Rebuilding Ukraine's Advantage."

[409] A combination of massive artillery bombardments, tens of thousands more drones in operation and massive use of FPV drones, multiple EW systems at the front, and the ability to replenish equipment and casualties has made it very challenging for Ukraine to maintain defenses. Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 37.

[410] Watling & Reynolds, "Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of its Invasion of Ukraine," 12-4.

[411] Particularly because they can target units assembling for an offensive and mass at attempted breaches. Watlings & Reynolds, "Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of its Invasion of Ukraine," iii.

These significant changes have included updating the manual on operations with a focus on multi-domain operations, realigning the force structure to support it, and beginning a deliberate equipment modernization process that includes fielding counter drone and new air and missile defense capabilities, long range fires, expanded engineering capabilities, and new communications architecture. However, the US armed forces do not have adequate solutions to address the challenges of the depths of fortifications, of establishing air superiority, and of overcoming the risk of drones and artillery to combined arms maneuver seen in Ukraine from 2022-2024. The Russian failures to implement effective suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) should not be viewed as solely an inadequacy of Russian doctrine but should be a sobering indication to US forces about the challenges of doing so in a contested environment. Further, the force structure changes rely upon division and corps staffs operating as tactical and operational decision-makers – something that level of staff usually only has experience doing in simulated warfighter exercises (which do not effectively simulate the challenges of coordinating the current fight, planning the future fight, and surviving as a high value target).

The DoD – particularly the Army – should be doing more to take advantage of the opportunity to learn from Ukrainian units. Various rotational units have created task forces to experiment with tactics, techniques, and procedures from Ukraine. The XVIII Airborne Corps and divisions within it have spearheaded experimentation with organizational changes – but these are highly dependent upon current leaders and require the Army to support innovative structures more deliberately within units and uniformly across the force.[412]

Beyond technological adaptations, the US should consider how important mobilizing forces and training them quickly have been to both Russia and Ukraine's war efforts. After mobilizing Composition 2 and 3 forces, the US does not have the administrative structure to mobilize at scale. Both Russia and Ukraine mobilized and contracted forces within two years roughly equivalent to the size of the US Army. The DoD should take cues from Ukraine's development after 2014-5 of the administrative and physical structures for large-scale mobilization.

Finally, the imperative to improve training support to Ukraine requires that senior military leaders reexamine the military structure of NATO. Current multinational joint, corps, and division headquarters do not have the resources or authorities to develop adequate operations plans, preposition stocks, or train with actual forces. The US force structure within Europe is also lacking – V Corps Headquarters should be stationed in Europe. While the current status of two division headquarters and three rotational brigade combat teams is not permanent, the corps aligned against the European mission should be stationed there to actively address serious logistical shortcomings to operational plans.

CONCLUSION

Supporting Ukraine matters for deterrence and US national security interests. Maintaining Ukraine's sovereignty has significant implications for European stability and the rules-based international order that is the bedrock of US and global security. Beyond Europe, the experience in Ukraine has implications for the US interest in the Republic of China. Taiwan does not have the same experience that Ukraine does after rallying and reforming in response to the Russian invasion of 204-2015, which may make it more unlikely to be able to resist an opportunistic incursion from China as successfully. Consistent support for Ukraine is an important signal to the world and to domestic political factions arguing for a more isolationist approach about US commitment to

[412] For example, both the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions have developed innovation task forces (of company to battalion-sized elements). These elements are not allocated by MTOE and require direct commander involvement to prioritize and overcome bureaucratic obstacles to enable experimentation. Adopting best practices from these models would be a good first step for adapting across the force.

allies.[413] The $61 billion aid package passed in April 2024 is a much-needed continuation of support but cannot be considered a final act by a country that has done enough. Continued commitment is necessary both for Ukraine's ability to hold its defenses in 2024 and build the capacity for future offensive operations – and to make the American defense industrial base better suited for today's complex threat environment.[414]

Continued US commitment to supplying aid and strengthening sanctions addresses Ukraine's materiel deficit and erodes Russia's industrial advantage. Of particular importance to Ukraine in 2024 will be provision of air defense systems, missiles, and artillery rounds. These are necessary to allow Ukraine to deter the full use of Russian air forces and to establish a frontline rotation that enables reconstitution and regeneration of forces. Improving training, while also expanding the availability and size of facilities, can help Ukraine address some of its critical manpower strains. Further, the US and NATO can improve the implementation of current sanctions by targeting Russia's oil revenues, addressing intermediaries' violations, and targeting the civilian technology imports that Russia is using for military purposes.[415] Finally, the US and NATO should work to reduce the number of different types of systems being provided and commit to production of ammunition, spare parts, and training on the most useful systems.

Russia has a distinct material advantage over Ukraine in an isolated confrontation. If Ukraine's allies wish it to prevail, they must help narrow this gap, both by increasing Ukraine's capabilities and capacity with lethal aid and by degrading Russian capabilities and capacity with an array of efforts to hinder its ability to mobilize its economy in support of harming Ukraine and threatening US allies in Europe. Russia's biggest challenge will be to achieve sufficient success towards its political objectives while they appear to have momentum while maintaining the facade of normalcy at home. If Ukraine thwarts these efforts this year, it can set conditions to conclude the war on favorable terms in the near future.

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[413] Keren Yarhi-Milo analyzes some of the challenges of signaling commitment and notes that "a state's reputation is not in its own hands." She has found that reputation depends on who is assessing the state. Commitment to Ukraine sends signals to Russia, to China, to Ukraine, to NATO, and to domestic audiences. Yarhi-Milo argues against leaders becoming trapped by anxieties about credibility. While the US does not control how the message is received, resolving to support Ukraine has tangible benefits for US national security and economic interests in Europe. Keren Yarhi-Milo, "The Credibility Trap: Is Reputation Worth Fighting For," *Foreign Affairs,* published 18 June 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/credibility-trap-reputation-yarhi-milo.

[414] CSIS estimates that of the $113 billion USD appropriated, $68 billion is destined to be invested in the US.

Elizabeth Hoffman et al., "How Supporting Ukraine is Revitalizing the U.S. Defense Industrial Base," *Center for*

Strategic and International Studies, 18 April 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-supporting-ukraine-revitalizing-us-defense-industrial-base.

[415] Snegovaya et al., "Back in Stock?" 41.

Chapter 8 – Security Force Assistance as a Tool of Strategic Competition

Erin Lemons and Ben Jebb

ABSTRACT

Security force assistance (SFA) providers routinely use SFA to address shared local threats and frustrate their adversaries' strategic plans, especially during periods of heightened competition between major powers. Strategic rivals like the U.S. and China are offering security assistance to potential partners to vie for global influence. However, using SFA for geopolitical goals is complex and prone to contradictions and missteps. Therefore, national decision-makers in the SFA sphere should consider several key points when designing SFA programs. First, SFA providers must establish a degree of influence over client states before effectively enhancing their warfighting capabilities. Second, practitioners should appreciate the utility of both the principal-agent model (i.e., carrots and sticks) and the socialization approach in planning and executing SFA. Finally, national security decision-makers must realize that prospective SFA partners often exist on a spectrum comprised of three interlocking positions: aligners, fence-sitters, and enemy campers. When the U.S. provides assistance to countries that already share U.S. goals (i.e., aligners), the U.S. can focus almost exclusively on building partner capacity. However, when dealing with fence-sitters or enemy campers, prioritizing influence is crucial. This approach allows the U.S. to maintain or strengthen political alignment with the former and disrupt the strategic plans of competitors with the latter.

SFA as Statecraft

Security force assistance (SFA) is an indirect tool of competition that has often been used during periods of heightened strategic rivalry. When Athens launched the Sicilian Expedition to capture Syracuse during the Peloponnesian War, Sparta countered by dispatching General Gylippus and a small contingent of Peloponnesian soldiers to train the Sicilian city-state's forces, who repulsed the Athenians.[416] In the wake of the Seven Years War, France sent military aid to the American colonists to obliquely weaken its long-standing rival, Britain.[417] And during the Cold War, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. eschewed direct confrontation in favor of proxy wars, which required substantial inflows of SFA by both sides.[418] Today, Washington and Beijing are adhering to this pattern by dangling SFA in front of prospective partners in a bid to vie for influence worldwide.[419]

The strategy of binding international partners to Washington through an intricate constellation of SFA programs will continue to remain a pillar of U.S. national security.[420] Accordingly, it is imperative to discern (1) if SFA is a viable approach for furthering U.S. interests and (2) what conditions make SFA programs successful. However, while many practitioners and scholars believe that states provide SFA to gain influence, this

[416] Thucydides, *The History Of Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley (New York, New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1950), 486-514.
[417] Edward S. Corwin, "The French Objective in the American Revolution," *The American Historical Review* 21, no. 1 (October 1915): 33, https://doi.org/10.2307/1836697, 34.
[418] Hal Brands, "Contesting the Periphery," *The Twilight Struggle*, January 25, 2022, 76–102, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv270kvpm.8, 76.
[419] Sheena Greitens and Isaac Kardon, "Playing Both Sides of the U.S.-Chinese Rivalry," Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/playing-both-sides-us-chinese-rivalry.
[420] Office of the Secretary of Defense, National defense strategy of the United States of America: Including the 2022 nuclear posture review and the 2022 missile defense review § (2022), 10.

assumption is rarely systematically interrogated.[421] In fact, a review of recent SFA literature fails to provide strong evidence that SFA—and more specifically American-backed SFA—translates into foreign policy influence.[422] The mixed results are likely due to the fact that most analyses focus almost exclusively on U.S. SFA endeavors in a vacuum.[423] While scholars suggest that the U.S. should have more influence in Country A where it trains 20 officers in comparison to Country B where it only trains 5 officers, the reverse is often true. Knowing that an adversary trains 30 officers in Country A and 0 officers in Country B would be helpful in better interpreting these results. This omission is particularly problematic because the U.S. often employs SFA to reduce the influence of its geopolitical rivals.[424]

A more nuanced understanding of SFA should contextualize the SFA process in a highly competitive environment between great power rivals. Drawing on new scholarship presented at a security seminar for scholars and practitioners, we help make sense of the complex web of factors that impact SFA's efficacy as a tool of competition. First, we delve into three main political goals associated with SFA: building partner capacity, enhancing international influence, and "spoiling" strategic adversaries' security designs. Second, we discuss how suppliers use SFA to gain influence in a recipient state, emphasizing principal-agent dynamics and socialization. Finally, we introduce a conceptual model that national decision-makers can use to align ways and means with ends.

SFA Goals in Strategic Competition

States provide SFA to recipient states for a myriad of reasons. Three significant political goals associated with SFA are building partner capacity (BPC), gaining influence in and over the recipient state, and spoiling strategic adversaries' abilities to accomplish their security-related goals. The ostensible goal for most U.S. SFA programs seems straightforward: to build the warfighting capacity of U.S. partners so they can address mutually shared security concerns.[425] SFA allows the U.S. to make cost effective investments in partners so they—and not Washington—can address security threats directly whenever and wherever they emerge.[426] Not only do allies and partners increase the sheer number of soldiers and firepower available to confront strategic threats, allies and partners often possess key local knowledge and insights that Americans do not. Likewise, they can often take the fight to the enemy when the U.S. is constrained from taking direct action itself.

Building partner capacity is successful as long as the SFA provider has sufficient money to equip and train the recipient state and both the SFA provider and recipient are sufficiently aligned – not only at the strategic level

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[421] For example, see Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, "When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups," *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 4 (July 2017): 546. Mariya Omelicheva, Brittnee Carter, and Luke B. Campbell, "Military Aid and Human Rights: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Security Assistance Programs," *Political Science Quarterly* 132, no. 1 (April 12, 2017): 120.

[422] For example, see Carla Martinez Machain, "Exporting Influence: U.S. Military Training as Soft Power," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65, no. 2–3 (February 1, 2021): 313–41. William C. Taylor, *Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East: Analysis from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

[423] For example, see Tomislav Z. Ruby and Douglas Gibler, "US Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 3 (September 2010): 339-364. Mariya Omelicheva, Brittnee Carter, and Luke B. Campbell, "Military Aid and Human Rights." Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock F. Tessman, and Xiaojun Li, "US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 3 (July 2011): 275-294.

[424] Christopher R. Kilford, *The Other Cold War: Canada's Military Assistance to the Developing World, 1945-1975* (Kingston, Ontario: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010), 41. John V. Clune, *The Abongo Abroad: Military-Sponsored Travel in Ghana, the United States, and the World, 1959-1992* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2017), 155-158.

[425] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, (9 September 2022), I-5.

[426] Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves," Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2010-05-01/helping-others-defend-themselves.

but also in terms of their goals for SFA. Many historical cases of SFA show that strategic alignment between the U.S. and its partner is a necessary but insufficient condition for partner capacity building to succeed. Strategic alignment means the U.S. and its partner share a common understanding of an acute strategic threat. Such threats include both foreign states as well as non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. When the U.S. and a partner share a common adversary, SFA can be quite successful as the historical cases of Turkey in the 1950s,[427] the Mujahidin in Afghanistan in the 1980s,[428] and present-day Ukraine highlight. Nonetheless, despite sharing a common adversary, U.S. endeavors to cultivate indigenous partner forces in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were all met with varying degrees of failure.[429]

SFA failed in these cases because while the U.S. and its partners were aligned at the strategic level, their specific goals for SFA were not aligned. While the U.S. wanted to build the capacity of its partner forces, its partners did not. Regimes have to balance both internal and external threats. Internal threats such as regime change are often more likely to lead to regime change than external aggression or mass uprisings.[430] Therefore, many countries – even those participating in SFA relationships – implement coup-proofing strategies to undermine their military's effectiveness and domestic influence. Due to coup concerns, South Vietnamese leaders sidelined American-trained officers despite their military competence.[431] Indeed, SFA is particularly likely to fail to accomplish capacity building in cases where large numbers of American forces are on the ground.[432] If the partner can rely on U.S. forces to defend against the external threat, the partner can focus exclusively on the internal threat. This threat prioritization incentivizes the partner to purposely weaken its military in direct contradiction to the U.S. goal of improving the military's effectiveness.

While building partner capacity is an inexact science that requires astute expertise at the operational and tactical levels, at a macro level, it is a relatively straightforward endeavor if both the SFA provider and recipient are aligned. The more complex task for the SFA provider, however, is using SFA as a tool to influence the recipient state to become more aligned with the former. Indeed, building partner capacity has no chance of success until the provider and recipient states are aligned. Therefore, SFA providers must often start with using SFA as a tool to influence.

States often provide SFA as a tool to gain influence in and over the recipient state.[433] Influence not only allows the provider to pursue successful partner capacity building but also enables the SFA provider to secure other geopolitical benefits such as overflight, basing, port call rights, political support at the United Nations or other international institutions, access to natural resources and markets, etc. These political concessions are important to enable countries to build wealth and to stage and project power throughout the world.

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[427] Sam Rosenberg, "U.S. Efforts to Modernize the Turkish Armed Forces (1947-1954)" (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).
[428] Barbara Elias, "Beyond Principals & Agents: How Diverse Interests Shape Policymaking in Proxy Wars" (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).
[429] Barbara Elias, "Beyond Principals & Agents: How Diverse Interests Shape Policymaking in Proxy Wars" (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).
[430] Steven R. David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkings University Press, 1991).
[431] Caitlin Talmadge, "Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices of Authoritarian Armies," *Security Studies* 25 (2016): 129.
[432] Kyle Atwell, "Critical Node Advisor Dispersion in El Salvador and Colombia" (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).
[433] Savage and Caverley, "When Human Capital Threatens the Capitol," 546. Omelicheva, Carter, and Campbell, "Military Aid and Human Rights," 120.

The U.S. and other SFA providers sometimes prioritize political influence over building partner capacity even when the latter's goal is to increase its military strength and expertise. For example, the U.S. provided SFA to Ethiopia from the 1950s-1970s predominantly to maintain a communications base, overflight rights, and access to port facilities in Ethiopia, not to build their army's capacity. In fact, the U.S. wanted to provide the minimum SFA necessary to maintain its communication base and other Ethiopian concessions.[434] One could argue that the Canadian experience in Tanzania in the 1960s is another example of where the SFA provider had more conservative military capacity building goals than its partner. The U.S. and U.K encouraged Canada to provide SFA to Tanzania in order to reduce Communist influence in the country. Canada, however, was hesitant to provide too much military equipment to the Tanzanians, despite the latter's repeated requests, for fear that it would be used by FRELIMO against Portugal, their NATO ally who was clinging on to its colonial possessions in Africa, especially Mozambique.[435] These examples highlight that while SFA can be used to gain influence in a recipient state, rivalry between providers can make such influence more difficult to achieve exactly when it is most desired – during times of great power competition.

Sometimes a prospective recipient state's preferred SFA provider is a strategic adversary. When a strategic adversary exerts near monopolistic control over the recipient state's foreign policy decisions, using SFA to gain political influence in and over such a recipient state is unrealistic. However, an SFA provider can still play the role of "spoiler" in this case. For example, during the Kennedy Administration, the 101st Airborne Division provided parachute training to Malian troops even though the Eastern Bloc, predominantly represented by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, was Mali's preferred SFA provider at the time. The Malian soldiers were excited and impressed to receive this training that the Soviets would not provide them.[436] The 101st Airborne Division's SFA was certainly only one small factor that led to a souring in the Soviet-Mali relationship and Mali's realignment with the West. Nevertheless, such small-scale investments can make recipient states reevaluate their relationship with their primary SFA provider. At a minimum, by providing a recipient state a realistic outside option, the primary provider loses some leverage over its recipient state. For instance, after Washington cut nearly $5 million in arms sales to Bangkok following a 2014 coup, Beijing happily filled the vacuum with condition-free military assistance.[437] This move put the DOD on the defensive, adding stress to an already delicate situation where the U.S. wanted to both support democratic ideals and maintain access to critical basing infrastructure in Utapao. Given competition, the SFA provider simply cannot exact as many political concessions from the recipient state, and the recipient state gains the ability to make more independent foreign policy decisions. In short, even a small amount of SFA can undermine a strategic adversary's ability to keep a recipient in line – at least without a more substantial and expensive investment.

States that use SFA to "influence" or "spoil" are using SFA for the same purpose: to shift a state's alignment. The only difference is one's perspective. When a provider uses SFA to influence a recipient, the focus is on more closely aligning the recipient with itself. When a provider uses SFA to "spoil" a strategic competitor's strategy, the focus is on breaking a recipient state's alignment with one's competitor. As alignment is a prerequisite to successfully build partner capacity, the next section will focus primarily on how SFA providers rely on principal-agent dynamics and socialization to shift alignment. While we will primarily use the word "influence," providers can use these same tools to "spoil."

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[434] Lemmu Baissa, "United States Military Assistance to Ethiopia, 1954-1974: A Reappraisal of a Difficult Patron-Client Relationship," *Northeast African Studies* 11, no. 3 (1989): 51-70.
[435] Renanah Miles Joyce, "Exporting Might and Right: Security Assistance and Liberal International Order," (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024). Kilford, *The Other Cold War*.
[436] Philip Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945-1968* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 164-168.
[437] Zachary Abuza, "America Should Be Realistic about Its Alliance with Thailand," War on the Rocks, January 4, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/01/america-should-be-realistic-about-its-alliance-with-thailand/.

Tool of Influence: The Principal-Agent Model

The first way of conceiving of the problem is the principal-agent model. The SFA provider (principal) gives equipment, training, and advice to the partner (agent) but can never be sure that the partner will use this SFA in accordance with the provider's intentions.[438] The provider can use different methods to monitor what the partner is doing with the SFA and structure rewards and punishments in a way to incentivize the partner to use SFA in accordance with the provider's intentions.

In terms of monitoring, the placement and function of advisors is critically significant. Optimizing advisor missions requires considering command echelon and engagement type (e.g., training, advising, or accompanying). Notably, the U.S. is most adept at monitoring agent compliance when advisors are strategically stationed at pivotal information hubs such as when they are embedded within partner-force headquarters where information is centralized and disseminated.[439]

Regardless of monitoring opportunities, the U.S. is often unsuccessful at structuring rewards and punishments in a way to force partner compliance. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. SFA still flowed to Pakistan despite Islamabad's tacit support for the Taliban. Today, a parallel dynamic unfolds as the Biden Administration tries to persuade Israel to exercise greater restraint in Gaza, notwithstanding the annual provision of approximately $3.8 billion in aid to Tel Aviv. Compliance can be very expensive for the partner due to domestic politics, coup risks, etc. and yet, at least a wealthy provider like the U.S. should be able to pay the price.[440] There are two main reasons why the provider may fail.

First, a provider's domestic politics may prevent it from providing its partner the necessary rewards or punishments. For example, diaspora politics could prevent the U.S. from sanctioning a non-compliant partner. In contrast, establishing human rights criteria—such as those reflected in the Leahy Laws—could prevent the U.S. from providing the rewards necessary to enforce compliance on other issues. Similarly, although Canadians initially saw the 1966 coup in Ghana as a success story for Western SFA in the face of Eastern Bloc competition, the Canadians later considered the reputational costs of being associated with coups to be too high.[441]

Second, a provider needs to have monopolistic control over at least part of the SFA market to have the leverage necessary to meaningfully threaten or punish a partner for noncompliance. In a competitive market, the partner has the advantage because if a provider puts any political conditions on the SFA, the partner can obtain a similar SFA from another provider that does not make the SFA similarly contingent.

In order to achieve monopolistic control, providers need to consider the "goods" they are providing their partners. Some scholars argue that the U.S. should only provide commodity-style goods such as tactical-level training or 155mm shells to aligned partners because these SFA markets are competitive and give the U.S. no leverage for influence. In contrast, sophisticated goods such as advanced weapons platforms and joint-level training enjoy less competitive markets.[442] Drilling down further, joint or operational-level training is less competitive for certain military branches, like the Air Force and Navy, which are more heavily dependent on advanced weapons platforms, whereas Army training and education – even at the operational and strategic

[438] Stephen Biddle, "Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency," *Daedalus* 146, no. 4 (October 1, 2017): 126–38.
[439] Atwell 2024
[440] Alexandra Chinchilla and Renanah, "Explaining Conditionality Failure in Alliances and Partnerships" (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).
[441] Kilford, *The Other Cold War*.
[442] Jonathan D. Caverley, "The Political Economy of Arms Transfers" (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).

levels – is more competitive.[443] Certainly, not every partner needs these sophisticated goods. Some argue that the U.S. should simply not seek influence where there is no demand for these goods.[444] The counterpoint is that if the U.S. exits the SFA commodity market, this market in turn becomes less competitive for U.S. strategic adversaries. Therefore, the U.S. may benefit from remaining in the commodity market if only to prevent a strategic adversary from gaining monopolistic control over a partner.

While the U.S. and other major strategic competitors may be in search of a winner-take-all outcome, smaller providers use a strategy of differentiated goods to increase their likelihood of achieving influence while managing risks in the SFA "marketplace."[445] There are two strategies providers use in response to the competitive environment: they either embed themselves within the host nation's institutional processes or avoid long-term commitments and the associated risks by pursuing shorter-term activities with a lighter footprint. The former approach will likely lead to more trust and influence with large sunk costs, while the latter affords the provider more flexibility and entails less investment. In contemporary West Africa, France tends to adopt the former approach whereas Britain and Belgium tend to adopt the latter approach.[446]

Tool of Influence: The Socialization Approach

Whereas the principal-agent model takes a very economic approach to influencing partner behavior, others have suggested the socialization approach as an alternative. Whereas in the first approach, a provider cannot expect its partner to comply once the money stops, ideally, socialization is a little more "sticky" and creates more long-time loyalty.

The general idea is that through military training and education and other personal contacts between the SFA provider's and recipient's military members, the recipient's military members develop personal relationships with the provider's military members, may be socialized into adopting their provider's worldview, and form a positive attachment to their provider. The recipient's military members subsequently rise to high-level positions within their state. From there, they have the desire and ability to align their state's foreign policy more closely with their SFA provider.[447]

There are three "pathways to failure" in the case of competing SFA providers.[448] First, the provision of alternate goods takes away from each provider's leverage and limits the provider's access to host-nation forces. Second, a rival provider can use a set of social strategies and messaging that explicitly challenges the other provider(s). Finally, these alternate material and ideational options create divisions within the recipient officer corps which lead to host nation efforts to reinforce cohesion by removing one of the providers.

These dynamics are evident in the competition between Canadian and Chinese aid to Tanzania between 1965 and 1970. The Canadians believed that SFA could build personal rapport among Tanzanian officers and serve as a tool of social influence through which their beliefs and preferences could be shaped to align with the West. The Canadian's initial efforts to shape force planning and defense governance were implemented using an iterative process in which policies would be drafted by the Canadians, then sent to key Tanzanian defense

[443] Erin Lemons, "Exploring the Influence of Leadership Preferences and Balancing Decisions on Foreign Military Education Outcomes," (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).
[444] Jonathan D. Caverley, "The Political Economy of Arms Transfers" (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).
[445] Alex Neads, "Understanding Competition and Control during Security Force Assistance" (Paper presentation, West Point Security Seminar, 2024).
[446] Ibid.
[447] For example, Carol Atkinson, *Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy Through Military Educational Exchanges* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2014). Machain, "Exporting Influence."
[448] Joyce, "Exporting Might and Right."

leaders for review before adoption. This "incremental socialization" facilitated political buy-in by the Tanzanians and the Canadians faced little resistance. However, in 1967 Chinese SFA in the form of equipment, such as tanks and artillery, and training began to increase.[449]

Both China and Canada encouraged resistance to the other in their training of the Tanzanians. For the Canadians, this meant emphasizing the poor quality of Chinese arms and equipment. For the Chinese, this meant discussions of "politics" and the distribution of Communist reading material. Ultimately, this resulted in divisions among the Tanzanian officer corps. In the end, Tanzanian President Nyerere selected China over Canada as his country's primary SFA provider in order to reinforce his military's cohesion. Military relationships alone cannot secure strategic alignment; strategic alignment requires political support and a whole-of-government approach.[450]

Nevertheless, military leader preferences in recipient states can also give one provider an edge over another.[451] Evidence challenges the widely held assumption that officials who attend professional military education in a provider state have an equal likelihood of rising to positions of influence upon return to their sending countries.[452] Recipient states have a large amount of autonomy in choosing participants in the process through which foreign military officials are selected for educational exchange programs. Case studies of Ghana and Tanzania in the 1960s show that participants are more likely to rise to positions of authority if their state's leadership attended training provided by the same sponsor.[453]

While these papers highlight some of the recipient state's dynamics that affect outcomes in a competitive socialization environment, more work also needs to consider how competing socialization experiences affect individual military leaders. Indeed, in a recent US government-sponsored survey of U.S. international military students, over 80% said that they had also received military training and education from another provider.[454] Ugandan General Muhoozi Kainerugaba Museveni, a graduate of the British Military Academy Sandhurst and the US Army Command and Staff College, tweeted his support for the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[455] Was this simply a failure of Western socialization? Or did the military courses he attended in Egypt, China, Israel, and South Africa socialize him in a different direction?[456]

While academics often conceptualize the SFA relationship through a principal-agent model or socialization lens, in practice, providers can, and probably do employ both approaches simultaneously. Nonetheless, it may be useful to consider the potential limitations of each approach in a particular context. For example, where domestic politics may limit the application of effective incentivization structures, a provider may need to rely more heavily on socialization to achieve its objectives.

What Does "Winning" Look Like?

[449] Joyce, "Exporting Might and Right."
[450] Ibid.
[451] Lemons, "Exploring the Influence of Leadership Preferences."
[452] For example, Atkinson, Military Soft Power. Machain, "Exporting Influence."
[453] Lemons, "Exploring the Influence of Leadership Preferences."
[454] Interview with Ms. Heather Moxon, Ms. Ellen Plants, and Mr. Lam Huynh, members of the FMF and IMET Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Team, State Department's Bureau of Political Military Affairs, July 29, 2022.
[455] Muhoozi Kainerugaba Museveni, Twitter Post, February 27, 2022, 7:35pm, https://twitter.com/mkainerugaba/status/1498094460580016128?lang=en. Uganda People's Defence Forces, "UPDF Leadership," Accessed July 19, 2022. https://www.updf.go.ug/who-we-are/leadership/.

[456] Uganda People's Defence Forces, "UPDF Leadership."

Using SFA as a tool of indirect competition is undoubtedly a tricky endeavor. First, national security decisionmakers must agree on the main goal of SFA given the recipient state: building partner capacity, gaining influence over the recipient state, or spoiling a strategic competitor's designs with respect to the recipient state. A recipient state's position on the alignment spectrum will largely dictate which goal is feasible.

On the far end of the spectrum (see **Figure 1** below), where the provider and the recipient goals are in lockstep, we have *alignment*. At the other end of the spectrum, when the prospective recipient state is strongly aligned with one's competitor, the state inhabits the *enemy camp*. The vast space in between the two poles is comprised of non-aligned *fence-sitters*, who hedge against both providers. These recipient states either (1) play one provider against the other, using the implicit threat of political realignment as bargaining leverage to extract more concessions or more freedom of action, or (2) they participate in SFA relationships with both providers.



Alignment. In cases where the U.S. forms an SFA relationship with a state (or non-state actor) that shares Washington's strategic threat-perception and desire to build its military capacity, the U.S. should use SFA almost exclusively to build partner capacity (BPC). In these circumstances, the U.S. should transfer articles of equipment and military training that enable the recipient state to directly address the shared security concern. "Winning" comes down to the battlefield effectiveness of the recipient force. Are they damaging U.S. strategic adversaries more efficiently regarding political and economic costs than the U.S. could without them? Indeed, if the U.S. desires a long-term, stable relationship with these types of recipient states and nonstate actors, the U.S. may also use SFA to maintain influence with subsequent generations of recipient leaders.

Fence-Sitters. The case of *fence-sitters* presents a far more complex and realistic problem set, since it is rare to find instances where SFA providers and recipients have perfectly overlapping threat perceptions and goals for SFA. Dealing with fence-sitters requires an approach that focuses less on building partner capacity and more on influence building. This is because fence-sitters represent "battleground" states. The U.S. should employ SFA policies that are not necessarily optimized to increase a fence-sitter's military capacity but are instead aimed at garnering support and winning influence. "Winning" means maintaining and improving alignment with less resources than it costs strategic adversaries to do the same. One of the most vital lessons of the Cold War is

that the U.S. should never be on the wrong side of the cost curve vis-à-vis strategic competition.[457] At the same time, the U.S. should be cognizant that fence-sitters will require the heaviest investment in tools of influence to remain competitive with strategic adversaries. If the U.S. withdraws from this competition, the U.S. will likely lose its expeditionary power projection advantage over its strategic adversaries.

Enemy Campers. The last category, *enemy campers*, presents strategic opportunities for the U.S. While these states may be unwilling to cozy up to Washington, the U.S. can nonetheless introduce uncertainty into the security relationship between the enemy camper and its preferred SFA provider. The U.S. should focus on "getting its foot in the door" to act as a spoiler by using a variety of low-cost, low-commitment SFA options. SFA along with other diplomatic and economic programs put pressure on Washington's adversary to invest more heavily in its recipient states or risk losing their alignment altogether. The U.S. should be aware that its strategic adversaries will apply the same tactics to disrupt the benefits that the U.S. derives from its SFA relationships.

CONCLUSION

Security assistance providers routinely use SFA not only to address shared local threats, but to frustrate their adversaries' strategic plans. This trend is particularly evident during periods of increased competition between great power rivals. While the security assistance enterprise is often rife with contradictions and misadventures, there are several key takeaways that policymakers should bear in mind when crafting SFA packages.

First, SFA providers must achieve a degree of influence over their recipient states before they can effectively build the latters' warfighting capacity. SFA providers and recipients rarely have perfectly aligned goals. Therefore, SFA programs should include tools of influence via the principal-agent model and socialization. Second, practitioners should appreciate the utility of both the principal-agent model (i.e., carrots and sticks) and the socialization approach. Academics often take an either-or approach when examining SFA. Isolating variables is, after all, an important aspect of building models to glean theoretical insights; however, practitioners have no such luxury in the daily execution of security assistance. During an intense standoff between Manila and Washington over the status of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 2020, for example, the U.S. relied on a combination of transactional penalties, as well as the U.S. military's decades-long relationship with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), to maintain its presence in the country.[458]

Finally, understanding the SFA continuum is crucial to aligning ways and means with ends. Policymakers should regularly reevaluate recipient states and determine where they exist on the spectrum. When the U.S. provides assistance to countries that already share U.S. goals, the U.S. can focus almost exclusively on building partner capacity. However, when a prospective recipient is a *fencer-sitter* or in the *enemy camp*, then Washington should prioritize gaining influence. Doing so will allow the U.S. to maintain (or ideally enhance) political alignment in the case of the former and spoil the plans of a strategic competitor in the case of the latter.

[457] Hal Brands, "Contesting the Periphery," *The Twilight Struggle*, January 25, 2022, 76–102, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv270kvpm.8, 77.
[458] Andrea Chloe Wong, "Duterte's Back-down on US Forces in Philippines," The Interpreter, September 15, 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/duterte-s-back-down-us-forces-philippines.

Chapter 9 – Personal Economic Security as a National Security Challenge

Jim Walker and Justin Erwin

ABSTRACT

How can the U.S. Army enhance financial readiness and economic security for servicemembers and their families? Current policy and research may overlook the full effects and costs of financial stress on military readiness, recruitment, and retention. While policies have increased focus on financial literacy training, the effectiveness is unclear due to a lack of standardized delivery and assessment. We analyzed current Army financial readiness programs, financial counseling, and metrics, along with insights from academic experts, industry leaders, and policies/provisions, to identify gaps and potential solutions. We find that financial readiness affects military readiness and that limitations in Army programs indicate a wider challenge across the US government. Although we look specifically at the U.S. Army, we believe it presents a much-needed case study of the military as a whole based on its larger amount of personnel and its disproportionate likeliness to be food insecure vs. the other services.[1] Key recommendations include the need to redefine metrics focused on financial behaviors and well-being rather than just training completion; the importance of partnering with private industry for surveying and program engagement; concerns about the effectiveness of current financial counseling models; and opportunities to better communicate the Army's comprehensive financial wellness offerings for recruitment/retention. Addressing personal economic insecurity is crucial for force readiness. The Army should invest in meaningful measurement, standardize training content, explore innovative education methods, and leverage external partnerships to enhance its financial readiness efforts in support of national security priorities.

Financial Readiness and its Importance to the US Army

In the relatively short period in which policy has focused on financial readiness, a developing link has emerged between the financial wellbeing of servicemembers, military readiness, and the broader spectrum of US national security concerns. Does financial readiness effect military readiness? Drawing upon research examining the relationship between personal financial health and professional performance in private and educational sectors, we contend that it does: [459] financial readiness is important to recruiting, retaining, and developing military human capital.

For example, Annamaria Lusardi finds that people on average spend eight hours a week thinking about and dealing with financial issues with an average of four of those hours occurring at work.[460] She also notes the startling increases of financially fragility over the years, citing a growing number of people unable to come up with $2,000 if a crisis arose within the next month.[461] While the cost of financial stress can be viewed as time spent thinking about financial issues during work hours, it also undermines the ability for individuals to cognitively perform in a detail-oriented manner. For example, truck drivers who experienced higher levels of financial precarity had significantly more preventable accidents up to 8 months after.[462] In another study, nursing

[1] Asch, Beth J., Berdie, Lisa, Gadwah-Meaden, Catria, Kempf, Jonas, Rennane, Stephanie, Trail, Thomas, E., Troyanker, Dina, Ward, Jason, M. 2023. "Food Insecurity in the U.S. Military." *Rand.Org* (4).
[2]Meuris, Jirs & Carrie Leana. 2017. "The Price of Financial Precarity: Organizational Costs of Employees' Financial Concerns." *Organization Science* 29 (2). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320616355_The_Price_of_Financial_Precarity_Organizational_Costs_of_Employees%27_Financial_Concerns.
[3] Lusardi, Annamaria. 2023. "Increasing the Effectiveness of Financial Education." https://gflec.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Lusardi-Presentation-Harvard_v6.pdf.
[4] Lusardi, Annamaria. 2023. "Financial Literacy Gaps and Inflation: Lessons from Seven Years of P-Fin Index Data." https://www.suomenpankki.fi/globalassets/en/media-and-publications/calendar/2023/finlit/finlit_lusardi_presentation.pdf.
[5] Ibid 2: Meuris et. al.

aides, normally high in empathy and adept at noticing safety problems with their patients, saw empathy erode as financial precarity increased. [463] Finally, college students with high SAT scores, which is a strong predictor in college performance, saw their grades reduce as financial stress became more present.[464] While these examples draw parallels to operational effectiveness, which is difficult to measure, there are also emerging implications for recruitment and retention necessary to sustain military forces.

This article emerges from discussions in the "Personal Economic Security" working group held during the Department of Social Sciences' annual "International Security Seminar," chaired by Mr. Jim Walker, Assistant Professor of the finance curriculum at the United States Military Academy. Those in attendance represented a broad spectrum of experts in policy, academic research, and industry leaders who have a personal affinity for military service and believe in the positive potential of future opportunities. Attendance included DoD Financial Readiness (FINRED) Director, Mr. Andy Cohen, and Army G9's Financial Education Program Manager, Mrs. Robyn Mroszczyk, who brought their respected backgrounds in policy and program management. Also in attendance, is Dr. Annamaria Lusardi, Stanford finance professor and Senior Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), who is one of the most cited authors in financial literacy and whose work has been featured in the Wall Street Journal. Mr. Tom Davidson, CEO of EVERFI, Inc., a leader in online educational solutions, was in attendance along with Mr. Matt Bahl, Vice President and Workplace Market Lead from Financial Health Network (FHN), and Mr. Michael Barry, Head of UBS Workplace Wealth Solutions, who brought their expertise in financial wellness as it relates to surveying, understanding, and implementing solutions. Also in attendance were Mr. David Evetts, President of The USAA Educational Foundation, and Mr. Tom Naratil, current West Point Senior Finance Fellow and former President of UBS Americas and Co-President of UBS Global Wealth Management. This working group's collective background and experiences align with the efforts of enhancing financial education and financial wellness while considering measures of progress and performance.

Background

The DoD and the United States Congress have expressed enduring significant concern regarding military financial wellness and education due to its pivotal role in military readiness with regards to national security. This has created a heightened sensitivity among government and military leadership to financial-related issues such as suicidal ideations, food insecurity, inflation, and the welfare of military families and their impacts on time, resources, and productivity. The FY2013 NDAA established DoD's financial literacy programs, and subsequent NDAA's sought to improve it through additional provisions. On January 1, 2018, the DoD replaced its traditional military retirement system to the Blended Retirement System (BRS) which required sweeping educational efforts for new recruits and existing service members. While each service component provides mandatory financial literacy training based on DoD requirements, we look specifically at the US Army's current training model and financial readiness program (FRP) for insights. We realize that we are still in a nascent stage of understanding and addressing financial readiness in the Force, given we are less than three years removed from mandatory financial training guidance issued in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1322.34. We believe there is

[6] Leana, C., Meuris, J., & Lamberton, C. (2018). More than a feeling: The role of empathetic care in promoting safety in health care. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, *71*(2), 394–425.
[7] Ibid 2: Meuris et. al.
[8] Office of Financial Readiness. "Service Member Financial Well-Being: An Overview for Commanders, Leaders and Service Providers." https://www.afpc.af.mil/Portals/70/documents/FINANCIAL%20READINESS/Leaders%20-%20Financial%20Security%20Overview.pdf.
[9] Mroszczyk, Robyn. "Department of Defense Financial Readiness Policy and Program Overview." *States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century* from the United States Military Academy, 7 Feb 2024.

room for improvement in how the current training model is measured for effectiveness and we aim to underscore the leadership imperative of addressing financial readiness for combat effectiveness.

The National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) for FY13, FY15, and FY16 introduced comprehensive provisions that sought to improve overall financial readiness. Financial readiness is described as a state in which successful management of personal financial responsibilities supports a service member's ability to perform their wartime responsibilities.[465] The FY13 NDAA established the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC) that was tasked to review military compensation and retirement systems to provide recommendations that ensured the long-term viability of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Out of their 15 recommendations, the two relevant to financial readiness were: 1) Replace the existing pay and retirement system with a blended plan and 2) Provide financial literacy training for service members at various points throughout their careers.

Section 992 of FY15 NDAA mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the financial literacy of members of the Armed Forces. The report required an assessment on the effectiveness of currently existing financial literacy programs along with planned initiatives and recommendations to improve personal financial decision-making within the military. This provision highlighted the increased importance placed on financial readiness and the shifting prioritization of servicemember financial wellbeing. The FY15 NDAA also took financial literacy a step further through measures requiring the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide financial education and counseling programs, mandating annual financial counseling, and reinforcing existing legal protections provided under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) and the Military Lending Act (MLA). The FY16 NDAA made way for the implementation of the Blended Retirement System (BRS) marking a historic change, as BRS replaced the traditional defined pension retirement plan to a combined defined contribution plan (participation in the Thrift Savings Plan – TSP) while maintaining a similar, albeit lesser, 20-year defined pension component. While enrollment into BRS is now the automatic default for new enlistees, this new retirement plan mandates a certain level of awareness and knowledge of investment types and investment allocation for servicemembers to maximize participation in the TSP.

On 13 January 2021, the Secretary of the Army published a memorandum explicitly outlining the purpose of financial literacy training for servicemembers and Families in a manner that "supports mission readiness." The memorandum also detailed the requirement for all Army components and defined delivery frequency as "professional and personal major life events, and as a component of periodically required training." The Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-9, was identified as the Program Manager for the Army Financial Literacy Training Program, charged with developing and releasing operational guidance. Soon after, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD-P&R) released the DoDI 1322.34 which became effective 5 November 2021 and laid out the extensive foundation for the Financial Readiness of Servicemembers. DoDI 1322.34 listed responsibilities and specifically codified financial literacy education and training along with financial counseling.

Commanders' priorities are the drivers on what the unit focuses on, as well as its culture. If leaders understood the true cost of poor financial literacy amongst Servicemembers, there would be a culture shaped on addressing

[10] Lusardi, Annamaria & Mitchell, Olivia S. 2023. "The Importance of Financial Literacy: Opening a New Field." The Importance of Financial Literacy: Opening a New Field - American Economic Association (aeaweb.org).
[11] Bahl, Matt. "Worker FinHealth and Worker Performance." *States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century* from the United States Military Academy, 7 Feb 2024.
[12] Ibid 11: Worker, 2024.
[13] Duebner, Brendan. 2022. "A Military Solution to a Military Problem. Personal Finance Issues in the United States Armed Forces." https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2022-ole/duebner/.

financial wellbeing. The Army places importance on the families of Servicemembers as seen by increased efforts in improving quality of life in housing and base amenities. Financial readiness needs to be examined along those same lines as finances impact families, and the family component is a major predictor for retention. The Army's current focus is on intervention and response which is reactive and involves the use of Army Emergency Relief (AER) and financial counseling, not primary prevention: **"We as an Army are trying to transition away from this secondary prevention role and trying to get into primary prevention. We are trying to work to change the culture of where we talk about personal finances."**[466] While financial readiness challenges underscore the interconnectedness of US economic security, personal economic security, and their impacts on servicemembers and their families, progress needs to continue to be made in understanding and properly approaching the problem.

What Gets Measured, Gets Managed

The evaluation metrics currently employed to gauge financial readiness lack efficacy, and adopting a more data-focused approach would create a culture from policymakers down to small-unit leaders that centers on identifying sources of financial strain and educational needs. DoDI 1322.34 requires the survey of the financial literacy and preparedness of members of the Armed Forces, delivered as part of the annual status of forces (SOF) survey, to serve as an overall measure to monitor financial readiness, evaluate financial readiness efforts, and identify training needs. While there is no shortage of information from reports generated by leadership, service providers, and entities such as the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), a benchmark of relevant metrics can highlight changes over time and provide clarity in understanding changing behaviors and attitudes. While an increase in BRS adoption by 1.4 million new accounts and an increase in total invested note positive behaviors in retirement savings, it does not offer the granular insights to tell the whole story of financial readiness. Likewise, US Army reporting mechanisms, such as completion certificates, sign-in sheets, and DTMS statuses, only provide the measure of personnel trained, but they do not offer insights into financial well-being or the understanding of essential financial concepts. Army data, therefore, only reveals if servicemembers attended training either online or through other potentially non-standardized means. Such data reflects "inputs" of a servicemember's time to what the Army considers financial readiness but does not measure the outputs, outcomes, or effectiveness of such investments of a servicemember's time. Appropriate efforts to measure effectiveness can help find solutions for improving financial education, financial well-being, and financial counseling.

Redefine Our Metrics for Education

There have been numerous findings that suggest education can impact behavior, but measurements that go beyond training numbers such as servicemember assessment of understanding, combined with their financial attitudes and behaviors unknown. Dr. Lusardi's two decades of financial literacy research casts financial knowledge as a form of investment in human capital. Her research has found that financial literacy is a strong predictor of retirement planning and wealth, which ultimately guides financial decision-making.[467] Matt Bahl notes that the average effect on financial knowledge and financial behaviors did improve for individuals who engaged in a financial education program even if programs varied widely – they positively impacted budgeting, saving, and investing behaviors.[468] There is a lack of clear understanding of Servicemember financial knowledge and behaviors at present. Understanding Servicemember's knowledge of important concepts like financial risk and inflation becomes even more important given modern challenges like the complexity of financial instruments, cryptocurrency, unfettered access to trading, and much easier access to credit by way of "Buy now, pay later." The current economic and financial landscape demands ever-evolving education and training – one

[14] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. "Explore financial well-being findings." Explore Financial Well-being Findings | Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (consumerfinance.gov).

[15] U.S. Army. 2024. "Securing the Financial Frontline – Financial Readiness Toolkit." https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/USARMYARD/2024/01/19/file_attachments/2754627/Financial%20Readiness%20Toolkit.pdf.

FRP_2024_Cover.eps (govdelivery.com)

that provides data-driven metrics and performance measures. The current training model is decentralized in its delivery and content, occurs at various bases and under different commands and is accounted for by use of sign-in sheets. Training such as this is intended to be tracked in the Army Digital Training Management System (DTMS). This delivery method presents measurement and assessment issues: because training is not standardized and we lack data on outcomes, we may be, for example, incorrectly estimating servicemembers' understanding of the new Blended Retirement System (BRS) and retirement savings if we do not properly measure-and-evaluate.

Partner With Private Industry & Non-Governmental Entities

DoDI 1322.34 provides autonomy to the service components to "identify, as appropriate, additional data sources to assess the financial readiness of Servicemembers and the impact of financial issues on readiness, resiliency, and retention, and to identify and address necessary training needs." This flexibility should encourage service components to partner and collaborate with non-governmental entities to better address gaps in understanding the current financial readiness situation. FHN's US Financial Health Pulse Survey is an effective example of leveraging academic and private partnerships to collect and define data to provide valuable insights. FHN partners with the University of Southern California's Center for Economic and Social Research and fintech company, Plaid, to validate the alignment of collected data with consumer behavior. The survey has been conducted annually since 2018 and asks about respondents' financial health across four pillars of spending, saving, borrowing, and that lead to eight indicators of financial health. The two leading indicators ask respondents: 1) Are they spending less than their income? And 2) Do they have sufficient liquid savings? The survey results assign a FinHealth Score out of 100 and enables FHN to segment employees or consumers into three categories: 1) Financially Vulnerable (0-39) or those who are struggling with seven or more indicators, 2) Financially Coping (40-79) or those who are struggling with some but not all indicators, and 3) Financially Healthy (80-100) or those who are performing well in seven or more indicators. These indicators provide an understanding of financial health outcomes and show subsequent year-over-year changes. FHN's analysis suggests that two-thirds of the US population are financially struggling. As observed from their findings from 2021-2023, those who spent less than their income had declined by 8%, combined with increases in those who reported being unable to cover three months of expenses and those who lost confidence in meeting long-term financial goals. Bahl

What's Driving FinHealth Outcomes?

Table 2. 5 of the 8 financial health indicators declined between 2022 and 2023.
Percentage of people with positive responses for each financial health indicator (2018-23).

Financial health indicator	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Spending less than income	53%*	54%*	58%*	57%*	51%*	49%
Pay all bills on time	65%*	67%*	66%*	72%	71%	71%
Have enough savings to cover at least three months of living expenses	55%*	54%*	57%	62%*	59%*	57%
Are confident they are on track to meet long-term financial goals	40%	40%	41%*	43%*	41%*	39%
Have a manageable amount of debt or no debt	70%	70%	72%	75%*	74%*	71%
Have a prime credit score	67%*	66%*	67%*	70%	71%	70%
Are confident their insurance policies will cover them in an emergency	61%*	58%	60%*	59%	57%	59%
Agree with the statement: "My household plans ahead financially."	60%	60%	63%*	62%*	62%*	59%

*Note: * Statistically significant relative to 2023 ($p < 0.05$).*

Over Two Thirds of The US Population Are Struggling

Figure 1. Percentage of people by financial health tier (2018-23).



*Note: * Statistically significant relative to 2023 ($p < 0.05$).*

Interpreting FinHealth Scores®



For more info: finhealthnetwork.org/score/

summarizes FHN's key takeaway, "In the workplace and in the US population, what it means is that the financially unhealthy are not in the workforce or in our country; they *are* the work force, and they *are* the country.

"We continue to see huge opportunities to reimagine the levels of investment, the interventions and solutions that can positively impact the financial health, particularly for the most vulnerable populations in our community."[469] FHN's data-driven approach illustrates a scalable model, deployable with strategic partners, to identify vulnerable servicemembers. Its analysis could then offer insights for optimizing primary and secondary prevention strategies for US servicemembers while allowing changes and trends to be monitored over time.

Deeper Evaluation and Understanding of Financial Counseling Effectiveness

DoDI 1322.34 also calls for understanding the measurements of performance as it relates to counselors. Current Army policy allows an E7/Sergeant First Class or above to financially counsel a Soldier, but the qualifying standards for Soldiers to financially counsel are not well known. There is also a lack of data analysis to understand if contracted civilian financial counseling is effective for the servicemember, leaving its efficacy to be inferred as speculation. Currently, financial counselors are incentivized by the number of appointments or headcount, and it is unclear how effective financial counseling is for the Soldier.[12]

The US Army's Financial Wellness Program

The DoD's Office of Financial Readiness (FINRED) programs "provide resources to improve financial well-being and reduce risk of financial challenges and associated stress that negatively impact individual performance and mission readiness." Financial wellbeing is in a positive state when a person can fully meet current and ongoing financial obligations, can feel secure in their financial future, and can make choices that allow enjoyment of life.[13] The Army's Financial Readiness Program (FRP) mission, as stated, "is to provide comprehensive financial education and no-cost, unbiased counseling services to help Soldiers and Families strengthen their financial well-being, which in turn, makes troops more effective in carrying out their essential missions."[14] The inability to accurately measure financial readiness questions the assertive claim that the FRP is contributing to the measured outcome of mission effectiveness.

Financial Readiness as a Recruitment & Retention Benefit

A study led by the UBS Head of Workplace Wealth Solutions, Michael Barry, highlights key findings in worker attitudes and engagement behavior of their financial wellness program that the DoD should strongly examine. Barry notes, "**90% of the millennial age demographic believe their employer has a responsibility to help with overall employee wellness, with a trend that has increased from Boomers (56%) to Gen X (76%).**[470],[15] A properly structured and messaged financial wellness program has become an expected benefit for today's labor market. The need for financial wellness in the workplace has transformed from a "nice-to-have" to an essential employee benefit. Participant engagement is a strong indicator of program effectiveness, and FRP should consider ways to increase engagement.[16]

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[16] Barry, Michael. "UBS Financial Wellness." *States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century* from the United States Military Academy, 7 Feb 2024.

[17] Ibid 16: UBS.

[470]Millennials: Born between 1982 to 2000.
Boomers: Born between 1946 to 1964.
Gen X: Born between 1965-1981.

Barry highlights that once UBS had simply changed the title of financial *counselor* to financial *coach*, they had a 30% increase in program engagement – a simple change in title may change its perception and increase engagement in programs, which makes it a worthy consideration. The Army needs to consider holistically how it communicates its comprehensive FRP as part of its total benefits package to potential recruits and existing servicemembers especially within the context of the competitive labor market, while testing the effects of different interventions in a rigorous and coherent manner. Failure to meet the financial wellness needs of servicemembers threatens the Army's ability to attract and retain personnel needed for the fighting force.

The DoD Office of People Analytics identified spousal and familial support, affective commitment, and overall satisfaction with military life as the top three predictors of retention based on data collected from 2014, 2016, and 2017 Status of Forces Surveys of Active Duty.[471] Retention rates were found to be highest among couples where both the servicemember and spouse reported satisfaction.[472] Affective commitment, characterized by an "emotional attachment to, identification with, and an involvement in an organization" is strongly correlated with retention.[473] Leader involvement with personal finance may not only reduce the costs of financial stress but may also increase readiness by fostering affective commitment. Prioritizing personal financial education may improve financial decision-making among military families, underscoring its significance in improving financial well-being and retention. Additionally, community quality and utilization of community services emerged as important predictors of retention,[474] with extensive users of community services being most likely to remain in the military.[475] Positioning the Family Readiness Program as a central community service for all military personnel may therefore support retention. The link between personal economic security, leadership involvement in financial education, and the use of financial counseling may, therefore, lead to heightened affective commitment and family satisfaction, thereby bolstering retention.

Future Considerations

While the tactical and operational outcomes of FINRED policy are defined as the benefit of servicemembers and their families combined with force readiness, according to Cohen, he argues that the key strategic outcome is the improved cost effectiveness for the DoD. He hypothesizes that cost effectiveness can be gained by mitigating costs of personnel churn that prevents reinvestment into focused readiness areas such as training and force structure. While the hypothesis that enhancing financial literacy could lead to improved recruiting, retention, and reduced time spent on financial issues, the actual costs in terms of labor hours and dollars remain undocumented, so the hypotheses remain untested. Cohen notes the room for improvement in finding the appropriate benchmarks: "We're struggling on how to get good metrics and define those metrics," he stated.[476]

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[18] U.S. Department of Defense Office of People Analytics. 2023. "Predictors of Retention Intentions Among Active Duty Service Members." https://www.opa.mil/research-analysis/quality-of-work-life/status-of-forces-survey-reports-briefings/predictors-of-retention-intentions-among-active-duty-service-members/.
[19] Weiss, Howard et. al. 2003. "Retention in the Armed Forces: Past Approaches and New Research Directions." https://www.mfri.purdue.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Retention-in-the-Armed-Forces.pdf.
[20] Ibid 18: OPA, 2023.
[21] Ibid 19: Weiss, et. al.
[22] Ibid 19: Weiss, et. al.
[23] Cohen, Andy. "Department of Defense Financial Readiness Policy and Program Overview." *States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century* from the United States Military Academy, 7 Feb 2024.

Army leaders' understanding of the leadership burden stemming from financial illiteracy varies, with personal experiences and anecdotes highlighting the lack of clarity regarding costs to labor, effectiveness, and personnel.

Is financial readiness truly a national security issue in that it relates to strategic resilience, which is vital for defense and deterrence in the US and our allies? If so, can we find the extent in which it affects readiness in terms of performance, personnel churn, and other costs? Financial readiness is DoD centric, but the strain of financial stress is felt throughout the US. Experts in academe and the private sector have dedicated their lives and resources to solving this problem. While a proactive attitude towards collaboration with field experts may make some parties uncomfortable, it should absolutely be further pursued. Much of the initial investment into this space has already been done by academia and is being implemented by the private sector, so partnership would require very little additional investment from the Army. Their methods and insights may seem incongruent to apply directly to the US Army, but there are bound to be features and questions that are worth exploring that could yield positive results. Finding appropriate measures begs us to ask: Does the Army's current policy, based on DoD's policy, enable the identification of performance benchmarks that can continuously be measured to capture overall progress and effectiveness? There is a clear need to assess the Army's adherence to its own policy pertaining to its financial training milestones while determining if 100% compliance with the policy would reveal inadequacies in training standardization and the appropriate coverage of financial counselors based on projected labor hour requirements. Surveying financial literacy levels across the force to establish a benchmark, experimenting with different training approaches, and evaluating the perception of the current financial wellness program among recruits, servicemembers, and leaders, is essential. In addition, further examination of financial counseling effectiveness, the open consideration for private sector engagement, and the continued alignment of policy combined with transparent communication on the costs of financial wellbeing to Army leaders, are crucial in advancing financial readiness within the DoD. **The Army should strongly consider ways to leverage non-federal entities and academic partners to research financial training innovations, develop meaningful metrics that provide leadership with insights, and to validate new initiatives within the current FRP.**

States, Societies, and Security in the 21st

Century

February 7-8, 2024

United States Military Academy West Point, New York

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Attire for Civilians and Visiting Military Personnel: Conference Attire **Uniform for SOSH Military Staff and Faculty:** ASU/AGSU-As **Uniform for Participating Cadets:** Dress Grey

Day 1 – Wednesday, February 7th, 2024

7:45 am – 8:50 am: Breakfast, West Point Club | MS Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting 8:15: Keynote Address, Ms. Sasha Baker, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Virtual) 8:30: Mr. Matt Cordova, Chairman's Action Group, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Virtual)
8:40: Introductory Remarks, LTG Steven Gilland, Superintendent, United States Military Academy

9:00 am – 12:30 pm: Morning Panels, Various Locations
Panel A: 9:00-10:45
Panel B: 10:45-12:30

12:30 pm – 1:30 pm: Lunch, West Point Club

1:45 pm – 5:15 pm: Afternoon Panels, Various Locations
Panel C: 1:45-3:30
Panel D: 3:30-5:15

5:30 pm – 9:00 pm: Plenary Dinner (West Point Club) | MS Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting
6:30: Fireside Chat, **Ms. Nicoletta Giordani**, Director, Office of Global Investment and Economic Security (GIES), Industrial Base Policy, OUSD (Acquisition and Sustainment), Office of the Secretary of Defense; **Ambassador Douglas Lute**, LTG (US Army, Retired) and former US Permanent Representative to NATO; **Ms. Bailey Devries**, US Small Business Administration; (Moderated by **Mr. John O'Connor**, CEO, J.H. Whitney Investment Management, LLC)

Day 2 – Thursday, February 8th, 2024

7:45 am – 8:50 am: Breakfast, West Point Club
8:30: Morning Remarks, LTG Jonathan P. Braga, Commander, US Army Special Operations Command

9:00 am – 12:30 pm: Morning Panels, Various Locations
Panel E: 9:00-10:45
Panel F: 10:45-12:30

12:30 pm – 1:30 pm: Lunch, West Point Club | MS Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting
1:00: Remarks by COL Suzanne Nielsen, Professor and Head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy and Promotion Ceremony for LTC Jordan Becker
1:15: Concluding Keynote by Ambassador Douglas Lute, LTG (US Army, Retired) and former US Permanent Representative to NATO

1:45 pm – 5:15 pm: Afternoon Panels
Panel G: 1:45-3:30
***Special Working Group on Professional and Academic Writing and Publication, West Point Club, Open to All**
Panel H: 3:30-5:15

Working Groups: Locations, Times, and Teams Links

Note: MS Teams links will be used for all panels within the Working Group

Working Group	POC
1: International Security – Theory and Strategy **Location:** Jefferson Hall 401 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	COL Mike Rosol, Michael.rosol@westpoint.edu
2: China – Societal and Strategic Perspectives **Location:** Thayer Hall 470 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	Dr. Haemin Jee, haemin.jee@westpoint.edu
3: Russia – Societal and Strategic Perspectives **Location:** Mahan Hall D3 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	Dr. Rob Person, Robert.person@westpoint.edu
4: Emerging, Advanced, and Persistent Challenges in the Strategic Environment **Location:** Mahan Hall D5 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	MAJ Katie Hedgecock, PhD, Kathryn.hedgecock@westpoint.edu
5: Society and Security – Human Capital in National Defense **Location:** Jefferson Hall 514 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	LTC Lee Robinson, PhD, Guyton.robinson@westpoint.edu
6: The US and its Allies – Societal and Security Perspectives **Location:** Mahan Hall D1B **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	Dr. Scott Limbocker, scott.limbocker@westpoint.edu
7: Economics, Defense, and Security **Location:** OEMA Conf. Room (Mahan 202) **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	COL Carl Wojtaszek, carl.wojtaszek@westpoint.edu
8: Alliances and International Security **Location:** Jefferson Hall 301 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	LTC Jordan Becker, Jordan.becker@westpoint.edu
9: Leadership, Justice, and International Order **Location:** Jefferson Hall 302 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	Dr. Josh King, Joshua.king@westpoint.edu; MAJ Hisham Yousif, hisham.yousif@westpoint.edu
10: Deterrence, Defense, and Diplomacy **Location:** Mahan Hall B6 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting	MAJ Alex Thew; alex.thew@westpoint.edu

11: Irregular Warfare, Terrorism, and Security Force Assistance **Location:** Jefferson Hall 501 **Teams Link:** **Click here to join the meeting**	MAJ Ben Jebb, Benjamin.jebb@westpoint.edu; MAJ Erin Lemons, erin.lemons@westpoint.edu
12: A Strategy for DoD Industrial Policy **Location:** Washington Hall 5114 / Mahan Hall C6 **Teams Link:** **Click here to join the meeting**	MAJ Caleb Stenholm, caleb.stenholm@westpoint.edu
13: Personal Economic Security **Location:** Mahan Hall 116 **Teams Link:** **Click here to join the meeting**	Mr. James H. Walker, james.walker@westpoint.edu
Special Working Group on Professional Academic Writing and Publication **Location:** West Point Club **Teams Link:** **Click here to join the meeting**	LTC Jordan Becker, Jordan.becker@westpoint.edu

Working Group 1: International Security – Theory & Strategy POC: COL Mike Rosol, Michael.rosol@westpoint.edu

1A: Power & Power Balancing in the 21st Century Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 401 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
James Sundquist	Yale University	james.sundquist@yale.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Lieutenant Colonel Seth A. Johnston, Ph.D.	US Embassy Brussels	seth.johnston@georgetown.edu	Remotely
Rapporteur			
Dr. Charlotte Hulme	United States Military Academy	charlotte.hulme@westpoint.edu	In-person
Jonathan Martin	Boston University	martin23@bu.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Jānis Bērziņš	National Defense Academy of Latvia	janis.berzins01@mil.lv	In-person
Dr. Nikolas Vander Vennet	Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)	nikolas.vander.vennet@vub.be	In-person
Dr. Tanisha Fazal & Page Fortna	University of Minnesota; Columbia University	fazal007@umn.edu	Remotely
Miss Gesine Weber	Defence Studies Department, King's College London	gesine.weber@kcl.ac.uk	Remotely

1B: Ending Wars and Maintaining Peace Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm Location: Jefferson Hall 401 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
COL Suzanne Nielsen, PhD	United States Military Academy	suzanne.nielsen@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Shawn Cochran	RAND Corporation	scochran@rand.org	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CDT Valentin Shatilenko	United States Military Academy	valentin.shatilenko@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
MAJ Patrick Kelly, PhD	United States Military Academy	patrick.kelly@westpoint.edu	In-person
Chiara Pierobon, PhD	University of Washington	cpierobo@uw.edu	Remotely
Dr. Anatoly Levshin	Harvard University	alevshin@hks.harvard.edu	In-person
Moritz Graefrath, PhD	European University Institute	moritz.graefrath@eui.eu	Remotely
Ph.D. Candidate Jungmin Han	University of Pittsburgh	jungmin.han@pitt.edu	Remotely

1C: Victimizing and Protecting Civilians Wednesday, February 7th, 1:45-3:30 Location: Jefferson Hall 401 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
Discussant			
Professor Andrew Shaver	University of California, Merced	ashaver@ucmerced.edu	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CDT Devin Valverde	United States Military Academy	devin.valverde@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Marguerite Benson	Sticky Wicket Advising	marguerite@stickywicketadvising.com	In-person
Zoë Gorman	Princeton University	zgorman@princeton.edu	In-person

1D: Shaping the Global Order with Information and Narratives Wednesday, February 7th, 3:30-5:15 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 401 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Jeffrey Reynolds	Atlantic Council (USA)	jeff_reynolds@mac.com	In-person
Discussant			
Lieutnant Colonel Seth A. Johnston, PhD	US Embassy Brussels	seth.johnston@georgetown.edu	Remotely
Rapporteur			
LCdr Mike St-Pierre	Royal Canadian Navy	michael.st-pierre@forces.gc.ca	In-person
CDT Trinity Stenger	United States Military Academy	trinity.stenger@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Edward Salo	Arkansas State University	esalo@astate.edu	In-person
Dr. Eyal Rubinson	Ariel University, Israel	eyal.rubinson@mail.huji.ac.il	Remotely
James Sundquist	Yale University	james.sundquist@yale.edu	In-person
Professor Andrew Shaver	University of California, Merced	ashaver@ucmerced.edu	Remotely

1E: (Failures of?) Strategic Analysis & Decision Making Thursday, February 8th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 401 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Gergely Németh		gergely.nemeth@act.nato.int	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Tanisha Fazal		fazal007@umn.edu	Remotely
Rapporteur			
Lt Col Joshua Stinson		joshua_stinson@g.harvard.edu	TBD
Panelists			
John P. Harden PhD	Dartmouth College - Dickey Center	John.P.Harden@dartmouth.edu	Remotely
Mr. Elliot M. Seckler and MAJ Travis Zahnow	Mr. Seckler: OSD; MAJ Zahnow: USSTRATCOM	travis.m.zahnow.mil@mail.mil & elliot.m.seckler.civ@mail.mil	In-person
Professor Tanguy Struye de Swielande	UCLouvain	tanguy.struye@uclouvain.be	In-person

1G: Compound Security Competition Thursday, February 8th, 1:45-3:30 Location: Jefferson Hall 401

Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Dr. Isaiah "Ike" Wilson III	Prof of Practice, Arizona State University and parther, Gainful Solutions Ventures Inc.	isaiah.wilson3@gmail.com	In-person
Discussant			
AMB(Ret.) Michael Ranneberger	Managing Partner, Gainful Solutions Ventures, Inc.	michael@gainfulsolutions.com	Remotely
Mr. Soheil Nazari-Kangarlou	Managing Partner, Gainful Solutions Ventures, Inc.	soheil@gainfulsolutions.com	Remotely
Ms. Alexious Butler	Senior Development Advisor, US Central Command	abutler@usaid.gov	Remotely
AMB (Ret.) Larry Butler	Senior Fellow, School of Policy and Int'l Affairs, University of Maine	law.butler@gmail.com	Remotely
Rapporteur			
MAJ Gabe Royal	United States Military Academy	gabriel.royal@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Dawson Stec	United States Military Academy	dawson.stec@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Isaiah "Ike" Wilson III	Prof of Practice, School of Politics & Global Affairs, ASU and CEO of Wilson W.i.S.E. Consulting LLC	isaiah.wilson3@gmail.com	In-person
Dr. Leonard Hochberg	Senior Fellow, FPRI and Coordinator, Mackinder Forum-US	lenhochberg@gmail.com	In-person
Mr. Peter Cloutier	Assoc. Prof of Human Security & Intl Dev., Joint Special Operations University	peter.cloutier@jsou.edu	In-person
Dr. Michael Hochberg	President, Periplous LLC and Visiting Scholar, Cambridge Center for Geopolitics	michael.hochberg@gmail.com	In-person
Dr. Scott Smitson	Director of the Grand Strategy Program at Denison University and Chamberlain Fellow and Visiting Professor of Political Science, Amherst College	scott.smitson@gmail.com	In-person

Working Group 2: China – Societal and Strategic Perspectives POC: Dr. Haemin Jee, haemin.jee@westpoint.edu

2A: Chinese Influence Beyond its Borders Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 Location: Thayer Hall 470 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Asha Clark	China Subject Matter Expert	asha.clark@act.nato.int	Remotely
Discussant			
COL Christopher Martin	State Department Policy Planning Staff	martincs@state.gov	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT Jose Valenzuela	United States Military Academy	jose.valenzuelagomez@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Brandon Tran	United States Military Academy	brandon.tran@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Lillian Li-Hsing Ho & COL E. John Gregory	United States Military Academy	lihsing.ho@westpoint.edu; eugene.gregory@westpoint.edu	In-person
Assistant Professor Siraj Ahmed Nizamani	University of Sindh (Pakistan)	siraj_1@yahoo.com	In-person
Dr Sara Van Hoeymissen	Royal Military Academy of Belgium and Vrije Universiteit Brussel	sara.vanhoeymissen@mil.be	In-person
Dr. Sebestyén Hompot, PhD	Central European Institute of Asian Studies	sebestyen.hompot@gmail.com	In-person
Rachel Hulvey, PhD Candidate	University of Pennsylvania	hulvey@sas.upenn.edu	In-person

2B: Cross-Strait Relations Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm **Location:** Thayer Hall 470 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
CPT Merlin Boone	United States Military Academy	merlin.boone@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
COL Christopher Martin	State Department Policy Planning Staff	martincs@state.gov	In-person
Rapporteur			
MAJ Amanda Monaghan	United States Military Academy	amanda.monaghan@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Sarah Cao	United States Military Academy	sarah.cao@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Vinicius Guilherme Rodrigues Vieira	Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) and University of Sao Paulo, Brazil	vinicius.vieira@fgv.br	Remotely
Jerome Gapany, MA & Matthias Schachtler, MA	Military Academy at the ETH Zurich, Switzerland	jerome.gapany@milak.ethz.ch	In-person
Professor Tanguy Struye de Swielande	UCLouvain	tanguy.struye@uclouvain.be	In-person

2C: Contesting the Maritime Domain in the Asia-Pacific Region Wednesday, February 7th, 1:45-3:30 **Location:** Thayer Hall 470 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Haemin Jee	United States Military Academy	haemin.jee@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Erik Bethel	Interval Ventures	ebethel@intervalventures.com	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CDT Noah Bogado	United States Military Academy	noah.bogado@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Diren Doğan, Lecturer, PhD Candidate	Taiwan Centre for Strategic Studies (TCSS)	diren.dogan@alanya.edu.tr	Remotely
Dr. Edward Salo, FRHistS	Arkansas State University	esalo@astate.edu	In-person

Working Group 3: Russia – Societal & Strategic Perspectives POC: Dr. Rob Person, Robert.person@westpoint.edu

3A: Power & Strategy in Russia's War in Ukraine Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Mahan Hall D3 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Rob Person	United States Military Academy	robert.person@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
MAJ Erin Mauldin	United States Military Academy	erin.mauldin@westpoint.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
LTC Meghan Cumpston	University of Notre Dame (PhD Student)	meghan.l.cumpston.mil@army.mil	In-person
CDT Daphne Karahalios		daphne.karahalios@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr Anna-Sophie Maass	Lancaster University, UK	a.maass@lancaster.ac.uk	Remotely
Dr. Alex Burilkov	Leuphana University of Lüneburg	alexandr.burilkov@leuphana.de	In-person
Dr. Jaganath Sankaran	LBJ School of Public Affairs, UT Austin	jaganath.sankaran@gmail.com	In-person
Dr. Ulrich Pilster	NATO International Staff	pilster.ulrich@hq.nato.int	Remotely

3B: State, Society, and War Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm
Location: Mahan Hall D3
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
LTC Meghan Cumpston	University of Notre Dame (PhD Student)	meghan.l.cumpston.mil@army.mil	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Elena Pokalova		elena.pokalova.civ@ndu.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
Isak Kulalic	Boston University	ikulalic@bu.edu	TBD
CDT Kathryn Scales	United States Military Academy	kathryn.scales@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Thomas Sherlock	United States Military Academy	thomas.sherlock@westpoint.edu	In-person
Associate Professor Katri Pynnöniemi	National Defence University, Finland and University of Helsinki, Finland	katri.pynnoniemi@helsinki.fi	In-person
Austin Knuppe, PhD	Utah State University	austin.knuppe@usu.edu	In-person
Dr. Jesse Driscoll	University of California - San Diego	jdriscoll@ucsd.edu	Remotely

3C: Narratives of History, Nation, and War Wednesday, February 7th, 1:45-3:30 **Location:** Mahan Hall D3 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Thomas Sherlock	United States Military Academy	thomas.sherlock@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Thomas Sherlock	United States Military Academy	thomas.sherlock@westpoint.edu	In-person
Peter D. Andreoli	State Department Policy Planning Staff	AndreoliPD@state.gov	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT William Joo	United States Military Academy	william.joo@westpoint.edu	In-person
Dr. Alexander Burilkov	Leuphana University of Lüneburg	alexandr.burilkov@leuphana.de	In-person
Panelists			
Benjamin Tremblay-Auger, PhD Candidate	Stanford Graduate School of Business	btauger@stanford.edu	In-person
Dr Jenny Mathers & Dr Allyson Edwards	Aberystwyth University, United Kingdom; Bath Spa University	zzk@aber.ac.uk	Remotely
Dr. Elena Pokalova	National Defense University	elena.pokalova.civ@ndu.edu	In-person
Dr. Ieva Berzina	National Defence Academy of Latvia	ieva.berzina@mil.lv	Remotely
Dr. Michal Parizek	Charles University, Prague, Czechia	michal.parizek@fsv.cuni.cz	Remotely

Working Group 4: Emerging, Advanced, and Persistent Challenges in the Strategic Environment

POC: MAJ Katie Hedgecock, PhD, Kathryn.hedgecock@westpoint.edu

4A: Persistent, Non-Kinetic Threats to the Strategic Environment Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Mahan Hall D5 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
MAJ Kathryn Hedgecock	United States Military Academy	kathryn.hedgecock@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Karen Guttieri	United States Military Academy	karen.guttieri@westpoint.edu	In-person
MAJ Kyle Wolfley, PhD	US Army Cyber Command	kylewolfley@gmail.com	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CPT Matthew Thomas Moellering	United States Military Academy	matthew.t.moellering2.mil@army.mil	Remotely
Panelists			
Abraham Holland, PhD	Institute for Defense Analyses	rholland@ida.org	In-person
Anne-Marie Dedene & Nikolas Vander Vennet	Vrije Universiteit Brussel	Anne-Marie.Dedene@vub.be	In-person
Emily Chapman PhD	Australian Defence Force	emily.chapman@defence.gov.au	In-person
Professor Jeff Colgan	Brown University	jeff_colgan@brown.edu	In-person
Thomas Wuchte	Founder Center for Multilateral Collaboration & Cooperation Leadership	tawuchte@gmail.com	In-person
Zachary Kallenborn	George Mason University	zkallenborn@gmail.com	Remotely

4B: Across Domains Complexity of the Strategic Environment Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm **Location:** Mahan Hall D5 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Professor Jeff Colgan		jeff_colgan@brown.edu	In-person
Discussant			
COL Heidi Demarest, PhD	United States Military Academy	heidi.demarest@westpoint.edu	In-person
MAJ Kathryn Hedgecock	United States Military Academy	kathryn.hedgecock@westpoint.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT Noah Jager	United States Military Academy	noah.jager@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Olivia Raykhman	United States Military Academy	olivia.raykhman@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Gary Ackerman	University at Albany	gackerman@albany.edu	In-person
Kashif Anwar	Global Strategic & Defence News, India	anwrkashif@gmail.com	Remotely
Major Kyle J. Wolfley, PhD	US Army Cyber Command	kylewolfley@gmail.com	Remotely
Ms Michaela Ticha	Masaryk University	michaela.ticha@gmail.com	In-person
Sanghyun Han (Ph.D. student)	Georgia Institute of Technology	shhan@gatech.edu	Remotely
Zachary Kallenborn	George Mason University	zkallenborn@gmail.com	Remotely

4C: Reflections on Russia – Ukraine Lessons for the Strategic Environment Wednesday, February 7th, 1:45-3:30 **Location:** Mahan Hall D5 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Gary Ackerman		gackerman@albany.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Benedetta Berti	NATO	benedetta.berti@hq.nato.int	Remotely
Rapporteur			
Dr. Kenneth Lasoen	Antwerp University	kenneth.lasoen@uantwerpen.be	In-person
Panelists			
Dr Marzena Żakowska, prof. Larry Goodson	War Studies University, Warsaw, Poland	marzena.j.zakowska@gmail.com; larry.goodson@armywarcollege.edu	In-person
Dr. Douglas Winton	National Defense University/Eisenhower School	douglas.w.winton.civ@ndu.edu	In-person
Dr. Edward Salo, FRHistS	Arkansas State University	esalo@astate.edu	In-person
Lt Col Jahara 'FRANKY' Matisek, PhD	US Naval War College	jahara.matisek@usnwc.edu	In-person
Paul E. Cormarie	RAND Corporation	Cormarie@rand.org	In-person

4D: Military Innovation, Diffusion, & Foreign Support Wednesday, February 7th, 3:30-5:15 **Location:** Mahan Hall D5 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Tony Porter	OCEA	patrick.porter.5@us.af.mil	TBD
Discussant			
Tim Wright		timothy.f.wright00@gmail.com	TBD
David Skinner	Northeast Director, National Security Innovation Network (NSIN)	dskinner@nsin.mil	TBD
Rapporteur			
CDT Christian Espos	United States Military Academy	christian.espos@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr Roland Popp	Researcher at the Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Switzerland	roland.popp@mailbox.org	In-person
Dr. Dominika Kunertova	ETH Zurich	dominika.kunertova@sipo.gess.ethz.ch	Remotely
Dr. Edward Salo	Arkansas State University	esalo@astate.edu	In-person
Giuseppe Spatafora	University of Oxford	giuseppe.spatafora@politics.ox.ac.uk	In-person
Octavian Manea, PhD student	Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS), Brussels School of Governance, VUB	octavian.manea@vub.be	Remotely
Prof. Olivier Schmitt	Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark	schmitt@sam.sdu.dk	Remotely

Working Group 5: Societies and Security – Human Capital in National Defense Enterprises

POC: LTC Lee Robinson, PhD, Guyton.robinson@westpoint.edu

5A/B: Talent Management Implementation in the U.S. Army Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-12:30pm **Location:** Jefferson Hall 514 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
LTC Lee Robinson	United States Military Academy	guyton.robinson@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Ed Kellough, PhD	University of Georgia	kellough@uga.edu	TBD
Mr. Michael Arnold	HQDA	michael.j.arnold58.civ@army.mil	In-person
Rapporteur			
MAJ Heather Jebb	United States Military Academy	heather.jebb@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
John Vigna	United States Military Academy	john.vigna@westpoint.edu	In-person
Christine Baker	US Army	christine.m.baker36.mil@army.mil	TBD
Colonel Bob O'Brien	US Army Command Assessment Program	robert.a.obrien12.mil@army.mil	In-person
LTC Delaney Brown	US Army	delaney.p.brown.mil@army.mil	In-person
Victoria Tilley	US Army	victoria.e.tilley.mil@army.mil	TBD

5A/B: Talent Management Implementation in the U.S. Army cont.
Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-12:30pm Location: Jefferson Hall 514
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
LTC Lee Robinson	United States Military Academy	guyton.robinson@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Ed Kellough, PhD	University of Georgia	kellough@uga.edu	TBD
Mr. Michael Arnold	Army Talent Management Task Force	michael.j.arnold58.civ@army.mil	In-person
Rapporteur			
MAJ Heather Jebb	United States Military Academy	heather.jebb@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
John Vigna	United States	john.vigna@westpoint.edu	In-person
Christine Baker	US Army	christine.m.baker36.mil@army.mil	TBD
Colonel Bob O'Brien	US Army Command Assessment Program	robert.a.obrien12.mil@army.mil	In-person
LTC Delaney Brown	US Army	delaney.p.brown.mil@army.mil	In-person
Victoria Tilley	US Army	victoria.e.tilley.mil@army.mil	TBD

5C: Characterization of Military Service Wednesday, February 7th,
1:45-3:30 Location: Jefferson Hall 514
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
COL Todd A. Schmidt, Ph.D., Directory, Army University Press	Army University Press	todd.a.schmidt.mil@army.mil	In-person
Discussant			
Prof. Chiara Ruffa	Sciences Po Paris	chiara.ruffa@sciencespo.fr	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CDT Camily Widger	United States Military Academy	camily.widger@westpoint.edu	In-person
Ms. Jennifer Lin, Ph.D. Candidate	Northwestern University	jenniferlin2025@u.northwestern.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Claire Oto	University of Virginia	wcv9qx@virginia.edu	In-person
Dr. Natalie D Baker	National War College	natalie.d.baker.civ@ndu.edu	In-person
Martin Armstrong, PhD Candidate	Ohio State University	armstrong.828@osu.edu	In-person
Prof. Chiara Ruffa	Sciences Po Paris	chiara.ruffa@sciencespo.fr	Remotely

5D: Influences on the Composition of Defense Forces Wednesday, February 7th, 3:30-5:15 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 514 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Prof. Fabrizio Coticchia	University of Genoa	coticchiafabrizio@gmail.com	Remotely
Discussant			
Dr. Natalie D Baker	National Defense University	natalie.d.baker.civ@ndu.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
CPT Jake Barnes	United States Military Academy	jacob.barnes2@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Richard Lacquement	US Army War College	richard.lacquement@armywarcollege.edu	In-person
Garrett Martin	Columbia University	garrett.martin@columbia.edu	In-person
Gil Barndollar, PhD	Catholic University of America	barndollar@cua.edu	In-person
Simon Rotzer, PhD	Austin Peay State University	rotzers@apsu.edu	In-person

5E: Human Capital Development Thursday, February 8th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 514 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Professor Vincenzo Bove	University of Warwick	v.bove@warwick.ac.uk	Remotely
Discussant			
Claire Oto	University of Virginia	wcv9qx@virginia.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT Jess Ho	United States Military Academy	jessica.ho@westpoint.edu	In-person
CPT David Hilden	United States Military Academy	david.hilden@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
COL Todd A. Schmidt, Ph.D., Directory, Army University Press	Army University Press	todd.a.schmidt.mil@army.mil	In-person
Katherine Kuzminski	Center for a New American Security	kkuzminski@cnas.org	In-person
LTC Brian Forester, PhD	US Army	bgforester@gmail.com	Remotely
Major Zachary Griffiths	Army Staff	zachary.e.griffiths@gmail.com	In-person

5F: Acquisition and Retention of Human Capital Thursday, February 8th, 10:45-12:30pm **Location:** Jefferson Hall 514 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Katherine Kuzminski	CNAS	kkuzminski@cnas.org	In-person
Discussant			
Max Margulies, PhD	United States Military Academy	max.margulies@westpoint.edu	In-person
Major Zachary Griffiths	US Army	zachary.e.griffiths@gmail.com	In-person
Rapporteur			
MAJ Heather Jebb	United States Military Academy	heather.jebb@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Jordan Marcusse, PhD	Institute for Defense Analyses	jmarcuss@ida.org	Remotely
Professor Vincenzo Bove	University of Warwick	v.bove@warwick.ac.uk	Remotely
Hannah Smith	Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies	hjs77@georgetown.edu	In-person

5G: Influences on Political Attitudes Thursday, February 8th, 1:45-3:30 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 514 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Rachel Sondheimer	United States Military Academy	rachel.sondheimer@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Marco Giani	King's College London	marco.giani@kcl.ac.uk	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CPT Jon Dove	United States Military Academy	jonathan.dove@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Captain Jake Barnes	United States Military Academy	jacob.barnes2@westpoint.edu	In-person
Ms. Jennifer Lin, Ph.D. Candidate	Northwestern University	jenniferlin2025@u.northwestern.edu	In-person
Mukesh Kumar	Research Scholar	Strikermukesh@gmail.com	Remotely
Professor Edmund Malesky	Duke University	ejm5@duke.edu	In-person

5H: Veteran Policy Priorities in the United States Thursday, February 8th, 3:30-5:15 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 514 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Carrie Farmer, Ph.D.	RAND Corporation	cfarmer@rand.org	TBD
Rajeev Ramchand, Ph.D.	RAND Corporation	ramchand@rand.org	In-person
Discussant			
MAJ Adam Cucchiara	United States Military Academy	adam.cucchiara@westpoint.edu	In-person
Prof. Carl A. Castro	United States Military Academy	cacastro@usc.edu	TBD
Rapporteur			
CDT Emmett Carey	United States Military Academy	emmett.carey@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Carrie Farmer, Ph.D.	RAND Corporation	cfarmer@rand.org	Remotely
Daniel Schwam	RAND Corporation	dschwam@rand.org	In-person
Heather Salazar	RAND Corporation	hsalazar@rand.org	Remotely
Kayla Williams	RAND Corporation	kwillia@rand.org	Remotely
Rajeev Ramchand, Ph.D.	RAND Corporation	ramchand@rand.org	In-person

Working Group 6: The US and its Allies – Societal and Security Perspectives POC: Dr. Scott Limbocker, scott.limbocker@westpoint.edu

6A: The Role of Institutions in US Alliances Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 Location: Mahan Hall D1B **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Toms Rostoks	Latvian National Defence Academy	toms.rostoks@mil.lv	Remotely
Discussant			
Daphné Charotte	Maastricht University	daphne.charotte@maastrichtuniversity.nl	Remotely
Maryum N. Alam, Ph.D. Candidate	The Ohio State University	alam.75@osu.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT Mark Cai	United States Military Academy	mark.cai@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Joshua Fawcett Weiner	University of British Columbia	jfawcettweiner@gmail.com	In-person
Mr. Abdirisak Mohamed Shaqale & Mohamed Abiib Osman	Visiting lecturer at University of Hargeisa; Hargeisa City Council	shaqale2025@gmail.com	In-person
Professor Amparo Pamela Fabe	National Police College	mimi.fabe@gmail.com	Remotely

6B: US Citizens Attitudes on Foreign Policy Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm Location: Mahan Hall D1B
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
MAJ Joseph Amoroso	United States Military Academy	joseph.amoroso@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Mael (Alan) van Beek, Ph.D.	Princeton University	mv3671@princeton.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT Stephen Torres	United States Military Academy	stephen.torres@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
MAJ Joshua Woodaz, CDT John Mitchell, & CDT Brandon Tran	United States Military Academy	joshua.woodaz@westpoint.edu	In-person
Andrew Goodhart	Ohio State University (Political Science and MESO)	goodhart.19@osu.edu	Remotely
Dan Vallone	More in Common	danvallone@gmail.com	In-person
Kathleen E. Powers, PhD & Kelly Matush	Dartmouth College	kathleen.e.powers@dartmouth.edu	Remotely
Maryum N. Alam, Ph.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University	The Ohio State University	alam.75@osu.edu	In-person

6C: The US and Europe Wednesday, February 7th, 1:45-3:30
Location: Mahan Hall D1B
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Dan Vallone	More in Common	danvallone@gmail.com	In-person
Discussant			
Josh Fawcett Weiner	University of British Columbia	jfawcettweiner@gmail.com	In-person
Kathleen E. Powers, PhD		kathleen.e.powers@dartmouth.edu	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CDT Tyler Wilson	United States Military Academy	tyler.wilson@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Solomon Smith	United States Military Academy	solomon.smith@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Daphné Charotte	Maastricht University	daphne.charotte@maastrichtuniversity.nl	Remotely
Dr. Toms Rostoks	Latvian National Defence Academy	toms.rostoks@mil.lv	Remotely

6D: Strategic Culture and Shifting Foreign Policy Wednesday, February 7th, 3:30-5:15 **Location:** Mahan Hall D1B **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Prof. Justin Massie	University of Ottawa	massie.justin@uqam.ca	In-person
Discussant			
Katri Pynnönieme		katri.pynnoniemi@helsinki.fi	In-person
Rapporteur			
Dr. Kenneth Lasoen	University of Antwerp	kenneth.lasoen@uantwerpen.be	In-person
Panelists			
LTC Jordan Becker	United States Military Academy	jordan.becker@westpoint.edu	In-person
Jean-Christopher Boucher	University of Calgary	jc.boucher@ucalgary.ca	In-person
Prof. Justin Massie, Srdjan Vucetic, & Barbara Tallova	Université du Québec à Montréal	massie.justin@uqam.ca	In-person

6E: Public Opinion, Leaders, and Foreign Policy Thursday, February 8th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Mahan Hall D1B **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Sarah Croco, PhD		scroco@umd.edu	TBD
Discussant			
Kathleen E. Powers, PhD	Dartmouth College	kathleen.e.powers@dartmouth.edu	Remotely
Richard K. Herrmann, PhD	Ohio State University	herrmann.1@osu.edu	TBD
Rapporteur			
CDT Trinity Stenger	United States Military Academy	trinity.stenger@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
MAJ Heather Jebb & CPT Matthew Fiorelli	United States Military Academy	heather.jebb@westpoint.edu; matthew.fiorelli@westpoint.edu	In-person
Joshua Schwartz, Ph.D.		joshuas2@andrew.cmu.edu	TBD
Mael (Alan) van Beek, Ph.D.	Princeton University	mv3671@princeton.edu	In-person
Maryum N. Alam, Ph.D. Candidate	Ohio State University	alam.75@osu.edu	In-person
Matthew J. Conklin, Ph.D. Candidate	University of Chicago	mconklin@uchicago.edu	In-person
Michael Goldfien, PhD		michael.goldfien@usnwc.edu	In-person

Working Group 7: Economics, Defense, & Security POC: COL Carl Wojtaszek, carl.wojtaszek@westpoint.edu

7A: Military Labor Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** OEMA Conf. Room (Mahan 202) **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Mr. Stanley Horowitz		shorowit@ida.org	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Michael Kofoed	University of Tennessee	mkofoed1@utk.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
MAJ Vincent Shaw	United States Military Academy	vincent.shaw@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
MAJ Vincent Shaw	United States Military Academy	vincent.shaw@westpoint.edu	In-person
Jan Kofron, PhD	Institute of Political Studies, Charles University	jan.kofron@fsv.cuni.cz	In-person
Mr. Stanley Horowitz	Institute for Defense Analyses	shorowit@ida.org	In-person

7B: Military Personnel Policy Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm Location: OEMA Conf. Room (Mahan 202) **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Michael Kofoed	University of Tennessee	mkofoed1@utk.edu	In-person
Discussant			
COL Carl Wojtaszek	United States Military Academy	carl.wojtaszek@westpoint.edu	In-person
Julie Lockwood		TBD	TBD
Rapporteur			
MAJ Andrew Webster	United States Military Academy	andrew.webster@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
MAJ Andrew Webster	United States Military Academy	andrew.webster@westpoint.edu	In-person
Dr. Jennifer Heissel	Naval Postgraduate School	jheissel@gmail.com	In-person
Dr. Michael Kofoed	University of Tennessee at Knoxville	mkofoed1@utk.edu	In-person
Lieutenant Colonel Ryan W. Pallas & Colonel Eric Reid	George Mason, Schar School of Policy & Government USMC Strategist Fellow	rpallas@gmu.edu	In-person

7C: Capital – Trade and Sourcing Risk Wednesday, February 7th,
1:45-3:30 Location: OEMA Conf. Room (Mahan 202)
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Prof. Andrew Glencross		andrew.glencross@univ-catholille.fr	Remotely
Discussant			
John O'Connor	JH Whitney	joconnor@jhwhitney.com	In-person
Lieutenant Colonel Ryan W. Pallas	Commandant of the Marine Corps Strategist Fellow; United States Marine Corps	rpallas@gmu.edu	In-person
Mr. Tomoshige Nambu	Ministry of Economy, Trade, & Industry (Japan)	nanbu-tomoshige@meti.go.jp	In-person
Mr. Takayuki Shirai	Ministry of Economy, Trade, & Industry (Japan)	shirai-takayuki@meti.go.jp	In-person
Rapporteur			
CPT Rachel Kim	United States Military Academy	rachel.kim@westpoint.edu	In-person
Florian David Bodamer	Boston University	fbodamer@bu.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Benjamin Tkach, PhD	Mississippi State University	bt1098@msstate.edu	Remotely
Florian David Bodamer	Boston University	fbodamer@bu.edu	In-person
Lucas F. Hellemeier	John F. Kennedy Institute, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany	Lucasfeh91@zedat.fu-berlin.de	In-person
Prof. Andrew Glencross	ESPOL, Catholic University of Lille (France)	andrew.glencross@univ-catholille.fr	Remotely
Vasabjit Banerjee, PhD	University of Tennessee, Knoxville	Vasabjit_Banerjee@utk.edu	In-person

7D: Strategic Competition Wednesday, February 7th, 3:30-5:15 **Location:** OEMA Conf. Room (Mahan 202) **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Dean Dudley	United States Military Academy	dean.dudley@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Brig Gen (USAF Ret) Raymond E Franck	USAF Academy (Professor Emeritus)	cfranck215@aol.com	In-person
Rapporteur			
Lucas F. Hellemeier		Lucasfeh91@zedat.fu-berlin.de	In-person
LTC Brandon Colas	US Army	brandon.colas@yale.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Daniel Arce, PhD	University of Texas at Dallas	darce@utdallas.edu	In-person
Leo Blanken	Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA	ljblanke@nps.edu	Remotely
Professor Eli Berman	University of California San Diego (UCSD)	eliberman1@gmail.com	In-person
Samuel Gerstle		samgerstle@gmail.com	TBD

7E: Military Expenditure Thursday, February 8th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** OEMA Conf. Room (Mahan 202) **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Nan Tian		nan.tian@sipri.org	Remotely
Discussant			
COL Heidi Demarest, PhD	United States Military Academy	heidi.demarest@westpoint.edu	In-person
Dr. Benjamin Tkach, Mississippi State University	Mississippi State University	bt1098@msstate.edu	Remotely
Rapporteur			
Lucas F. Hellemeier		Lucasfeh91@zedat.fu-berlin.de	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Marcin Terlikowski	Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)	terlikowski@pism.pl	In-person
Dr. Nan Tian	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute	nan.tian@sipri.org	Remotely
LTC ret. Bohuslav Pernica, PhD.	University of Pardubice, Czechia	bohuslav.pernica@seznam.cz	Remotely
Prof. J. Paul Dunne	University of Cape Town	john.dunne@uct.ac.za	Remotely

Working Group 8: Alliances & International Security POC: LTC Jordan Becker, Jordan.becker@westpoint.edu

8A: Europe's New Security Environment – Adapting to Strategic Shocks in NATO's Core Peripheries **Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 Location:** Jefferson Hall 301 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Katherine Elgin	Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments	kelgin@csbaonline.org	In-person
Discussant			
MG(Ret) Gordon "Skip" Davis		gbdavisjr@icloud.com	Remotely
Paul Poast	University of Chicago	paulpoast@uchicago.edu	TBD
Rapporteur			
CDT Martayn Van de Wall	United States Military Academy	martayn.vandewall@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr Lemonia Tsaroucha	EFTA Surveillance Authority (EU/EEA)	lemonia.tsaroucha@eftasurv.int	In-person
Dr. Gorana Grgić	ETH Zurich Center for Security Studies and the University of Sydney	gorana.grgic@sydney.edu.au	Remotely
Gita Leitlande	National Defence Academy of Latvia	gita.leitlande@mil.lv	Remotely
Malgorzata Samojedny & Zuzanna Nowak	The Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs	nowak.zf@gmail.com	In-person

8B: NATO: Deterrence & Defense Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm Location: Jefferson Hall 301
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Prof. Cind Du Bois	Royal Military Academy of Belgium	cindy.dubois@rma.ac.be	In-person
Discussant			
Colonel Bryan Frizzelle, PhD	US Army	bryan.frizzelle@gmail.com	Remotely
Katherine Elgin	Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments	kelgin@csbaonline.org	In-person
Hon. Nicoletta Giordani	Director of Global Investment and Economic Security (GIES) (OSD)	lisa.m.difalco2.ctr@mail.mil; nicoletta.s.diordani.civ@mail.mil	In-person
Rapporteur			
Ms Lotje Boswinkel	Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS), Brussels School of Governance, VUB	lotje.boswinkel@vub.be	Remotely
Panelists			
Dr. Alexander Lanoszka	University of Waterloo	alexander.lanoszka@uwaterloo.ca	In-person
Isa Mulaj	Institute for Economic Policy Research and Analyses	isa.mulaj@gmail.com	Remotely
Professor Christos Kollias	Department of Economics, University of Thessaly	kollias@uth.gr	Remotely

8C: Partnerships & Defense Cooperation Wednesday, February 7th, 1:45-3:30 Location: Jefferson Hall 301
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Ms Lotje Boswinkel	Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS), Brussels School of Governance, VUB	lotje.boswinkel@vub.be	Remotely
Discussant			
Dr. Marcin Terlikowski	PISM	terlikowski@pism.pl	In-person
Mr Alessandro De Cicco	Geopolitical Analyst	alessandro.decicco14@gmail.com	Remotely
Rapporteur			
K. Ryan Gentry	United States Military Academy	kenneth.gentry@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Diana Chioma Onyejiaka, JD, MPA	Southern University Law Center (Graduate)	donyejiaka@icloud.com	In-person
Dr Alexander Mesarovich	European University Institute	iksander7@gmail.com	Remotely
Dr. Federico Donelli	University of Trieste, Italy	federico.donelli@dispes.units.it	Remotely
Eleftheris Vigne	Royal Miltary Academy (Brussels)	eleftheris.vigne@mil.be	In-person

8D: Alliances & Alignment – Causes and Consequences Wednesday, February 7th, 3:30-5:15 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 301 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Alexander Lanoszka	U of Waterloo	alexander.lanoszka@uwaterloo.ca	In-person
Discussant			
Benedetta Berti	NATO	benedetta.berti@hq.nato.int	Remotely
Dr. Andrew Bennett	Georgetown	hoyafac@gmail.com	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CDT Martayn Van de Wall	United States Military Academy	martayn.vandewall@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Patrick McCabe	United States Military Academy	patrick.mccabe@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Major Jane Kaufmann	Stanford University	janekauf@stanford.edu	Remotely
Juhong Park, PhD Candidate	University of Bath, UK	jp2590@bath.ac.uk	Remotely
Ms Lotje Boswinkel	Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS), Brussels School of Governance, VUB	lotje.boswinkel@vub.be	Remotely
Prof. Ethan B. Kapstein	Princeton University	kapstein@princeton.edu	Remotely

8E: Strategy, Sovereignty, and Burden Sharing Thursday, February 8th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 301 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Eleftheris Vigne		eleftheris.vigne@mil.be	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Gorana Grgić	ETH Zürich's Center for Security Studies and the University of Sydney	gorana.grgic@sydney.edu.au	Remotely
Jan Havranek	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Czech Republic, Washington DC	jan.havranek@gmail.com	In-person
Rapporteur			
Mr Alessandro De Cicco	Geopolitical Analyst	alessandro.decicco14@gmail.com	Remotely
Panelists			
Dr. Raúl González Muñoz	University of Leicester & Spanish Association for Aeronautical and Space Law (AEDAE)	rgm12@leicester.ac.uk	Remotely
Dr. Ringailė Kuokštytė, Dr. Vytautas Kuokštis, and COL ordan Becker	General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania; Vilnius University; United States Military Academy	kuokstis@gmail.com	Remotely
Mr Alessandro De Cicco, Mr. Raffaele Madaio, Mr. Claudio Lisi, Ms. Mariagrazia Romano	Geopolitical Analyst, Guglielmo Marconi University (Rome, Italy), European Security and Defence College - ESDC (Brussels, Belgium)	alessandro.decicco14@gmail.com	Remotely
Prof. Cind Du Bois	Royal Military Academy of Belgium	cindy.dubois@rma.ac.be	In-person

Working Group 9: Leadership, Justice, and International Order

POC: Dr. Josh King, Joshua.king@westpoint.edu; MAJ Hisham Yousif, hisham.yousif@westpoint.edu

9A: National Sovereignty and the Limits on International Justice Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 302 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Josh King	United States Military Academy	joshua.king@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Mr. Jason Pack	NATO Defense College Foundation	Jason@Libya-Analysis.com	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT Mason Harris	United States Military Academy	james.harris@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Richard W. Maass & Kenneth Schultz	Old Dominion University; Stanford University	RMaass@ODU.edu	Remotely
Esra Biala, Fulbright Master's Scholar	Middle Tennessee State University	eb6m@mtmail.mtsu.edu	In-person
Professor Hans Peter Grüner	University of Mannheim	gruener@uni-mannheim.de	Remotely

9B: Domestic Pressures and Foreign Policy Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm Location: Jefferson Hall 302 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
MAJ Hisham Yousif	United States Military Academy	hisham.yousif@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Esra Biala, M.A. & Dr. Josh King	Middle Tennessee State University	eb6m@mtmail.mtsu.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT Peter Connelly	United States Military Academy	peter.connelly@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Jason Pack	NATO Defense College Foundation	Jason@Libya-Analysis.com	In-person
Mark Berlin	George Washington University	markberlin2@gwmail.gwu.edu	Remotely
Megan A. Stewart, Ph.D.	University of Michigan	mgnstwrt@umich.edu	Remotely

Working Group 10: Deterrence, Defense, and Diplomacy POC: MAJ Alex Thew, alex.thew@westpoint.edu

10A: Deterring Diverse Threats in Multiple Theaters Wednesday, February 7th, 9:30-11:00 **Location:** Mahan Hall B6 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Prof. Maria Mälksoo		maria.malksoo@ifs.ku.dk	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Robert G. Bell	CSDS/VUB and Georgia Tech	nscbell@aol.com	Remotely
Rapporteur			
Tyler Bowen, PhD		tyler.bowen@usnwc.edu	In-person
CDT Jared Cordova	United States Military Academy	jared.cordova@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Carlton G. Haelig, PhD	The Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin	chaelig@utexas.edu	In-person
Dr. Maximilian Hoell	Center for Global Security Research at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	hoell1@llnl.gov	In-person
Lieutenant Colonel Matt Kuhlman	U.S. Army / George Mason University	mkuhlma@gmu.edu	In-person
Major Luke Tyree	USSTRATCOM J55	luke.a.tyree.mil@mail.mil	In-person
Zachary Kallenborn	George Mason University	zkallenborn@gmail.com	Remotely

10B: Future of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence Wednesday, February 7th, 11:15-12:45pm Location: Mahan Hall B6
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Dr. Marcin Terlikowski	PISM	Terlikowski@pism.pl	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Wojciech Lorenz	PISM	Lorenz@pism.pl	In-person
Rapporteur			
Dr. Marcin Terlikowski	PISM	Terlikowski@pism.pl	In-person
Dr. Wojciech Lorenz	PISM	Lorenz@pism.pl	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Malcolm Davis	The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Australia	malcolmdavis@aspi.org.au	Remotely
Dr. Robert G. Bell	CSDS/VUB and Georgia Tech	nscbell@aol.com	Remotely
Fabian R. Hoffmann	University of Oslo, Norway	fabian.hoffmann@stv.uio.no	Remotely
Mr. Artur Kacprzyk	The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)	kacprzyk@pism.pl	In-person

10C: Learning How to Deter: Governance, Strategy & Training
Wednesday, February 7th, 2:00-3:30 Location: Mahan Hall B6
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Dr. Robert G. Bell	CSDS/VUB and Georgia Tech	nscbell@aol.com	Remotely
Discussant			
Dr. Edward T. Canuel		TBD	TBD
Michael Goldfien, PhD		michael.goldfien@usnwc.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
MAJ Todd Graham	United States Military Academy	todd.graham@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Landon Stauffer	United States Military Academy	landon.stauffer@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Colonel Bryan Frizzelle, PhD	U.S. Army / Strategic Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)	bryan.frizzelle@gmail.com	Remotely
Dr. James Platte, COL Christopher M. Whelan, Dr. Michael Bonura	United States Army Combined Arms Center (TRADOC)	james.e.platte2.civ@army.mil; christopher.m.whelan2.mil@army.mil	In-person
CPT Victoria Henley	Massachusetts Institute of Technology	vhenley@mit.edu	In-person
Major Ryan Van Wie	US Army	ryan.c.vanwie.mil@army.mil	Remotely
Prof. Maria Mälksoo	University of Copenhagen	maria.malksoo@ifs.ku.dk	In-person

10D: Fear and Terror: Nukes, Missiles, Drones, and Deterrence Wednesday, February 7th, 3:45-5:15 **Location:** Mahan Hall B6 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Colonel Christopher M Whelan	United States Army Combined Arms Center (TRADOC)	christopher.m.whelan2.mil@army.mil	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Malcolm Davis	The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, Australia	malcolmdavis@aspi.org.au	Remotely
Mr. Matthew Abbott	National Committee on North Korea	matthew.john.abbott@gmail.com	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT Eun-Soo Moon	United States Military Academy	eunsoo.moon@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Andrew Ellison	United States Military Academy	andrew.ellison@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Olga Raluca Chiriac	Black Sea Area Studies Center, University of Bucharest and Irregular Warfare Initiative, Modern War Institute	olga.r.chiriac@gmail.com	In-person
Ali Alkis	Hacettepe University	alialkis@hacettepe.edu.tr	Remotely
Dr. Jaganath "Jay" Sankaran	LBJ School of Public Affairs, UT Austin	jaganath.sankaran@gmail.com	In-person
Mr. Zachary Kallenborn & Mr. Marcel Plichta	George Mason University	zkallenborn@gmail.com	Remotely

10E: Preventing Proliferation & Weapons of Mass Destruction Thursday, February 8th, 9:30 **Location:** Mahan Hall B6 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Olga Raluca Chiriac		olga.r.chiriac@gmail.com	In-person
Discussant			
Carlton G. Haelig, PhD	University of Texas	chaelig@utexas.edu	In-person
Mr. Fabian Hoffman		fabian.hoffmann@stv.uio.no	Remotely
Rapporteur			
TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD
CDT Cora Nephew	United States Military Academy	cora.nephew@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Brandon Behlendorf & Dr. Gary Ackerman	University at Albany	bbehlendorf@albany.edu	In-person
Dr. Jiyoung Ko	Korea University	jyko@korea.ac.kr	Remotely
Mr. Matthew Abbott	National Committee on North Korea	matthew.john.abbott@gmail.com	In-person
Wannes Verstraete	Vrije Universiteit Brussel	Wannes.Johan.Verstraete@vub.be	Remotely

10F: Public Constraints on the Use of Force Thursday, February 8th,
11:15-12:45pm Location: Mahan Hall B6
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Dr. Jaganath "Jay" Sankaran	LBJ School of Public Affairs, UT Austin	jaganath.sankaran@gmail.com	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Maximilian Hoell		hoell1@llnl.gov	In-person
Dr. Jiyoung Ko	Korea University	fabian.hoffmann@stv.uio.no	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CDT Knox Watson	United States Military Academy	knox.watson@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT William Joo	United States Military Academy	william.joo@westpoint.edu	In-person
CDT Kathryn Scales	United States Military Academy	kathryn.scales@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Minseon Ku & Dr. Brian Finch	Dickey Center at Dartmouth	minseon.ku@dartmouth.edu	Remotely
Mr. Fahd Humayun	Tufts University	fahd.humayun@tufts.edu	In-person
Michael Goldfien, PhD	Assistant Professor, National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College	michael.goldfien@usnwc.edu	In-person
Prof. Michal Onderco	Erasmus University Rotterdam	onderco@essb.eur.nl	Remotely
Tyler Bowen, PhD & Michael Goldfien, PhD	United States Naval War College	tyler.bowen@usnwc.edu	In-person

Working Group 11: Irregular Warfare, Terrorism, and Security Force Assistance

POC: MAJ Ben Jebb, Benjamin.jebb@westpoint.edu & MAJ Erin Lemons, erin.lemons@westpoint.edu

11A: Implications for Reduction of SOF Forces Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 **Location:** Jefferson Hall 501 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
GEN Joseph L. Votel	Combating Terrorism Center		In-person
Discussant			
COL Sean Morrow	United States Military Academy	sean.morrow@westpoint.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
CDT John Kolb	United States Military Academy	john.kolb@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Douglas Livermore	Irregular Warfare Initiative	dolivermore@gmail.com	TBD
Dr. Jan Kallberg	George Washington University / New York University	jkallberg@gwu.edu	In-person
MAJ Dalton Fuss	Jon Hopkins SAIS	dfuss4@jhu.edu	Remotely

11B: Security Force Assistance and Strategic Competition Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm **Location:** Jefferson Hall 501 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
MAJ Erin M. Lemons, PhD	United States Military Academy	erin.lemons@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
COL Sean Morrow	United States Military Academy	sean.morrow@westpoint.edu	In-person
LTG (Ret) Sean MacFarland	US Army (Retired)	sean.b.macfarland@gmail.com	Remotely
Rapporteur			
LTC Nerea Cal	Yale University	nerea.cal@yale.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Chris Kilford, PhD	Queen's Centre for International and Defence Policy	cakilford@gmail.com	Remotely
Dr. Alex Neads	Durham University	alexander.neads@durham.ac.uk	In-person
Dr. Renanah Joyce	Brandeis University	renanahjoyce@brandeis.edu	In-person
LTC Sam Rosenberg	University of Texas	s.rosenberg@utexas.edu	Remotely
MAJ Erin Lemons, PhD	United States Military Academy	erin.lemons@westpoint.edu	In-person

11C: Irregular Warfare in the 21st Century Wednesday, February 7th, 1:45-3:30 Location: Jefferson Hall 501 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Dr. Sara Plana		sara.c.plana.civ@mail.mil	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Megan A. Stewart	University of Michigan	mgnstwrt@umich.edu	Remotely
Dr. Jason Lyall	Dartmouth	jason.lyall@dartmouth.edu	Remotely
Rapporteur			
Lt Col Joshua Stinson	Harvard University	joshua_stinson@g.harvard.edu	TBD
Panelists			
Dr. Gregory Smith	Syracuse University	gsmith28@syr.edu	In-person
Dr. Margaret J Foster	Duke University	m.jenkins.foster@gmail.com	Remotely
Zachariah Lee Parcels, MA and Michel Wyss, MA	Purdue University (Zachariah Lee Parcels), Military Academy at ETH Zurich (Michel Wyss)	zacwatsonparcels10@gmail.com, michel.wyss@milak.ethz.ch	In-person

11D: Principals, Agents, and Mechanisms of Control Wednesday, February 7th, 3:30-5:15 Location: Jefferson Hall 501 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
MAJ Ben Jebb	United States Military Academy	benjamin.jebb@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Jake Shapiro	Princeton University	jns@princeton.edu	In-person
LTG Jon Braga	US Army		In-person
Rapporteur			
LTC Matt Kuhlman	US Army / George Mason University	matthew.j.kuhlman3.mil@army.mil	In-person
Panelists			
Dr. Alexandra Chinchilla, Dr. Renanah Joyce	Texas A&M	achinchilla@tamu.edu	In-person
Dr. Niklas Karlen, Dr. Vladimir Rauta	Swedish Defence University; University of Reading	v.rauta@reading.ac.uk	In-person
MAJ Kyle Atwell	US Army	kyle.atwell@gmail.com	In-person
Prof. Barbara Elias	Bowdoin College	belias@bowdoin.edu	In-person
Prof. Jonathan D. Caverley	United States Naval War College	jon.caverley@usnwc.edu	In-person

11F: A Bridge Between Two Worlds – Formerly Armed Actor Reintegration and Mobilization and Implications for Int'l Security **Thursday, February 8th, 10:45-12:30pm** **Location:** Jefferson Hall 501 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Erin K. McFee, PhD	Irregular Warfare Initiative	erinmcfee@gmail.com	In-person
Discussant			
Luke Magyar	University of Chicago	magyarlj@uchicago.edu	Remotely
Rapporteur			
CDT Andrew Young	United States Military Academy	andrew.young@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Connor Christensen	University of Chicago	ctchristensen@uchicago.edu	TBD
Douglas Livermore	Irregular Warfare Initiative	dolivermore@gmail.com	In-person
Jonathan Röders	London School of Economics and Political Science	j.roders@lse.ac.uk	TBD

11G: The Persistent Threat of Terrorism Thursday, February 8th, 1:45-3:30 Location: Jefferson Hall 501 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
COL Catherine Crombe	US Army / Joint Staff	catherine.b.crombe.mil@mail.mil	In-person
Discussant			
Dr. Nakissa Jahanbani	United States Military Academy	nakissa.jahanbani@westpoint.edu	In-person
LTG Ken Tovo	US Army		In-person
Rapporteur			
1LT Ryan Bender	US Army	ryan.t.bender2.mil@army.mil	In-person
SSG Joseph Hotz	US Army		In-person
CDT Reagan Overton	United States Military Academy	reagan.overton@westpoint.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Tammy Palacios	Newlines Institute	tpalacios@newlinesinstitute.org	In-person
CW4 Patrick Schorn	US Army	patrick.p.schorn.mil@army.mil	In-person
Mark Berlin	George Washington University	markberlin2@gwmail.gwu.edu	Remotely
Sara Harmouch	American University	saharmouch@gmail.com	In-person

Working Group 12: A Strategy for DoD Industrial Policy POC: MAJ Caleb Stenholm, caleb.stenholm@westpoint.edu

12A: Capital – Defense Industrial Base Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-10:45 Location: Washington Hall 5114, B-Room **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Megghi Pengili		ptmp@leeds.ac.uk	In-person
Discussant			
Hon. Nicoletta Giordani	Director of Global Investment and Economic Security (GIES) (OSD)	lisa.m.difalco2.ctr@mail.mil; nicoletta.s.diordani.civ@mail.mil	In-person
Frank Finelli	Carlyle Group	frank.finelli@carlyle.com	In-person
Prof. J. Paul Dunne		john.dunne@uct.ac.za	Remotely
Rapporteur			
Samuel Gerstle	Boston University	sgerstle@bu.edu	In-person
Panelists			
Brig Gen (USAF Ret) Raymond E Franck & Jomana Amara, Ph.D., P.E.	USAF Academy (Professor Emeritus); Naval Postgraduate School	cfranck215@aol.com	In-person
Dr Daniel Fiott	Vrije Universiteit Brussel	daniel.fiott@vub.be	Remotely
Megghi Pengili	1)University of Leeds 2) Asst. Editor @ Civil Wars Journal (Taylor & Francis)	ptmp@leeds.ac.uk	In-person
Ms. Osebhahiemen Okooboh	Kennesaw State University	okoobohose@gmail.com	In-person
Nicolas Véron	Bruegel (Brussels) and Peterson Institute (Washington DC)	nicolas.veron@gmail.com	In-person

12B: Technology & Investment Wednesday, February 7th, 10:45-12:30pm Location: Washington Hall 5114, B-Room
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
Nick Houttekier		nick.houttekier@mil.be	In-person
Discussant			
Hon. Nazak Nikakhtar	Wiley Rein LLP	Nnikakhtar@wiley.law	In-person
Tony Porter	OCEA	patrick.porter.5@us.af.mil	TBD
Vasabjit Banerjee, PhD		Vasabjit_Banerjee@utk.edu	In-person
Rapporteur			
MAJ Caleb Stenholm	United States Military Academy	caleb.stenholm@westpoint.edu	In-person
Dr Daniel Fiott	Vrije Universiteit Brussel	daniel.fiott@vub.be	Remotely
Panelists			
Daisy Romanini, PhD student	Institute of Informatics and Telematics (IIT) at the Italian National Research Council (CNR) & IMT Scuola Alti Studi Lucca	daisy.romanini@iit.cnr.it	In-person
Liliana Filip, PhD	Visiting Lecturer at Regional Department for Defense Resources Management Studies, National Defense University, Romania	lilianafilip1@gmail.com	Remotely
Nick Houttekier	Royal Military Academy (Belgium) and Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB; Belgium)	nick.houttekier@mil.be	In-person
PhD candidate Eva Szego	ENSTA Paris	eva.szego@ensta-paris.fr	Remotely
Sanne Cornelia J. Verschuren	Boston University	sverschu@bu.edu	In-person

12C/D: Crowding Private Capital into a 21st Century Industrial Base for Defense Wednesday, February 7th, 1:45-5:30 Location: Washington Hall 5114, B-Room
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Chair			
MAJ Caleb Stenholm	United States Military Academy	caleb.stenholm@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Aaron Hood	Summit Carbon Solutions	TBD	TBD
Peter Gaudet	Campfire Capital	TBD	TBD
TBD	Office of Strategic Capital	TBD	TBD
Will George	R7 Ventures	TBD	TBD
William Dean	Department of Energy	TBD	TBD

12E/F: Streamlining Procurement Thursday, February 8th, 9:00-12:00pm Location: Mahan Hall C6 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
CPT Rachel Kim	United States Military Academy	rachel.kim@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
MG Claire Nestier	Former French Deputy Military Representative to NATO	clairenestier@hotmail.fr	Remotely
Brandy Szczesny	Project Linchpin / PEO-IEW&S PM IS&A		Remotely
William Bonvillian	McKinsey Consulting	TBD	Remotely
Lara Sayer	PPBE Reform Committee	TBD	Remotely
SES Jongsun Kim	OUSD R-E	TBD	Remotely

Working Group 13: Personal Economic Security POC: Mr. Jim Walker,

james.walker@westpoint.edu

13A: Personal Economic Security Wednesday, February 7th, 9:00-12:00pm Location: Mahan Hall 116 **Teams Link:** Click here to join the meeting			
Chair			
Jim Walker, CFP	United States Military Academy	james.walker@westpoint.edu	In-person
Discussant			
Andrew Cohen	Director, DoD Financial Readiness		In-person
Robyn Mrosczcyk	Financial Education Program Manager, Army G9		In-person
Annamaria Lusardi, PhD	Senior Fellow, GFLEC - Stanford		In-person
Michael Boskin	Professor of Economics, Hoover Institution, Stanford University		Virtual
Bill Skimmyhorn	Associate Professor, College of William and Mary		Virtual
Catherine Walker O'Neal	Assistant Professor, University of Georgia		TBD
Tom Davidson	Founder and President, EVERFI		Virtual
Michael Barry	Managing Director, UBS Workplace Wealth Solutions		In-person
Matt Bahl	Co-Founder & Senior Partner, Financial Health Network		In-person
David Evetts	Assistant VP, USAAEF		In-person
MAJ Justin Erwin	United States Military Academy	justin.erwin@westpoint.edu	In-person
Tom Naratil	Finance Senior Fellow, United States Military Academy		In-person
Mickey Strasser	Finance Senior Fellow, United States Military Academy	mickey.strasser@westpoint.edu	In-person
MAJ Todd Graham	United States Military Academy	todd.graham@westpoint.edu	In-person

Special Working Group on Professional and Academic Writing and Publication

POC: LTC Jordan Becker, Jordan.becker@westpoint.edu

Public Facing Policy Outputs Thursday, February 8th, 1:45-3:30
Location: West Point Club
Teams Link: Click here to join the meeting

Moderator			
MAJ Zachary Griffiths	The Harding Project	zachary.e.griffiths.mil@army.mil	In-person
Panelists			
Megghi Pengili	Civil Wars	ptmp@leeds.ac.uk	In-person
John Amble, Pat Sullivan	MWI, United States Military Academy	john.amble@westpoint.edu	In-person
Christos Kollias	Defence and Peace Economics	kollias@uth.gr	Remotely
Dr. Daniel Fiott	CSDS Policy Briefs	daniel.fiott@vub.be	Remotely
Nicholas Danforth	War on the Rocks	nicholas.l.danforth@gmail.com	TBD
Simon Smith	Defence Studies	simon.smith@staffs.ac.uk	Remotely
Olivier Schmitt (T)	European Journal of International Security, Review of International Studies	schmitt@sam.sdu.dk	Remotely
Rick Landgraf	Texas National Security Review	rick.landgraf@tnsr.org	Remotely

Select Panel Essays

The essays below reflect select individual panels' inputs to the working group chapters above.

Why the human factor matters: approaches to military service and professionalism.

Todd Schmidt, Chiara Ruffa, Fabrizio Coticchia, Natalie Baker, Jake Barnes, Camily Widger, Jennifer Lin

This essay considers military professionalism and its future. Conscription and alliances address the broader factors shaping professionalism and defense force policies. Macro-level influences on the composition of defense forces help provide insights into rethinking or envisioning solutions to current challenges. Then, narrowing the focus, multifaceted connections between military service, professionalism, and gender are explored.

1. Military service and the contemporary international system

A professional crisis in the United States military threatens its ability to serve American society due to recruitment and retention. Causes are ascribed to internal perceptions of the profession's appropriate expertise and jurisdiction that conflict with demands from society and civilian leaders. Tensions exist in how the general citizenry thinks about and perceives the military and, in turn, how the military thinks about itself. Another question is what the US Military profession's role, in general, should be on behalf of contemporary American society.

Contemporary challenges are the root of the problem. One is the changing character of war. This has manifested in the creation of nuanced specialties in response. Cyber, nuclear, air, and maritime innovations directly attend to the dynamism of modern technology. Given many nations, including the US have capability problems. The military's role in other professions and communities needs clarification. This also includes pressures on the armed forces to adapt and conform to emerging societal norms, risks of politicization, and growing societal rejection of professionalism. How do we envision innovating the development of future professionals with expertise, considering difficulties in recruitment and retention?

Solutions are rooted in adapting expectations. It is crucial to acknowledge overall tensions in the culture of civil-military relations, as Richard Lacquement notes. The most pressing is crafting visions of the future without limitation. Barriers stem from disconnections between society and how it understands civil-military relations and deeply entrenched world views. For recruitment issues, we must question how we determine who can serve. Gender and the role of women in the military and combat come to mind. Restrictions on how the military engages in civilian life, and vice versa, are one source of conflict. Removing artificial barriers, such as prohibiting civilians from accessing services provided by military professionals, can better integrate both populations and provide familiarity with various expertise within the institution. Knowledge is also limited on the state of civ-mil tensions about medical care, of which the military has both efficient and specialized expertise. One innovative approach is to consider if military healthcare systems could treat civilians as a step towards meaningful civ-mil integration to address recruitment deficits creatively.

Gil Barndollar suggests military manpower is a critical resource and is not a problem for the United States alone. Practices of strategic deterrence are as relevant to the military profession in general, given the burgeoning Great Power Competition. The war in Ukraine persists, yet Russia has not utilized nuclear weapons. There is some evidence that tactical nuclear weapon use is unlikely, but questions remain about the role of conventional deterrence. It is believed that Russian intel misled Putin into thinking the invasion of Ukraine would be easy. However, the conflict has become a war

of attrition in its third year with massive consumption of materials and manpower. An array of new technologies in Ukraine demonstrates incremental increases in war. It is also the case that US allies struggle. The British Army, for example, is the smallest it's been since 1799 and below the threshold of strategic significance. In addition, Japan's military mirrors its larger society, which is shrinking in population. There has been no significant move to address military manpower shortfalls. New York, in 2022, was the only state that met its recruiting numbers. Despite problems, the United States has meaningful potential manpower advantages. In line with Mearsheimer, states seek to avoid wars of attrition. However, if success is assured, a state will initiate conflict through a war of attrition. The downside is that it is caped in a campaign of blitzkrieg or limited aims. Mearsheimer argues this will lead US adversaries to test strategic deterrence, which requires possibly rethinking who and how the military decides it can recruit in the future. One consideration is conscription.

What helps is to ask why countries implement conscription while others do not? Some general reasons are state security, ideology, foreign influences, and economic issues. A study by Simon Rotzer and Gary Uzonyi examined if conscription is higher in autocracies and that states that face war or have distinct rivals are more likely to engage in this practice. Conscription occurs in democracies and states that are at peace without a rival, which can be seen in nations like Latvia, Macedonia, and Mozambique. The author theorized conscription as a security policy, a way to avoid competition with the private sector, and a quick and efficient way to staff a military, and it became accepted by the public during major conflicts. It is further suggested that alliances serve as security policy in a dependable balance against threats that allows for the rapid increase of defensive power. The role of rivals as threats is also part of conscription. Conscription attempts to negatively impact rivals' behavior but also results in anxiety that can elicit emotional decisions that ultimately affect military capacity.

Levels of state security can lead to a need for arming, which elicits rapid methods of gaining military personnel through conscription practices. Thus, a country is less likely to implement conscription when it has alliance partners that can provide its defense. But this relationship is conditional on whether the country faces an interstate rivalry. Relatedly, rivalry is present when a country is more willing to implement conscription and find allies to increase its defensive security. As the number of allies increases, conscription decreases. Former British colonies demonstrate a significant relationship between the negative effects of conscription. Areas previously colonized by Britain are less likely to conscript. Here, the law of defensive alliances is always statistically significant. This suggests conscription is a substitute for allies. It was also found that countries implement conscription when they have no allies and no rivals. While there are aspects of protection and dependability that conscription affords, it provides a substitution for allies when facing interstate rivals. Alliances are an easier way to sell security to a populace. Further, theorizing is needed to understand what types of states are likely to conscript versus having solid alliances.

Conscription serves as a metaphor for human relationships. When humans are inducted into the military, conscription exists in using or threatening force, which essentially strips humans of their agency to not participate in the military. Pertinent here is the fallacy of correlation equals causation in the implication that conscription "causes" state security. It is important to ask how relationships and dysfunctions create threats or alignments in the first place.

2. **Dynamics of military service and military professionalism**

Connections between military service, gender, and professionalism are also meaningful. Claire Oto investigates connections between military service and the lethality of extremist attacks in the United States. Despite concerns regarding extremism among service members, Oto highlights the critical need to study the lethality of attacks. In an analysis of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from January 1970 to June 2021, Oto investigates over 3,000 incidents of terrorism, shedding light on the

backgrounds of approximately 900 perpetrators. Her findings challenge the notion that military service correlates with increased attack lethality. She suggests a slight decrease in lethality associated with military service. Considering factors such as group organization and ideology as better indicators of danger from extremist groups is essential. Preliminary coding of ideological affiliations suggests extreme right-wing ideology may be more closely associated with heightened attack lethality. While military service emerges as an independent variable, its nuanced nature warrants deeper examination. Unpacking military roles, ranks, and combat variations could enhance understanding of motivations for extremist behavior. Oto acknowledges the need to expand data sources to mitigate endogeneity biases and provide richer insights into motivations behind extremist actions.

Natalie Baker discusses complex representations of femininity, focusing on why women commit violence. She shows why constraining women to limited notions of gender is problematic, especially when it comes to war. Drawing upon examples from mythology and contemporary conflict, Baker deconstructs femininity to show women perform violence for mostly the same reasons as men. This allows for the interrogation of essentialist ideals of gender. Both mythology and phenomenological thought are integrated here. Deconstructing gender/sex dualisms permits a nuanced view of women as central protagonists in their narratives and as active agents who often exert violence for their own will. This sheds light on consistent portrayals of women, particularly about violence, as either victims of men or unintelligent, passive agents when women enact violence for similar reasons as men.

Chiara Ruffa and Kristine Eck unpack military professionalism, its varied interpretations, and implications within different contexts. From institutional autonomy to volunteer forces, military professionalism encompasses a spectrum of attributes, reflecting evolving norms and practices within armed forces worldwide. They call for a more conscientious use of the term, urging scholars to delineate its components and consider diverse perspectives beyond Western-centric frameworks.

In conclusion, these studies contribute a richer understanding of military service, gender dynamics, and professional norms within conflict research. By probing complexities, researchers strive to unravel underlying mechanisms, challenge conventional narratives, and inform policy interventions to promote peace and security in a rapidly changing world.

Human Capital Development

Zachary Griffiths & Max Margulies

The United States military faces major challenges in human capital development and retention. As recent accession shortfalls show, the recruitment and retention of service members requires innovative approaches. This essay explores the insights and solutions proposed by three presentations: Vicenzo Bove's analysis of the recruitment crisis in European militaries, Jordan Marcusse's development of the Retention Prediction Model-Army (RPM-A), and Hannah Smith's examination of optimizing Army influencer social media marketing strategies.

Each of these ongoing research efforts tackles a distinct element of the problem. Bove examines the pressures facing human capital development, and encourages us to look beyond our own backyard for solutions by situating these pressures in a comparative context. Marcusse's presentation of a novel Retention Prediction Model developed with and for the Army provides insight into some of the data and tools the service currently has at its disposal for understanding and managing the problem within its ranks. Smith, meanwhile, provides a valuable analysis of what the Army has done—and can do—to cast a wider net for recruiting talent.

As these diverse perspectives show, addressing the challenges of recruiting and retention requires a strategy that combines data-driven analytics, innovative marketing approaches, and a nuanced

understanding of the economic and cultural factors influencing potential recruits and current service members. In exploring the insights of each of these presentations and putting them in conversation with each other, this essay aims to provide actionable insights for military leaders, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to enhance strategies for human capital development and retention, ultimately strengthening the military's operational readiness and effectiveness.

Human Capital Pressures in European Militaries

While we often think of the recruiting crisis as a uniquely American phenomenon, adopting too narrow a view of its potential causes risks focusing our efforts to address in the wrong places. The recruitment crisis in European militaries, as analyzed by Vicenzo Bove, highlights that many of our allies and partners in the European Union may be facing similar pressures. Over the past two decades, there has been a noticeable decline in military personnel numbers across Europe. This decline is steeper compared to global counterparts, indicating unique pressures within the European context. While this does not necessarily account for European militaries' recruiting targets or their military strategies, it nonetheless reflects a troubling trend that may hinder their ability to respond to emerging crises.

Bove's research delves into the root causes of this recruitment crisis, identifying two main arguments: economic and cultural. The economic argument suggests that labor-market competition significantly erodes the pool of eligible military candidates. Through an analysis utilizing the EU labor force survey, Bove plans to examine how local economic shocks, such as business closures or economic downturns, influence military enrollment rates. This approach aims to understand the socio-economic factors driving or deterring military service.

On the cultural front, Bove hypothesizes that a growing divide between civilian and military populations in attitudes and policy preferences diminishes the military's appeal as a career choice. This cultural gap is explored through surveys on values and attitudes, investigating the socio-economic indicators and values that correlate with military service. Preliminary findings suggest that military personnel tend to prioritize traditions, authority, and have more conservative political views compared to the civilian population. However, these gaps are not prohibitively large and have been narrowing over time for some metrics, raising questions about the normalization of military service and its impact on recruitment attractiveness.

Together, Bove's two explanations reflect an important truth about human capital in the military: without conscription to make up for any shortfalls, all-volunteer militaries must find ways to appeal to the populations from which they are drawn; states can manipulate both economic and sociocultural incentives to do this. However, other variables that are outside the military's control can also shape the recruiting environment, including the security environment, demographic shifts, and the potential cultural and economic overlaps influencing recruitment.

In sum, as in the United States, European militaries are subject to both economic and cultural pressures on their military recruitment. Bove's ongoing research aims to unpack these complexities, offering a clearer picture of the challenges and potential strategies for addressing the dwindling numbers of military personnel in Europe. It will be important to understand not only the constraints facing our allies and partners' ability to contribute to collective security in Europe, but also what lessons can we apply to the recruitment problem on the homefront.

Analytical Perspectives on Pressures

Improved retention can offset some of the pressures facing the broader recruiting environment. Jordan Marcusse's Retention Prediction Model-Army (RPM-A) introduces a transformative analytical perspective on addressing human capital pressures within the military. This advanced tool employs machine learning algorithms to forecast the retention probabilities of individual Army members by analyzing vast datasets to identify patterns of stay or departure. The RPM-A's future developments, including the integration into the Army Person-Event Data Environment (Army PDE), aim to offer senior leaders a dynamic dashboard for strategic personnel management and to extend its application to the enlisted population.

The model's utility in predicting future shortfalls, particularly among critical roles such as senior cyber officers or high-performing officers, showcases the strategic advantage of leveraging big data analytics in military personnel management. By processing extensive data through its algorithm, RPM-A can forecast retention trends up to five years in advance with significant accuracy (82.2% over three years), outperforming traditional person-rank-branch analyses. This makes it a valuable tool for identifying correlates of career long-service versus early separation, as well as major patterns in who stays in and when.

However, the model's reliance on historical data to predict future trends necessitates careful consideration, as it cannot establish causality, only correlations. This limitation underscores the importance of using the model's outputs to supplement, rather than dictate, individual-level career management decisions, due to both ethical concerns and the potential inaccuracy at the individual level.

As with any model, it is only as good as the data that goes into it—and the questions senior leaders ask it. While the RPM-A considers an impressive array of data, models might be improved by including variables such as types of dependents, the importance of raters or senior raters, commissioning sources, types of deployment, and the impact of civilian education. These suggestions might enhance the model's predictive accuracy and relevance for policymaking, highlighting the potential for the RPM-A to test the effectiveness of Army programs on retention outcomes. Similarly, it is important to communicate its findings to senior leaders carefully to avoid unintended consequences or perverse incentive structures that could arise from misinterpretation of data, such as cutting education funding based on a correlation between civilian education and early departure from the military.

In conclusion, the RPM-A represents a significant leap forward in using analytical tools to understand and address human capital pressures within the Army. By continuously refining and expanding its variables and predictive capabilities, the model offers a promising avenue for strategic talent management and policy development aimed at enhancing retention and addressing potential shortfalls in the force.

Engaging the Public as a Response to Challenges

Hannah Smith's exploration into Army influencer social media marketing strategies offers a contemporary response to the recruitment challenges and human capital pressures facing the military. This initiative seeks to bridge the civilian-military gap by leveraging the power of social media to transform public perceptions of the Army and

meet potential recruits where they are most active. With the propensity to serve at an all-time low, Smith's research underscores the importance of adapting to the digital landscape where 90% of Americans aged 18-29 are engaged on platforms like TikTok.

The Army's strategic shift to engage influencers—ranging from micro to macro specialists—in paid partnerships marks a novel approach in military marketing. This effort, however, is not without its critiques, including concerns over the misuse of taxpayer dollars and the authenticity of content. Feedback from the research community suggests the need for a more nuanced understanding of the civ-mil gap, questioning the impact of non-serving influencers on recruitment and advocating for a clearer demonstration of return on investment compared to traditional outreach methods.

Smith's findings highlight the critical attributes for successful influencer collaborations: relevance, reach, and especially resonance with authenticity being paramount. The public's desire for relatable and genuine content on social media suggests that the Army's messaging must balance sincerity with its institutional image. The comparative effectiveness of influencer marketing, particularly against the backdrop of large-scale traditional advertising campaigns, suggests a potential pivot towards more grassroots, authentic engagement strategies, exemplified by the high impact of unpaid soldiers sharing their experiences online. While there are certainly challenges to such an approach, the Army would not need to reinvent the wheel: it could look to the Navy's Digital Ambassador program for important lessons.

The Army's response to human capital challenges through influencer marketing represents a forward-thinking adaptation to contemporary media landscapes. By prioritizing authenticity, relatability, and strategic investment in digital platforms, the Army can enhance its recruitment efforts, potentially setting a precedent for low-cost, high-impact solutions to bridging the civ-mil gap and attracting the next generation of service members.

CONCLUSION

Armed forces today face tough human capital challenges that require thoughtful responses. As Vincent Bove showed, the recruitment crisis in European militaries is exacerbated by economic and cultural factors, leading to a steep decline in military personnel. Additionally, Jordan Marcusse's development of the Retention Prediction Model-Army (RPM-A) illustrates the potential of leveraging advanced analytics to predict and understand retention trends. With its ability to forecast individual service member retention probabilities, this model highlights the importance of data-driven decision-making. Finally, Hannah Smith's research into optimizing Army influencer social media marketing strategies points to the evolving landscape of recruitment in the digital age. The effectiveness of genuine, relatable content in bridging the civ-mil gap and enhancing recruitment efforts suggests a broader application of social media strategies.

These presentations also demonstrate the interrelationship between recruitment and retention. Recent and active servicemembers are an important source of information about the military to the general public. High levels of job satisfaction will not only reduce the rate of churn the Army needs to respond to, but can also help communicate positive stories of military service.

Key Takeaways and Actions for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs:

- Adopt a Multifaceted Approach to Recruitment and Retention: Recognize and address the economic and cultural factors impacting military service appeal. Support initiatives that make the military an attractive career option for diverse demographic groups.
- Leverage Advanced Analytics: Promote the informed use of predictive analytics tools like the RPM-A across all services to better understand and act on retention challenges. This could involve setting up a task force to explore the integration of similar models tailored to each service's unique needs.
- Embrace Digital Engagement: Encourage the services to develop and implement digital marketing strategies that resonate with younger populations. This includes expanding the use of social media influencers, focusing on authenticity and relatability in content creation.
- Facilitate Cross-Service Learning: Foster a culture of knowledge sharing and collaboration across the services to ensure that successful practices in one branch can inform strategies in others. This could involve creating a joint committee focused on human capital development and retention strategies.
- Prioritize Ethical Considerations and Authenticity: Ensure that adopting new technologies and marketing strategies maintains a commitment to ethical standards and authenticity, preserving the trust and respect of both the service members and the public.

By taking these actions, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can significantly contribute to improving human capital development and retention within the military, ensuring that the armed forces remain robust, resilient, and ready to meet future challenges.

West Point Panel 8B – NATO Deterrence and Defence

Participants: Boswinkel Lotje, Du Bois Cind, Elgin Katherine, Frizzelle Bryan, Giordani Nicoletta, Kollias Christos, Lanoska Alexander, and Mulaj Isa

Panel Theme

As part of the working group on Alliances and International Security this panel focuses on NATO deterrence and defence. Highlighted by Colonel Bryan Frizzelle, the connecting theme between the different papers and presentations is the intersection of both national and alliance resilience with respect to enabling deterrence and defence. First, Ms. Giordani presented an overview of the US National Defence Industrial Strategy, which emphasises redundant supply chains, flexible acquisition procedures, and increased workforce readiness. Next, Lanoszka et al. address the issue of NATO members' military assistance to Ukraine, they describe how the individual alliance members and NATO as a whole provide resilience to a partner in war. Relatedly, Mulaj's paper also speaks to the question of how to maintain a war effort through securing resources once in it. Kollias et al.'s paper addresses an important aspect of member states' resilience as it studies member national cybersecurity capabilities among alliance members. The three papers, combined with Ms. Giordani's presentation highlights that national resilience is essential to allied ability to deliver deterrence before a conflict, and to defend once a conflict has begun.

The overarching theme of the panel hence directly relates to Article 3 of the Treaty "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, *by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid,* will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." The underlying principle of resilience built into Article 3 goes right to the heart of deterrence and defence. As noted by Dr. Seth Johnston a session with this title would, only a few years ago, direct the discussions towards Article 5 collective defence measures. Today, in a time of hybrid warfare, the concepts of "deterrence and defence" touch upon both technological, economic and societal dimensions as we can witness in the current conflict in Ukraine but also when it comes to strategic competition with China. Hence, the current geopolitical landscape underscores the importance of 3 of the Washington Treaty as critical for deterrence and defence.

Ms. Giordani – *National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS)*

One of the prerogatives of resilience is of course related to a strong National Defence and Technological Industrial Base (DTIB). Hence, as an introduction to the session, Ms. Giordani presented the recently published US National Defence Industrial Strategy. As the Acting Principal Director of Global Investment and Economic Security (GIES), Ms. Giordani – and the larger Industrial Base Policy organization – is responsible for this strategy prioritising the strengthening of the national DTIB as identified as a priority in the 2022 National Defence Strategy (NDS). The strategy focuses on ensuring the resilience of the defence-industrial base in the United States but also its allies to support integrated deterrence. Challenges in this area arise amidst major shifts in the global arena, including peer-to-peer and near-to-peer competition that can no longer be thought of in terms of kinetic, traditional conflict. Ms Giordani emphasises the importance of economic warfare as a new domain while "it is not typically considered a DoD area of concern". Economic deterrence becomes one of four key priorities of the strategy and will demand new knowledge and capability building. More specifically, the NDIS highlights the importance of creating resilient supply chains, through 1) enhancing domestic production but also diversifying supplier bases; 2) promoting flexible acquisition, through leveraging existing authorities in the acquisition of dynamic capabilities while enhancing efficiency, maintainability, customisation and standardisation; 3) increasing workforce readiness, whereby attention should be paid to attracting workforce in manufacturing jobs as well as non-traditional recruitment areas; and 4) economic deterrence will promote fair and effective market mechanisms that support a resilient defence industrial ecosystem among the U.S. and close international allies. Also, in NATO (and the EU), discussions about economic security and deterrence can take place within the context of the NDIS. Production diplomacy will be key, of which AUKUS is a primary example. The question as to how to devise an economic security framework, and develop an alliance strategy around it, will be critical.

Lanoszka, Becker, and Parizek – *More Than Partial? NATO Members' Military Assistance to Ukraine*

In an update to a paper published last year on NATO members' assistance to Ukraine (2014-2022), Lanoszka et al. add new data to shed light on the significance of *Zeitenwende* and the resilience of the European support for Ukraine. These issues are key, not least as Ukraine's performance is very much contingent on Western aid yet US continued support is uncertain in light of upcoming elections and two-theatre competition. In this research note, Lanoszka et al. explore whether drivers of aid have changed with the addition of new data. They confirm previous findings indicating that previous strategic preparation in the form of investments in military readiness and infrastructure is positively associated with military aid to Ukraine. The often held belief that resource dependency on Russia has a negative impact on military support to Ukraine is not confirmed by their data. In contrast to their

previous study based on 2022 data, the 2023 numbers do not show a correlation between media saliency and support to Ukraine. As the authors suggest, this finding could be positive for Ukraine as after the October attacks of Hamas in Israel the media coverage of the Ukraine war has decreased. Based on their results, this decreased media coverage is not expected to result in lower military aid to Ukraine in 2024. One objection to this conclusion is that there may be a time lag: given the time it takes to decide on, coordinate and organise aid, outputs of 2023 aid could reflect decision-making in 2022 – with potential repercussions for aid expected in 2024. One could also question whether there is a correlation between media coverage and distance to Moscow which is one of the other independent variables in their model. It would be logical to see that these two variables are positively correlated, i.e. that media coverage of the Ukrainian conflict is larger in countries who are geographically closer to the conflict. Another aspect highlighted by the discussants relates to the indicator of aid. As the study looks at the monetary value of aid as a percentage of NATO members' GDP, it does not reflect the volume and content of aid. Yet in thinking about sustaining a war effort, this is also of critical importance.

Mulaj – *War on Energy Resources: From Hitler's "Directive No. 33" in 1941 to Putin's "Special Military Operation" in 2022*

Mulaj's paper compares two military operations from the angle of a war on energy resources and then tries to explain how this affects military strategy. He makes the case that economic motivations drove Hitler's invasion of Ukraine during WWII as well as Putin's current calculations vis-à-vis Ukraine. Especially in the first case, Mulaj makes a convincing case; and in the case of the 2022 invasion, as the war progressed, Putin diverted the focus to the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine which so far caused the bulk of casualties. There is a difference between conducting a war for resources and targeting resources within a war to support the war effort (that is ultimately waged for different motivations). Indeed, the current war shows how resources and industrial requirements are critical to sustaining war efforts (again touching upon the issue of resilience). This paper then also highlights how disentangling motivations for war remains one of the hardest and most difficult to predict questions in IR.

Kollias & Tzeremes – A Club Analysis of NATO Allies' Cyber Security Capabilities: United We Stand(?)

As the cyberspace is officially acknowledged as a domain of operations by NATO since 2016 a session on deterrence and defence has to include a paper on the allies' cyber security capabilities. In their paper, Kollias and Tzeremes study whether NATO allies converge in terms of perceptions of cyber security capabilities. The question of how NATO as an alliance and individual alliance members prepare and develop their cyber capabilities is key as cyberattacks on the alliance grow more frequent, complex, destructive and coercive. Building on convergence models the authors identify three convergent clubs in the group of NATO countries. Estonia seems to be the divergent ally as the country stands out with a very high score. Important to highlight for the interpretation of these results is that the authors use a perception index of cyber security capabilities. As such indices are subjective one should take into account the limitations of these indices as they can influenced by specific cases (e.g. a cyberattack with large media coverage). The paper is however a large contribution to the literature as measures of cybersecurity capabilities lack and are nevertheless important in the broader burden sharing debate. Hence, this paper promises an interesting research path.

CONCLUSION

As this session was entitled "deterrence and defence," all contributions can be related to some aspect of the Treaty's Article 3, specifically its underlying principle of resilience. This article defines resilience as both a national responsibility as well as a collective commitment. While the publication of the US's first NDIS exemplifies the former, the work by Kollias and Tzemeres touches more upon the latter. As providing military support to Ukraine is also a collective effort the paper of Lanoszka et al also nicely fits in this category. While Mulaj's paper focuses more on the preparation of war, his study also highlights the importance of the necessary economic resources. This underlines Ms Giordani's statement that economic deterrence will become key in the future. Looking towards the present war in Ukraine as well as NATO's future, the alliance's ability to deter– and if necessary, defend– truly hinges on whole-of-alliance resilience in both economic and military terms. The presentations and papers in this panel usefully advance understanding of these critical concepts.

Panel 8E Essay: Strategy, Sovereignty, and Burden Sharing

Chair: Eleftheris Vigne

Discussants: ***Gorana Grgić and Jan Havranek***
Rapporteur: ***Alessandro De Cicco***

This panel brought together diverse perspectives and critical insights into contemporary challenges and dynamics in the broader context of burden-sharing and transatlantic security cooperation. The breadth of topics covered reflects the complexity of the global landscape, spanning the Euro-American space collaboration, the survival of the European defense industry, patterns of free riding in NATO, and the nuanced examination of ideology-induced military spending. As we delve into the summary of these papers, we explore the intricate interplay between partnership and autonomy in space collaboration, navigate the crossroads faced by the European defense industry, unravel spatiotemporal patterns of free-riding within NATO, and engage in a nuanced debate on the ideological underpinnings of military spending. Together, these contributions offer a comprehensive and multifaceted exploration of key issues shaping the contemporary international security environment.

The Euro-American Space Collaboration in a Multipolar World (Gonzalez Munoz)

In the context of an increasingly multipolar world order, the paradigms of Euro-American space collaboration are shifting (Aliberti et al. 2023). The original space race between the United States (U.S.) and the USSR from the 1950s to the 70s changed due to the evolving geopolitical landscape, presenting a multipolar competition between the U.S., China, and other powers, including India (Bowen 2022). The dynamics at play in contemporary space exploration and utilization, alongside the resulting implications for space access, technology, and policy decisions, have enabled Euro-American collaboration to pool resources and expertise in advancing ambitious space projects.

The complex interplay between international partnerships and national or regional space interests informs the European countries' moves towards interdependence or strategic autonomy. For instance, Europe is pursuing a degree of independence in space matters by leading the Argonaut lunar lander in the field of lunar surface large logistics. However, without significant investment and political reform, it will be challenging for Europe to achieve strategic autonomy and power parity in space (Moltz 2019).

The European Space Agency (ESA) has shifted towards services provided by European launchers, which could potentially mirror the successes of the U.S. system. However, this shift also raises the question of turning fair competition between companies into competition between countries. Europe's preferred partner in space operations remains the U.S., with which it cooperates both bilaterally and multilaterally, including through NATO, UNOOSA, and the Artemis Accords.

The EU will struggle to compete or be independent from the U.S. in the space field. To achieve strategic autonomy, the EU must overcome challenges related to political reforms and significant investments (Damen 2022). The EU's commitment to strengthening its strategic autonomy in space is visible in initiatives such as the creation of IRIS2, a secure-connectivity satellite constellation, and the European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence. The Euro-American cooperation, characterized by joint initiatives and defense components, reflects a complex interplay between autonomy and cooperation, with the U.S. remaining Europe's preferred partner.

The European Defense Industry's Survival at a Crossroads (De Cicco, Lisi and Madaio)

Beyond the space domain, further reshaping of the security and defense cooperation between the EU and the U.S. is underway. This is due to the EU's pursuit of strategic autonomy alongside the adopted steps to tackle the long-standing deficiencies of the European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (EDITB). The rise of geopolitical tensions in its neighborhood has prompted the EU to put a remedy to decades of under-investment in defense, committing to the survival of its industry. Thus, new proposals stimulate joint defense research efforts between member states and funding collaborative capability development projects.

Moreover, through the EDIRPA and ASAP measures, Brussels signaled the intention to reinvigorate defense procurement and ramp up ammunition production. However, challenges for the European defense industry – concerning fragmentation, duplication, product availability, and third-country dependence – still lie ahead (Andersson 2023). The strategic partnership between the EU and the U.S is beyond question, as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) have signed the Administrative Arrangement (AA) in April 2023. Nevertheless, the EU's latest measures aim at, inter alia, mitigating the bloc's dependence on NATO and U.S. assets.

A systematic revision of the presented brief could enhance clarity by outlining contributing factors to optimistic and pessimistic scenarios (Biscop 2020). Emphasizing the distinction between perennial issues and novel challenges arising from the analysis would provide a more structured understanding of the long-term impact of the AA. This approach would enable a more comprehensive exploration of the strategic implications, addressing both the potential benefits of increased collaboration and the concerns about potential limitations on EU Member States' autonomy in defense investments. Integrating NATO into the broader analysis would contribute to an even more nuanced understanding of the intricate dynamics at play in transatlantic defense relations.

Some focal points, whether structural changes in EU-U.S. cooperation, or obstacles to the EU defense industry's survival, should be considered as hypotheses rather than research questions. The survival of the European defense industry and the fact that this is critical to the EU and the U.S. should be further explored. In particular, the EU institutions' point of view on the call for strategic autonomy should be tackled. The EU-U.S. defense cooperation is not homogenous, as deeper issues are at stake; for instance, the sense of urgency dictates the preferred choice acquisition choice. In the defense field, experience with previous equipment also matters and contributes to several other variables to influence the issue of dependency on a particular market. The impact of the AA on the defense sector is limited, although the denoted symbolism. Regardless of the EU's efforts towards more integration in defense, the vast majority of capabilities are still acquired nationally rather than jointly.

Unpacking Patterns of Free Riding in NATO (Kuokstyte, Kuokstis, and Becker)

In the realm of studies focusing on NATO allies, the concept of free riding, whereby some members gain benefits from collective defense efforts without contributing adequately, continues to pose a complex challenge in the alliance (Thies 2003). Following the logic of strategic interdependence, this study conceptualizes free riding as the tendency of an ally to reduce its defense spending in response to increases in defense spending by other allies (Cook et al. 2022). The empirical strategy integrates both spatial and temporal dimensions to address the complex issue of free riding within NATO. Recognizing that interdependence has a spatial dimension, the authors employ spatial models, specifically spatial autoregressive models, to account for the geographic relationships among NATO allies.

Regarding the tentative hypotheses, the authors posit that increases in personnel spending constitute a strong signal of an ally's commitment to strengthening its military capacity, as increasing personnel spending can incur high political costs. The decision to increase military personnel also has profound political implications within a society. Not only does this category already represent the largest share of defense budgets, but it also involves broader societal and political considerations. In addition, the authors point out a lack of evidence on the economic spill-ins from personnel spending, especially in situations where unemployment is not a serious problem.

Thus, the authors suggest that if other allies within the alliance significantly increase their personnel spending, a given country may interpret this as a signal of strong resolve. In such a scenario, the country is more likely to perceive greater incentives to reduce its own personnel expenditures. This hypothesis underscores the interconnected nature of defense budget decisions within NATO, where one nation's actions can influence the strategic calculus of others.

Increases in personnel expenditure and the resulting strong commitment to military capacity align with traditional notions of visible and tangible contributions to defense. However, the effectiveness of the strategic signaling – whereby a country is more likely to reduce its personnel spending if other allies increase theirs – may depend on the broader geopolitical context and the specific motivations driving personnel spending adjustments. A lack of defense spending in one country does not necessarily constitute an influencing factor for another country. Defense spending depends on countries' specificities and other intervening elements, including GDP outputs, economic performance, and structures.

Ideology Induced Military Spending: Nuancing the Debate (Du Bois)

In the context of burden sharing, the determinants for military spending are typically categorized into economic (e.g., GDP), security (spending of enemies and allies), and political (e.g., ideology) factors. Focusing on the latter category of variables, partisan theories emphasize the effect of ideology on military spending (Odehnal and Neubauer 2020; Potrafke 2020; Schmidt 1996).

Traditional dichotomy posits that right-wing governments are more hawkish and thus more in favor of higher levels of military spending, while left-wing governments have more dovish foreign policy preferences resulting in lower defense spending. According to the "welfare-in- disguise" line of thought, defense spending can have economic consequences through employment effects.

Building on this, partisan effects can be identified by comparing disaggregated levels of military

spending, i.e. relative military spending on personnel (welfare effects) versus relative military spending on equipment (security effects). Moreover, it is more efficient to use ideological indicators at the level of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) rather than at the level of the government, since it is the MoD who brings plans to the governments table. Furthermore, defence spending decision-making processes are limited by bureaucratic politics and institutional constraints. If these institutional constraints limit the maneuver space of the Minister, they also mitigate a possible partisan effect.

However, in those countries where state ideology was predominant – as it was the case for former socialist countries, the impact of ideological divides on government spending priorities may vary. Unlike in more established democracies where left-wing governments are often associated with greater social spending than right-wing governments, the dynamics in former socialist nations is less clear-cut. Instances where governments, ostensibly positioned right from the center, indulge in expansive spending highlight the influence of local political contexts.

In addition, the study suggests that the notion of "burden shifting" is essential to a better understanding of the nuances of the burden-sharing debate (Becker 2021). This notion refers to "the extent to which a country limits or decreases defence expenditures while at the same time favoring personnel over equipment modernization and readiness in the composition of defence budgets." This concept is critical to understanding how countries may appear to comply with the 2% rule but may not be contributing qualitatively to the readiness of their allies. The study also points out that the role of defense ministries should not be overlooked, as the personal backgrounds of key decision-makers in these ministries are important in determining the applicability of ideological indicators to defense spending. This underscores the need to consider the individual level, particularly the defense minister, when analyzing the factors influencing military spending decisions.

CONCLUSION

This panel has provided a rich tapestry of insights into the complex dynamics of defense cooperation and military spending. The discussions on the EU's quest for strategic autonomy in the space domain underscore the challenges of political reforms and the imperative of substantial investments. Initiatives like IRIS2 and the European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence exemplify the EU's commitment to fostering autonomy while navigating a delicate balance with the United States as its preferred partner. In the realm of EU-US defense cooperation, the nuanced

examination of acquisition preferences, dependency on particular markets, and the role of historical experience highlights the multifaceted nature of this collaboration. Furthermore, the interconnected nature of defense budget decisions within NATO, explored through the lens of personnel spending, further emphasizes the complex web of influences shaping strategic calculations among alliance members. Lastly, the partisan theories in military spending shed light on the ideological underpinnings and the potential economic consequences of defense expenditure, providing a nuanced understanding of the interplay between security, ideology, and economic considerations. Collectively, these contributions deepen our understanding of European and transatlantic security and defense policy, leaving some important questions for future observation and research.

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Adapting to Strategic Shocks in NATO's Core Peripheries

Gordon B. Davis, Jr., Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Paul Poast, and Martayn Van de Wall

It is often said that the world is becoming more interconnected. The same can be true for security. While security and defense could be narrowly considered, recent research and the war in Ukraine remind us that thinking holistically about security is critical.

Based upon a panel at the *States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century* conference at the United States Military Academy, this paper will consider lessons from Ukraine on two areas of interconnectedness with defense and military affairs. The first section examines the relationship between non-military strength and defense, highlighting the role of societal resilience and the private sector. The second section examines the interconnectivity of a different type: across regions. Together, these sections help address two key questions: How to defend Europe? And does what happen in Europe stay in Europe?

Defending through Non-Military Means

Even though wars may be largely fought between military forces, resilience and non-military services and capabilities are likely to have strong effects on war outcomes. Some states – including new NATO members Finland and Sweden – have a strong history of the concept of total defense, mobilizing the society to support defense and recognizing the need to ensure psychological preparedness for war and to ensure that the delivery of critical services continue during wartime.[477] Terms like "total defense" and "comprehensive security" encompass overlapping and related concepts, but both recognize the interconnectivity of security. The war in Ukraine has highlighted several aspects of this interconnectivity, including societal resilience and the role of the private sector in defense.

Societal Resilience

In part due to the rise in geopolitical competition, the concept of resilience has been revitalized in recent years to shape, defend against, and respond to potential adversarial aggression. Though resilience can also apply to natural disasters, much of this conversation within security communities took place around how to address 'gray zone' activities. For example, the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept asserted, "Strategic competitors test our resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness, and digitalization of our nations."[478]

[477] Björn von Sydow, "Resilience: Planning for Sweden's 'Total Defence,'" NATO Review, April 4, 2018, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/04/04/resilience-planning-for-swedens-total-defence/index.html; Jyri Raitasalo, "Finnish Defense 'Left of Bang,'" *PRISM* 10, no. 2 (March 2023), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3323915/finnish-defense-left-of-bang/https%3A%2F%2Fndupress.ndu.edu%2FMedia%2FNews%2FNews-Article-View%2FArticle%2F3323915%2Ffinnish-defense-left-of-bang%2F.

[478] "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept" (NATO, June 29, 2022), 3.

Societal resilience is the ability of a society to "resist and recover from attacks."[479] There are at least two dimensions to societal resilience: physical resilience and psychological preparedness or resolve.[480] The role of physical resilience in military affairs is in some ways more straightforward, but psychological preparedness is more difficult to measure.

However, the role of psychological preparedness has been made clear in the war in Ukraine. Several analysts have identified the Ukrainian people's willingness to fight, determination, and cohesion as having a key impact on the conflict.[481] Governments have also sought to learn lessons from the resilience that Ukraine has demonstrated.[482] Early work by Leitlande suggests that there are several lessons that can be drawn, including fostering a sense of nationalism, encouraging a tradition of robust civil society, and identifying key leadership traits.[483]

The Private Sector

The war in Ukraine has also highlighted the role the private sector can play on and behind the battlefield, particularly in cybersecurity, cloud computing, space, artificial intelligence, and communications.[484] Starlink, for example, has gotten significant attention as it provides internet and

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[479] Edward Hunter Christie and Kristine Berzina, "NATO and Societal Resilience: All Hands on Deck in an Age of War," Policy Brief (Washington, D.C: German Marshall Fund of the United States, July 2022), 2, https://www.gmfus.org/news/nato-and-societal-resilience-all-hands-deck-age-war.
For a more academic discussion, see, for example: Elena A. Korosteleva and Irina Petrova, "What Makes Communities Resilient in Times of Complexity and Change?," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 35, no. 2 (March 4, 2022): 137–57, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2021.2024145.

[480] Ben Caves et al., "Enhancing Defence's Contribution to Societal Resilience in the UK: Lessons from International Approaches" (RAND Corporation, October 21, 2021), 10, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1113-1.html.
In many ways, the concept of psychological resilience seems to be related to the concept of resolve. For a study of resolve in international relations, see, for example: Joshua D. Kertzer, *Resolve in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Danielle L. Lupton, *Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020).

[481] Peter Dickinson, "Ukraine's Remarkable Resilience May Prove Decisive in Long War with Russia," *Atlantic Council* (blog), August 29, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-remarkable-resilience-may-prove-decisive-in-long-war-with-russia/; Frederick W. Kagan and Mark Polyak, "Ukraine's Resilience Transcends the Battlefield," *TIME*, October 7, 2022, https://time.com/6220447/ukraines-resilience-transcends-the-battlefield/; Orysia Lutsevych, "How Ukraine's Invention and Resilience Confounds Russia," February 3, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-02/how-ukraines-invention-and-resilience-confounds-russia; Ishaan Tharoor, "Ukraine's Resilience Sets a Global Standard," *Washington Post*, December 14, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/14/ukraine-resilience-global-standard/; "Resilient Ukraine," Resilient Ukraine, accessed February 23, 2024, https://resilient-ukraine.org.

[482] Janez Lenarčič, "Lessons from Ukraine: strengthening European resilience" (Forum Ukraine, Stockholm, Sweden, May 4, 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/speech_23_2607; "Building Resilience for the Future: Lessons from Ukraine" (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, September 2023).

[483] Gita Leitlande, "Societal Resilience: Lessons of Ukrainians for NATO Nations" (States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century, West Point, New York, February 7, 2024).

[484] Franklin D Kramer, "The Role of the Private Sector in Warfare" (Washington, D.C: Atlantic Council, October 2023).
For more on the role of the private sector in defending Ukraine's information environment, see: Emma Schroeder and Sean Dack, "A Parallel Terrain: Public-Private Defense of the Ukrainian Information Environment"

communications to the Ukrainian population, government, and military.[485] Other companies have also contributed services to Ukraine's cause: Microsoft and Amazon, for example, moved data to cloud services to help secure data and connectivity; Google has created an air raid alerts app and expanded its anti-distributed denial-of-service software; Palantir's data analytics has provided battlefield intelligence to the Ukrainian military; and multiple commercial companies have provided satellite imagery.[486] Moreover, Western militaries rely on private contractors to provide a range of services behind the frontline, from port management to intelligence services.[487]

However, the involvement of private actors on the battlefield also brings risks. In 2022, a Russian official told the United Nations that "quasi-civilian infrastructure may be a legitimate target for a retaliatory strike."[488] Kramer has described the operational and coordinate activities that the private sector provides the "sixth domain," outlining several recommendations to ensure the resilience and security of those providing critical services.[489] Within the context of sea-based critical infrastructure, Tsaroucha has highlighted the need to consider how risk assessment interacts with the legal frameworks for regulating and enforcing risk reduction measures.[490] Given the importance of private actors in military affairs, ensuring their resilience and security is an important challenge facing defense policymakers.

Connections Across Regions

In addition to interconnectivity across sectors, the war in Ukraine has also revitalized conversations about interconnectivity between regions. How does the war in Ukraine – not a NATO member – impact security in NATO's area of responsibility? How does the reputation of the United States, NATO, or specific allies travel across scenarios in response to their actions towards the war in Ukraine? What lessons from the war are being learned by other countries?

(Washington, D.C: Atlantic Council, February 2023), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/a-parallel-terrain-public-private-defense-of-the-ukrainian-information-environment/.

[485] "How Elon Musk's Satellites Have Saved Ukraine and Changed Warfare," *The Economist*, January 5, 2023, https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/01/05/how-elon-musks-satellites-have-saved-ukraine-and-changed-warfare?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=17210591673&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQiAoeGuBhCBARIsAGfKY7zgA5AmSeu_9JFWyay7d8u8KV8OKk7q1CnIK8FQARX4-CbfO_FCh-YaAp6FEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds.

[486] Vera Bergengruen, "How Tech Giants Turned Ukraine Into an AI War Lab," *TIME*, February 8, 2024, https://time.com/6691662/ai-ukraine-war-palantir/; Irene Sánchez and José Ignacio Torreblanca, "Ukraine One Year on: When Tech Companies Go to War" (European Council on Foreign Relations, March 7, 2023), https://ecfr.eu/article/ukraine-one-year-on-when-tech-companies-go-to-war/.

[487] Heidi M. Peters, "Defense Primer: Department of Defense Contractors" (Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, January 17, 2023).

[488] Guy Faulconbridge, "Russia Warns West: We Can Target Your Commercial Satellites," *Reuters*, October 27, 2022, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-says-wests-commercial-satellites-could-be-targets-2022-10-27/.

[489] Kramer, "The Role of the Private Sector in Warfare."

[490] Lemonia Tsaroucha, "Critical Infrastructure Security in Europe: Ports and Assets at Sea" (States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century, West Point, New York, February 7, 2024).

Cores, Peripheries, and Mobility

Although Ukraine is not a NATO ally and NATO is not, nor are any of its member states, directly involved in the war, the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has had profound impacts on NATO member states' perceptions of security. In addition to revealing gaps in Europe's own capabilities and capacities, many European countries have dedicated new resources to a growing sense of threat from Russia, fearful that its aggression may expand beyond Ukraine. Instability does not limit itself by political bounds and can spread through several means, including risks of horizontal escalation, the flow of refugees, and impacts of global supply chains. In an increasingly interconnected and digital world, too, a lack of resilience in one country can have impacts elsewhere.[491] Connecting Ukraine and other countries to NATO members through overlapping organizational membership and outreach, including possible initiatives through the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), can provide additional avenues for increasing security.[492]

The flow of support into Ukraine has highlighted the necessity of having good military mobility and sustainment pathways. The need to improve military mobility within the NATO AOR is recognized by many, but, importantly, sectors outside of the military and geographies outside of NATO membership also affect military mobility and sustainment.[493] For example, 3SI's focus on energy, transportation, and communications can play a role in supporting not only commercial trade routes, but also in supporting military lines of communication. Ensuring the physical and digital resilience of maritime critical infrastructure is similarly important for both commercial goods and services and the flow of military assets in time of crisis and war.

Global Perceptions and Lessons

What happens in Europe may also not stay in Europe. Discourse about levels of U.S. support to Ukraine are frequently framed around the support's effects on other regions. Some claim that demonstrating resolve in Ukraine increases a U.S. reputation for resolve in other regions, while others argue that does resource investment in Ukraine detracts from the United States' credibility to successfully fight elsewhere. How are reputations for credibility formed?[494] Emergent research from Australia suggests that policymakers believe that reputations for resolve transfer between scenarios.[495]

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[491] Daniel S Hamilton and Hans Binnendijk, eds., *One Plus Four: Charting NATO's Future in an Age of Disruption*, NATO Task Force Report (Washington, D.C: Transatlantic Leadership Network, 2022), 15.
[492] Malgorzata Samojedny and Zuzanna Nowak, "Three Seas One Opportunity - New Wave" (States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century, West Point, New York, February 7, 2024).
[493] See, for example: Heinrich Brauss, Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French, "The CEPA Military Mobility Project" (Washington, D.C, March 3, 2021), https://cepa.org/comprehensive-reports/the-cepa-military-mobility-project/.
[494] For broader literature on reputation, see, for example: Lupton, *Reputation for Resolve*; Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*, Reprint edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010); Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Who Fights for Reputation*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
[495] Gorana Grgić, "Reputation Is (Not) Transferable: US Indo-Pacific Allies and the War in Ukraine" (States, Societies, and Security in the 21st Century, West Point, New York, February 7, 2024).

The messages that the war in Ukraine sends to other actors is by no means clear. Some argue that Russian success in Ukraine will suggest to other would-be aggressors that armed conflict is a viable means to achieve goals. For example, on the eve of the second anniversary of the war, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told an audience at the Munich Security Conference, "of course, if President Putin wins in Ukraine, it's not only challenging for the Ukrainians, but it sends a message not only to Putin, but also to Xi that when they use military force, they get what they want."[496] Leadership in China, like leadership in other countries, is likely watching the war closely, but there is a strong debate about what lessons they are actually learning.[497] Similarly, analysts debate what lessons Taiwan should be learning from the war – not to mention the lessons that the United States and Europe should be drawing.

CONCLUSIONS

Security is holistic. While the War in Ukraine is producing a host of lessons, from the continued relevance of mechanization on the battlefield to the intricacies of weapons supply, a critical lesson pertains to the broader impact, both within the war-fighting nations and globally, on how societies adapt to war.

The papers and presentations from this panel underscored the connections between military and non-military activities. Societal resilience and the performance of the commercial sector both play a crucial role in contemporary warfare and international competition. The War in Ukraine emphasizes how war is a political and economic phenomenon, not solely a matter of military affairs. The papers and presentations also emphasized geographic interconnectivity, examining how events in one region affect perceptions and events in others. A war in one region has economic and political influences beyond that region.

Military capabilities and capacity in the region are crucial, but they are impacted by a broader set of factors. Policymakers, in drawing lessons from the war in Ukraine, should pay careful attention to the interconnectivity between defense, resilience across a variety of issue-areas, the private sector, and varying geographies. The military operates within this broader context, and failure to account for that context will undermine the military's mission.

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[496] Jens Stoltenberg, "Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference Panel Discussion" (Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany, February 17, 2024), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_222630.htm.

[497] David Sacks, "What Is China Learning From Russia's War in Ukraine?," *Foreign Affairs*, May 16, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine; M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Potential Lessons from Ukraine for Conflict over Taiwan," *The Washington Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (July 3, 2023): 7–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2260141; Audrye Wong, "China's Economic Statecraft: Lessons Learned from Ukraine," *The Washington Quarterly* 46, no. 1 (January 2, 2023): 121–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2023.2188830; Joel Wuthnow, "Rightsizing Chinese Military: Lessons from Ukraine," Strategic Forum (Washington, D.C: Institute for National Strategic Studies (National Defense University), September 2022).

Panel Paper for Working Group 8D

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Panel Contributors: Jane Kaufmann, Lotje Boswinkel, Luis Simón, and Juhong Park

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Original Panel Name: Alliances: Causes and Consequences

Suggested Revision: Alignments and Alliances: Origins and Change

What explains how closely aligned any two states might be, and how might those alignments change over time? Countries obviously vary in how close they are to one another. On the one extreme, states could be at war with one another, hoping to use violence to impose their will on the other. On the other extreme, countries could have such tight interests that cooperation is easy and requires little, if any, policy adjustment.[498] Short of such extremes, countries often cooperate to varying degrees. Some groups of states even cultivate military alliances among themselves. Yet some states might still cooperate but eschew military alliances for various reasons.

Scholars have been at pains to distinguish between the related concepts of "alignment" and "alliance." According to James Morrow, alignments are relationships that are informal—that is to say, not underwritten by a treaty commitment—because "the common interest is obvious to all." Alignments thus do not need a political mechanism put in place to sustain what diplomatic and military cooperation might ensue between the aligned states, whether with respect to a "passing issue" or "over a longer period of time."[499] Military alliances, however, do involve a treaty commitment between two or more states wishing to coordinate their defense and foreign policies around a shared security challenge. All alliances reflect a degree of alignment. States must have common enough interests to want to establish and maintain one. Yet, not all alignments lead to alliances. In some instances, the aligned countries have such tightly bound interests with one another that none is necessary. In others, negotiating a mutually satisfactory treaty commitment would be too tricky for all sides because they disagree on more fundamental issues than those that are simply "passing." Regardless, states vary in how much they are congruent with one another in their interests.

Such distinctions do not simply serve academic purposes. They can have important policy consequences. The debate about which of the terms "alignment" or "alliance" best describes the relationship between Russia and China is indicative in this regard. All can agree that no formal treaty commitment exists between those two countries. Of course, they have concluded some agreements

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[498] Robert O Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 63.

[499] James D. Morrow, "Alliances: Why Write Them Down?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 1 (2000): 64-65.

with one another, but none have the international or domestic obligations as binding as what the U.S. has with its allies in NATO. Arguably, the most serious agreement that the two countries have struck is an executive one testifying to their strategic partnership, which they affirmed in February 2022 as being "without limits." Some observers still label their relationship as an alliance, given their expanding ties and shared dislike for liberalism. However, the fact that they have so far refrained from pledging mutual defense as a treaty commitment indicates a lack of common ambition or even trust. By this token, if they decide to elevate their alignment with each other through a treaty, then that would suggest that the two are ready to embark on a much more significant international political project.

This chapter takes up the issue of how alignments and alliances themselves vary. It reviews some recent scholarly work in so doing. Several conclusions are worth foreshadowing here. First, alignments do not just happen naturally. They are the result of political processes. Second, even alliances that feature deep security cooperation can loosen. Dealignment might be too strong of a word to use at times to describe instances of weakening alliance ties. Still, the point is that alignments and alliances are much more fluid than the international relations literature sometimes implies.

The Origins of Alignment

The folk wisdom about why countries might align with one another is that their interests overlap enough on one or more issues of importance to them. Their interests might overlap because of "realist" reasons: they need one another for their political survival and could think they have to pool their resources to balance a threat they both perceive. Their interests could also overlap for "liberal" reasons: they share the same basic set of political institutions, have leaders who hold the same values, and assess threats and friends through a common ideological lens. This folk wisdom has much to commend it, not least because it can explain many historical cases. They need not be mutually exclusive either. China and Russia are both autocratic and are led by men who have a clear distaste for liberal values, not least because they threaten their own power bases. Moreover, though they are both great powers, they still fall short militarily of what the U.S. and its network of alliances can pool together.[500] By collaborating more, they can balance better against that rival camp in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.

Yet alignment does not simply happen as if it were some organic or natural process. Recent literature has emerged on how states can adopt wedge strategies to undermine, if not prevent, enemy coalitions.[501] States can engage in activities that pull others into their orbit. Albert Hirschman famously showed how Nazi Germany used its commercial power to draw southeastern European countries closer, in part by empowering those business interests that would then support pro-German policies to ensure smooth trading relations.[502]

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[500] Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth. "The Myth of Multipolarity: American Power's Staying Power." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 102, no. 3 (2023): 76-91.

[501] See Timothy W. Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics," *International Security*, vol. 35, no. 4 (2011): 155-189.

[502] Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980).

Countries can shape alignments through their provision of foreign aid. In her working paper, Jane Kaufmann examines how aid affects alignment, which she measures with reference to voting patterns within the United Nations General Assembly.[503] She finds that countries receiving more aid from the U.S. generally align closer with that country, whereas countries receiving more aid from China will align with China. Her theoretical model for accounting for this finding differs from standard bargaining models whereby countries effectively pay for the alignment on the part of the other within a simple bilateral context.[504] Hers emphasizes geopolitical competition such that China and the U.S. use aid vis-à-vis a third country in what is a tug-of-war game. That side, with the greater provisioning of aid, will tug the recipient country closer. To be sure, reverse causality could be at play: certain states might already be leaning toward the U.S. and China, making them more likely to receive more aid from that particular donor. Given this concern, Kaufmann includes country-fixed effects in her model. Most interesting is that her findings reveal a first-mover advantage. A donor country wishing to regain lost ground in a contested influence space will find it hard to do so.

Of course, aid is not the only vector for shaping alignments, but it may yet grow in importance precisely because of the intensified geopolitical competition between China and the U.S.

Varieties of Alliances

Some alignments, even close ones, remain simply that: alignments. Others, however, become sufficiently strong that the states involved establish and maintain alliances. Those military alliances that do exist can still vary significantly. For example, they can vary in size, involving simply two in a bilateral framework or, to take NATO, as many as thirty-two members. They can also vary in how much institutionalized military cooperation exists, whether with respect to war-planning, defense plans, or acquisition. Germany's treaty alliance with Austria-Hungary prior to the First World War was a broad commitment, but everyday military-to-military cooperation was sparse. In contrast, the U.S. and South Korea are highly integrated, as South Korean forces would come under U.S. command in wartime.

To get at such variation, Loje Boswinkel and Luis Simón aim to classify formal defense commitments that the U.S. has at present, given their explicitness and inherent credibility.[505] As much as treaty-based alliances are the most explicit and institutionalized forms of alignment, they still vary in the believability of the promise to defend that these arrangements embody. The treaty language can vary in terms of its precision and conditionality.[506] Over the lifetime of the alliance, states can do things that affect how strong the treaty commitments are, irrespective of its founding language. States can go about relatively

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[503] Jane Kaufmann, "How to Buy Friends and Influence States: A Structure Estimation of Competing Aid Sources," working paper presented at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 6 February 2024.

[504] As Kaufmann reports, the literature due to date has been indeterminate in its assessment of the impact of aid on alignment. She argues that this indeterminacy is a result of the methodological decisions made.

[505] Lotje Boswinkel and Luis Simón, "Not All Allies Are Created Equal: A Hierarchy of U.S. Defence Commitments," working paper presented at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 6 February 2024.

[506] Tongfi Kim, "Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States," *Security Studies*, vol. 20, no. 3 (2011): 350-377.

cheap efforts that nevertheless tie their hands by implicating national or leadership credibility. For its part, the U.S. can use official statements, visits, and symbolic military gestures that pledge support in such a way that lends confidence to its fealty to the original treaty. The U.S. can also engage in costlier actions. These actions can include forward military deployments on an ally territory and combined forces integration under a unified command structure.

Another attribute of the alliance relationship i the willingness of the U.S. to support an ally if a militarized crisis implicating it breaks out. Factors could include where the ally is located and whether it is (sub)region receives priority from the United States. Japan is on the front-line with China, and so has more inherent importance than Portugal, which is geographically removed from any of the potential adversaries that the U.S. designates as a geopolitical competitor.[507] Other factors could relate to whether the ally has invested its own forces and plays functional roles that complement U.S. military operations and grand strategic goals. Iceland may not share a border with any U.S. geopolitical competitor. Nor does it have significant military capabilities. However, its position in the North Atlantic renders it important concerning anti-submarine warfare, especially because of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap.

Of course, within particular alliances may yet be indivisible. An attack on Portugal implicates Article 5 of the Washington Treaty as much as an attack on Iceland or, for that matter, Estonia. The credibility of the U.S. could be at stake, or so leaders might believe, in any Article 5 situation; however, one country might "rank." Short of such conditions, however, allies do vary in their value to each other. The U.S. might formally declare all its allies equal in standing, but in practice when resources and attention are scarce, it will have to make priorities.

Alliances and Dealignment

Boswinkel and Simón flag those attributes of a military alliance that can change over time. After all, in the years after the founding alliance treaty comes into force, economic fortunes can change, foreign policy interests might evolve, new leaders come to power, and old security threats can recede into the background while new ones take their place. As institutions, military alliances tend to be 'sticky' so that they can outlast major power shifts and leadership transitions.

Sometimes, military alliances can experience dramatic changes even when they still exist on paper. A excellent illustrative case is South Korea in the early 1970s. South Korea has formally been an ally of the U.S. thanks to their 1953 mutual defense treaty, signed shortly after the armistice that ended the fighting in the Korean War. To demonstrate further its loyalty and anti-communist credentials, South Korea contributed large numbers of its military forces to support the U.S. in the Vietnam War. Unfortunately for South Korea and the U.S., their military efforts stumbled: the North persevered despite high attrition, and the war became a deeply polarizing controversy in U.S. domestic politics. Towards the end of the 1960s, the United States was a spent force, undermined by mounting economic problems, a sense of overstretch, and a home front in turmoil. President Richard Nixon sought to rebalance U.S. foreign policy not long after coming to office. Though he escalated bombing campaigns

[507] James Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2018).

in the former Indochina, he sought to extricate the U.S. from the war, hoping to "Vietnamize" the conflict by shifting the main fighting burden to South Vietnam. He also put forward what became known as the Guam Doctrine—the notion that the U.S. would continue to provide nuclear-extended deterrence, but it would rely more on its allies for local conventional deterrence.[508]

Such was the context when Nixon announced, to the surprise of South Korea, the withdrawal of a whole troop division—the 7th Division—from the Korean peninsula by the end of 1971. How could Nixon carry out such a major alteration to the basic alliance relationship with South Korea? Characterizing the move as de-alignment would be an overstatement, but it did suggest that U.S. and South Korean interests may not have been as close as previously believed. Indeed, Nixon's unilateral move could have elicited much opposition, but the U.S president succeeded in this endeavor, although arguably, he wanted to withdraw all U.S Army ground troops from the Korean peninsula. Juhong Park develops an explanation that focuses on civil-military relations.[509] His theoretical model emphasizes, first, it emphasizes the degree of conflict between the executive and legislative preferences; second, the relative balance of conflict between those civilians and military elites; and third, how much the civilian leadership can effectively monitor and punish those military authorities tasked with implementing executive branch decisions. In Park's telling, institutional mechanisms were in place to create open communication channels between the relevant decision-makers. Nixon, the U.S. Congress, and the military leadership may have been united in their desire to contain communism, but they differed on which military strategies would best achieve that outcome. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed back against a more ambitious troop withdrawal, agreeing to withdraw one while modernizing the South Korean military to uphold the conventional deterrence of North Korea.

The South Korea-U.S. military alliance would survive Nixon's 1971 troop withdrawal. Other controversies threatened to break the relationship throughout the remainder of the 1970s, including alarm over South Korean human rights abuses, South Korean efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program, and President Jimmy Carter's thwarted plan to go about a complete withdrawal of all U.S. ground troops. Even now, concern abounds whether South Korea and the U.S. will become estranged. North Korea remains a threat, albeit one that tends to distract, without any apparent resolution, from other regional challenges.[510] Still, when so many U.S. military alliances seem to endure for many decades, the episode is a good reminder that military alliances can go through an existential crisis.

The literature on how military alliances come to an end is under-developed.[511] Presumably, before they expire, there was already a process of dealignment afoot. The interests diverge so that the value placed on the military alliance lessens with time, making it vulnerable to any abrupt alterations to the military and political substance that underpins the commitment. That process itself can be political and could

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[508] United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, PT. 1, Korea, 1969-1972*, vol. 10865 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010): 29.

[509] Juhong Park, US-Korea Alliance and US Forces Korea: US Troop Withdrawal from Korea, 1964-1971," working paper presented at the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 6 February 2024.

[510] Richard Lawless, "Nuclear North Korea and Japan: The INF Option," *The National Bureau of Asian Research*, 14 December 2020, https://www.nbr.org/publication/nuclear-north-korea-and-japan-the-inf-option/.

[511] For a review, see Alexander Lanoszka, *Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2022): 163-188.

be, as Park's analysis suggests, a function of the give-and-take between key political and military decision-makers.

CONCLUSION

Alignments may not necessarily involve alliances, but all alliances involve some degree of alignment. Moreover, alignments do not just emerge naturally. They are often cultivated and nurtured. If states agree to elevate their security relationships in the form of military alliances, they can still choose to back up those commitments with varying precision in their founding language as well as different levels of military investment and diplomatic support. Those attributes of an alliance can yet change over the lifetime of a military alliance. The papers this panel brings together speak to how alignments form, adjust, and even experience diminution.

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